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ABSTRACT 
 
CHRIS HIGGINBOTHAM: Lost Missiles and Lost Messages: How the Air Force 
Misplaced Six Nuclear Weapons Without Anyone Knowing 
(under the direction of Napoleon Byars, Queenie Byars and Derrick Crawford) 
 
When the Air Force accidentally shipped six nuclear weapons across the country, it led to 
a breakdown in the confidence of the American public in the service. As the Air Force 
took action to repair its procedures, a series of dated regulations and communication 
errors kept the service from repairing its reputation. The conflict between the need to 
inform and the need to protect national security led to an inconsistent communication 
strategy that hamstrung the service and left its credibility crippled in an extended and 
multifaceted crisis. This case study examines the Air Force‘s mistakes and provides 
suggestions for how the military can better communicate with its stakeholders. 
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Introduction 
 It was a typical Wednesday morning at Montana‘s Minot Air Force Base in 
August 2007. The mission: transfer 12 unarmed AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles to 
Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. It was one day of a multi-week operation to move 
the aging missiles into storage for retirement. Personnel began the day by removing 12 
steel cylinders from the base‘s secure weapons storage facility and had them loaded 
under the wings of an aging B-52 bomber by that evening. When the airmen went home 
for the day, the missiles hung under the wings of an aircraft protected by the base‘s 
standard security measures – an exterior fence and roving guards. They sat there until the 
plane took off the next morning. 
 This is standard operating procedure for shipping unarmed missiles. It was a 
mission the airmen at Minot had been performing for weeks, having already shipped 
more than 200 of the decommissioned missiles to Barksdale (Warrick & Pincus, 2007). 
The problem on this day – a problem which was not identified until 36 hours after those 
missiles were removed from storage – is that six of the missiles had been misidentified by 
Minot personnel. 
 The AGM-126 was designed to carry the W80-1 warhead, a nuclear warhead with 
the destructive capacity of up to 10 of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima (Warrick & 
Pincus, 2007). When the missile is disarmed, a dummy warhead is inserted to maintain 
the missile‘s proportions for flight purposes, leaving it with the same weight and basic 
visual profile. It was Thursday night before anyone realized that six of these bombs still 
carried live nuclear warheads. By that time, they had already been flown more than 1,000 
miles over American soil. The Air Force had flown six nuclear weapons over the heads of 
millions of Americans, unbeknownst to anyone in the world.  
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 Upon arriving at Barksdale on Thursday, the B-52 sat for another nine hours on a 
runway without the special guards required for nuclear weapons. While offloading the 
missiles that evening, an airman noticed something suspicious and notified a senior 
officer. Upon realizing there were nuclear weapons on the aircraft‘s wings, Barksdale 
commanders contacted the Pentagon (Warrick & Pincus, 2007). On Friday, Air Force 
Chief of Staff General Michael Moseley called Defense Secretary Robert Gates to notify 
him about the incident (Hoffman, 2007).  
Bent Spear 
 A Bent Spear incident was declared on Thursday night by the Pentagon‘s National 
Military Command Center (Warrick & Pincus, 2007). A Bent Spear involves the damage 
or temporary misplacement of a nuclear weapon. It is the second most serious nuclear 
mishap. A Broken Arrow – the loss, theft or accidental detonation of such a weapon – is 
the only more serious event (Warrick & Pincus, 2007). As Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) 
pointed out in subsequent testimony regarding the Minot incident, ―No breach of nuclear 
procedures of this magnitude had ever occurred previously,‖ (Schanz and Chapman, 
2008). 
Breakdown 
 The Air Force has several measures in place to prevent such an incident from 
happening. Regulations require several redundant steps to ensure that an oversight at one 
step will be caught at a subsequent step. It was clear from the start that not just one 
mistake led to this, rather a pattern of errors among a large team of airmen at two separate 
bases ensured that these security procedures failed (Hoffman, 2007).  
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 The eventual investigation of the event found five mistakes compounded on each 
other. First, the airman who had to move the weapons, which are stored in groups of six 
mounted to a pylon, failed to inspect the warheads before removing them from storage. 
The crews that operate the trailers that move weapons to the flightline began hooking the 
pylons onto the trailers while the pylon inspection was still going on. These two mistakes 
fed into the third mistake, when airmen didn‘t verify they were in possession of the 
correct weapons when they attached the pylons to the aircraft. The munitions control 
center also failed to check the serial numbers of the missiles being transported against the 
inventory database to make sure the right munitions were being moved. 
 After the weapons spent the night on the flightline, there was one more chance for 
the mistake to be noticed. The flight crew is required to do an inspection of its payload 
before any flight operation. The airmen who conducted the inspection only checked the 
weapons under one wing – the weapons that did belong on the flight. No one checked the 
weapons on the other wing. 
 This series of errors led to the Bent Spear and were included in the report the Air 
Force delivered to Congress regarding the investigation. 
Public Knowledge 
 These errors were made in August, but it was September before the Air Force 
released any information about it. Further, it was because of a leak that the information 
even got out. An anonymous leak from Air Force officers to a Military Times reporter led 
to the first story about the incident appearing in the Military Times on Sept. 4. Articles in 
the mainstream media followed on Sept. 5.  
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 A policy that forbade personnel from commenting on the location of nuclear 
warheads meant that the Air Force could confirm that there was an incident, but could not 
confirm that nuclear weapons were involved.  
The events led to a breakdown in the confidence civilian military leadership had 
in Air Force staff. In a time of uncertainty about nuclear proliferation in Iran and North 
Korea and nuclear security in Pakistan, it compromised the world‘s confidence in the 
United States as a secure and responsible nuclear power. Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-
Mass.) said after the event, "The complete breakdown of the Air Force command and 
control over enough nuclear weapons to destroy several cities has frightening 
implications not only for the Air Force, but for the security of our entire nuclear weapons 
stockpile." (White, 2007) 
 This is a situation in which the Air Force found itself in crisis. To make matters 
worse, Air Force leadership learned the following March that the service had mistakenly 
shipped nosecone assemblies for Minuteman missiles to Taiwan in 2006. These pieces of 
classified equipment had been mislabeled as helicopter batteries and quarterly inventory 
inspections failed to show that the items were missing. Taiwanese officials alerted 
American authorities to the mistake in early 2007, but it wasn‘t until March 2008 that Air 
Force authorities realized the gravity of the error. The Air Force again found itself in a 
situation in which it had mistakenly and unknowingly mishandled sensitive national 
security equipment. 
There was already existing tension between civilian military leadership – namely, 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates – and the Air Force, and these were obvious and 
serious errors that did not help alleviate that tension. The Air Force confounded the errors 
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with mistakes in its communication strategy, especially with early communication 
failures after the Bent Spear incident. Leaders allowed dated policies to direct the 
organization‘s early response to the situation and vastly underestimated the level of 
interest that the situation would generate.  
 This paper will analyze the Air Force‘s crisis communication strategy from the 
day the Bent Spear story broke until Air Force Chief of Staff Michael Moseley and 
Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne were asked to resign in June 2008. Using 
established communication strategies for high-reliability organizations (HROs) and crisis 
communication theory, this paper will examine the Air Force‘s initial reaction to the 
event, its prediction of media coverage and its reaction to media and internal government 
queries. The paper will conclude with a discussion of best practices for HRO‘s 
communicating in crises, recommendations about how the Air Force could have better 
communicated in this crisis, and recommendations about how the military in general can 
improve its ability to communicate rapidly in a crisis. 
The United States Air Force 
 The Air Force has played a constant role in the United States‘ nuclear capabilities. 
It is the only military organization in the world to have used nuclear weapons in combat, 
having launched nuclear strikes in Japan in 1945. During the Cold War, the Air Force 
operated the Strategic Air Command, or SAC, which stood on constant alert in case of a 
Russian strike (―U.S. Air Force‖). SAC‘s collection of nuclear-armed B-52s stayed armed 
and airborne as a constant deterrent and SAC also controlled the Trident and Minuteman 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that comprised the U.S.‘s counterstrike 
capability.  
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 Accidents involving nuclear weapons had happened before 2007 in the U.S. Air 
Force. Two important accidents happened in the 1960s that led to major changes in the 
way the Air Force operated with nuclear weapons. In 1966, a B-52 bomber collided with 
a KC-135 refueling aircraft while airborne over the Mediterranean, off the Spanish coast. 
The KC-135 exploded in air, killing all crew members. The B-52, which was loaded with 
four Mk28 hydrogen bombs, broke apart in the air, spilling its payload. One bomb fell 
into the sea and had to be recovered; the other three found land and leaked radioactive 
plutonium, contaminating a sizable portion of Spanish land. 
 In 1968, another B-52, also carrying four hydrogen bombs, declared an in-flight 
emergency when part of the aircraft caught fire over Greenland. The crew had to abandon 
the aircraft without performing an emergency landing. The plane crashed on sea ice and 
the nuclear payload again ruptured and spread radioactive contamination. After this 
accident, the Air Force initiated a review of its safety procedures and major changes were 
made in nuclear-weapon design to increase safety. Both of these missions were part of 
Cold War operations, when aircraft flew with armed nuclear weapons under their wings 
to offer both offensive and counter-strike capabilities against Soviet forces. 
 The Air Force maintains a vital role in the security and drawdown of the nation‘s 
nuclear arsenal. The SAC dissolved in 1992 and ultimately left three units under the 
command of the Air Combat Command to control the branch‘s nuclear arsenal – the 5th 
Bomb Wing in Minot, North Dakota; the 2
nd
 Bomb Wing in Barksdale, Louisiana and the 
509
th
 Bomb Wing in Whiteman, Missouri. These units are charged with maintaining 
America‘s aging ICBMs and nuclear warheads, as well as the missiles and bombers used 
to deploy said weapons. According to one Air Force officer who spent time in Minot in 
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the 90‘s, the aging equipment was constantly coming up for maintenance (Warrick & 
Pincus, 2007). The mission units of the 5
th
 Bomb Wing were conducting in August of 
2007 was part of an extended operation to retire 400 missiles of the 17-year-old AGM-
129 design. These were missiles the wing had been maintaining for years and 200 of 
them had already been shipped to Louisiana for retirement. 
Air Force Public Affairs  
 Like the other three branches of the Department of Defense – and the DoD itself – 
the Air Force has its own public affairs division, which is charged with handling the Air 
Force‘s internal and external communication. In the civilian world, the field would be 
called public relations.  
 Air Force public affairs operations are guided by Air Force Doctrine Document 
(AFDD) 2-5.3. The directive defines the role of public affairs as to inform the public to 
gain trust and support to aid in recruitment, training and sustainment of the Air Force. 
The directive makes clear the Air Force‘s goal of being a credible source of information 
to both internal and external audiences, stressing the importance of providing ―maximum 
disclosure of timely and accurate information as rapidly as possible,‖ (AFDD 2-5.3).  
Air Force public affairs is further governed by Department of Defense Directive 
(DoDD) 5122.5, which requires all branches of service to make timely and accurate 
information available to the public. 
Truth is the foundation of all public affairs operations, but public affairs operators 
have to strike a delicate balance between the need to inform the public and the need to 
maintain operational security (OPSEC). Information that could harm the service‘s ability 
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to operate or that could put troops at risk has to be protected. Information cannot, 
however, be withheld simply because it is unflattering.  
Lamb and McKee (2005) point out that public relations is a management function, 
meaning that the public relations team has the ear of management and can advise and 
make decisions about an organization‘s path forward in situations. In the military 
command structure, public affairs leaders are considered special staff, meaning a public 
affairs officer answers directly to the commander. This gives public affairs officers the 
ear of command, but the nature of the military rank system intervenes. While public 
affairs officers have the ear of command, there is usually a large separation in the level of 
rank between the two parties. For example, the Air Force chief of staff is a four-star 
general, while his public affairs officer – the highest ranking public affairs officer in the 
service – has only one star. And this is a unique situation; the current chief of public 
affairs is the first public affairs officer to make general in 11 years (Elsasser, 2011).   
Commanders have the ability to make decisions counter to the recommendations 
of their PAOs and even counter to the doctrine put forth in public affairs regulations.  
Crisis 
Crisis Defined 
 In evaluating the Air Force‘s loss of these weapons as a crisis communication 
study, it is first necessary to establish a definition of a crisis. Fishman (1999) points out 
that ―crisis‖ is largely an overused term. In common usage, just about anything that is a 
variance from the norm is called a crisis. It‘s important to make sure that ―crisis‖ is not 
used as an overly broad term, or crisis communication would be necessary for 
organizations on any given day. Coombs (2007) defines a crisis as ―the perception of an 
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unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can 
seriously impact an organization‘s performance and generate negative outcomes.‖ (p. 3) 
The term is defined on several levels by various sources and most share the same basic 
tenets: that crises are unpredictable and can negatively affect an organization‘s operations 
(Lee, 2008; Miller & Horsley, 2009; Barton, 1993). Coombs‘ definition is unique in the 
inclusion of the word ―perception,‖ signifying that it only takes a belief that an 
organization is in crisis to make an organization be in crisis. ―If stakeholders believe an 
organization is in crisis, a crisis does exist, and stakeholders will react to the organization 
as if it is in crisis.‖ (p. 3) 
 It‘s possible for organizations to have emergencies that do not result in crisis. This 
paper will discuss several organizations that went through an emergency, but by reacting 
properly, avoided crisis. Crises are unpredictable (Coombs, 2007; Miller & Horsley, 
2009; Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger, 2007). They are not, however, unforeseeable. As 
Coombs points out, wise organizations identify vulnerabilities in their operations and 
continually prepare for emergency situations. These organizations have a crisis 
management plan that clearly defines the role of every part of the organization during a 
crisis situation – including communication strategies. These plans are practiced regularly 
so the organization can identify weaknesses before the plan has to be put into action. 
 A prepared organization isn‘t immune to crisis, but it is more able to adequately 
react to one. Emergency management officials in California constantly prepare for 
wildfires. Firefighters practice fire prevention measures; emergency management 
officials plan their roles in communication and containment. Officials conduct annual 
assessments to plan for the likelihood and extent of the wildfire season. Even with this 
10 
 
level of preparation, fires in San Diego County in 2003 grew beyond the county‘s level of 
preparedness. (Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger, 2007). Before the fire broke out, Fire Chief Jeff 
Bowman was honest with the public and the media about the effect budget cuts had on 
his team‘s ability to prevent and react to a fire. So there was a crisis when a blaze broke 
free and the fire department had difficulty containing it, but because the organization had 
worked to maintain an open and honest relationship with the public before the crisis 
happened, the crisis didn‘t lead to a complete breakdown between the fire department and 
its stakeholders. 
 Crises have the potential to create a great breadth of impact. A crisis in one 
organization can affect an entire industry (Coombs, 2007). The 1996 crash of ValuJet 
flight 592 obviously had an immediate effect on ValuJet Airlines, as customers began to 
question the safety of the airline. That doubt quickly spread to the discount air travel 
market, as customers began to doubt the ability of low-rate airlines to maintain their 
fleets. On the day after the crash, the U.S. secretary of transportation made a statement to 
the American public, reassuring them that ―the entire aviation system‖ was safe 
(Fishman, 1999). This kind of reassurance would have been wholly unnecessary if 
officials were not worried about a single accident having an adverse affect on the entire 
aviation industry. Though it was only ValuJet that experienced the problem, the industry 
communicated to prevent the situation from affecting the entire industry. 
The Life of a Crisis  
 There are three basic stages in the life of a crisis: precrisis, crisis event and 
recovery (Coombs, 2007). Each of these macro levels has sub-stages that detail the 
evolution of a crisis. 
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 In the precrisis phase, organizations seek signs of and prepare for coming crises. 
As organizations monitor for warning signs, they remain prepared to take action to 
respond to warning signs in order to prevent incidents and emergencies from becoming 
crises (Coombs, 2007). Again, an incident does not become a crisis until it has a negative 
impact on an organization‘s mission. Typical steps taken in this phase are issues 
management, preparation of crisis communication plans and practicing crisis response 
scenarios. When the FDA began investigating phenolphthalein in laxatives in the 90‘s, 
Schering-Plough, the maker of a laxative called Correctol, decided to change the formula 
of its medicine to remove phenolphthalein. When the FDA found a link between 
phenolphthalein and cancer and pushed for a ban on the ingredient, Correctol was in 
position to avoid crisis. Schering-Plough publicized that it had removed phenolphthalein 
from its medicine more than a year earlier. Makers of other laxatives that used 
phenolphthalein were caught in a tough situation and were forced to recall their products. 
Because Schering-Plough practiced issues management and took steps to avoid crisis, the 
phenolphthalein issue never made it past the precrisis stage (Coombs, 2007). 
 The crisis event begins with some sort of trigger that signifies the beginning of the 
crisis (Coombs, 2007). In this phase, organizations recognize the onset of a crisis and act 
to contain it. This is where the training and planning conducted in the precrisis phase 
pays off. ―Crises are unique moments in the history of organizations,‖ (Ulmer, Sellnow & 
Seeger, 2009, p. 5). In the above example, the crisis event for companies like Novartis, 
which still used phenolphthalein in its laxatives, came when the FDA announced a 
potential link between phenolphthalein and cancer. Novartis hadn‘t been proactive in the 
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precrisis stage, forcing it to act to contain, instead of prevent the crisis. Novartis had to 
recall its products in order to prevent further damage to its operations.  
 The recovery phase is the end of the crisis. In this phase, organizations review the 
crisis and analyze how to better their responses for future crisis events (Coombs, 2007). 
It‘s important to mention that not all organizations reach this phase, as many 
organizations fail during a crisis. An organization that handles a crisis well is not only 
more likely to emerge from crisis, but can even emerge even stronger. 
 Importantly, AFDD 2-5.3 makes reference to this same notion of the three-stage 
life of a crisis in its guidance on how to operate public affairs missions. As the directive 
states, public affairs operations must be well planned (precrisis), executed (crisis event) 
and assessed (recovery).  
Communicating in a Crisis 
 Organizations rarely can predict when difficult situations will befall them, but they 
should work to prepare for the eventuality of emergencies. An organization that is 
cognizant of its vulnerabilities can act upon early signs of an emergency and lessen the 
chance of the situation escalating to the point of crisis. If a crisis is unavoidable, the 
prepared organization is more likely to come out of an emergency without going into 
crisis mode (Coombs, 2007). A prepared organization that does go into crisis is still in a 
better position than one that is not prepared. 
 Again, the important part of crisis communication is the preparation. Crisis 
communication doesn‘t begin with the crisis event, it begins at the precrisis stage, when 
organizations prepare for emergencies. Remember the example of how San Diego Fire 
Chief Jeff Bowman proactively communicated with the media and the public before a fire 
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got out of control and caused a crisis? Once the crisis event occurs, communicating is a 
whole new ball game; it‘s good to have credibility and positive relationships you‘re your 
stakeholders from the start.  
 Communicating in a crisis situation is different from everyday communication 
because normal rules no longer apply (Lee, 2008; Ulmer, Sellnow &Seeger, 2009). Crisis 
situations shorten a communicator‘s response time and have an impact on an entire 
organization‘s operations (Miller & Horsley, 2009; Coombs, 2007; Barton, 1993). When 
Tylenol capsules caused seven deaths in the Chicago area in 1982, the corporate 
communication team first heard about the situation from a reporter asking for comment. 
―As it was the first knowledge we had here in this department, we told him we knew 
nothing about it. In that first call we learned more from the reporter than he did from us," 
Assistant Director of Public Relations Robert Andrews said (Harris et al.). Not only was 
the media on to the story first, but people had already died as a result of using poisoned 
Tylenol products (Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger 2009). Johnson and Johnson had to figure 
out what was going on, then act quickly not only to communicate effectively, but also to 
prevent further deaths as a result of its products.  
 The Federal Emergency Management Agency obviously deals with emergencies 
and crises on a regular basis. In 2004, FEMA created the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) to establish common best-practices for government communication in 
times of crisis. The crisis communication strategy outlined by NIMS calls for ―maximum 
disclosure with minimum delay,‖ a phrase repeated in AFDD 2-5.3 (―NIMS website‖). 
This fits with Lee‘s (2008) example of government communication during the time 
immediately following 9/11. In the aftermath of the attacks in New York, Mayor Rudy 
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Giuliani had regular meetings with the press and served as the spokesman for the 
majority of the government‘s response to the crisis. His reports consisted of all of the 
information he had at the time, no matter how new it was. This meant he often had to 
adjust and correct information at later times (Lee, 2008). Even though accuracy was 
sometimes sacrificed in the name of immediacy, stakeholders believed the authorities 
weren‘t holding back information.  
 NIMS lays a framework for openness in communications and cooperation among 
relevant agencies when dealing with crisis. It‘s important for any organization to be able 
to act quickly and to maintain an open and transparent dialogue with stakeholders in 
order to communicate successfully during a crisis. 
 When an organization faces a crisis, Armisted (1996) says that two things that can 
save the organization are its crisis management plan and its credibility going into the 
crisis. 
 Crisis Management 
 Despite the potentially large and negative impact crises can have on organizations, 
many organizations fail to plan for crisis management (Coombs, 2007). Some 
organizations that do prepare will put a plan in place, but will overlook the importance of 
effective communication in their plan (Coombs, 2007; Miller & Horsley, 2009). This 
failure puts those organizations at a deficit during phase two of a crisis – the crisis event. 
While the other parts of the organization are reacting to the crisis in accordance to the 
crisis management plan, the communication arm is caught flat-footed. While the crisis is 
being contained, an expectation gap is forming with stakeholders who are left uninformed 
about the progress that‘s being made. Even though the organization is containing the 
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crisis, it‘s unable to communicate that fact, so as far as the stakeholders are concerned, 
the crisis is still out of control. 
  In their study of crisis management in the coal industry, Miller and Horsley 
(2009) found that even though many coal mining organizations had extensive crisis 
management plans in place, there was little emphasis on communication or media 
relations. Their research found two major themes existed in communicative efforts within 
the industry: First, there was a dearth of public relations personnel in crisis leadership. 
Second, there was a failure to balance the information needs of stakeholder groups 
(Miller & Horsley, 2009). An engrained hostility toward the media led the stated goals of 
crisis management plans to include strict instructions to corral media members, restrict 
their access to sites and assign ill-prepared organization members to media liaison work 
(Miller & Horsley, 2009). Some of these same themes have been present in military 
communication efforts, as will be discussed later. 
 Credibility 
 Crises affect corporations with good reputations as well as those with poor ones.  
Organizations that work to build credibility with stakeholder groups prior to a crisis face 
a distinct advantage in surviving a crisis. Like most industries, a key stakeholder group 
for New England-based Malden Mills, a textile factory owned by Aaron Feuerstein, is its 
workforce. Malden Mills twice faced crises in the 1980‘s and 90‘s, and the credibility 
Feuerstein built with his workforce by treating employees fairly and paying good wages 
helped the company survive both situations. 
 The first crisis came in the 1980‘s, when the company had to file for bankruptcy 
(Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger, 2007). Feuerstein approached his labor union and asked 
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permission to lay off a portion of the workforce, promising to hire back every employee 
once the company returned to profitability. The union went along with the agreement and 
Feuerstein stuck to his promise. This situation established the credibility Feuerstein 
needed in the in 1995, when a fire took down a portion of the operation. Feuerstein again 
stuck by his workforce and kept paying wages. The credibility he had developed in the 
past helped him get most of the company back in operation in 60 days (Ulmer, Sellnow & 
Seeger, 2007). 
High-Reliability Organizations 
 Just like the drug and coal industries, the military faces intense government 
scrutiny and attention from the media. In these operations, failure at a mission could lead 
to potential catastrophe. These traits are among those common to what are known as 
high-reliability organizations (HROs). The HRO concept has been applied to numerous 
operations meeting the standard of necessary successful operation in unpredictable 
circumstances, including prisoner transport, airport security, naval flight operations and 
coal mining (Dougall, Horsley & McLisky, 2008; Miller & Horsley, 2009). 
 HROs share many of these common traits (Dougall, Horsley & McLisky, 2008; 
Miller & Horsley, 2009): 
 Practice mindfulness 
 Have centralized command, with decision-making authority at all levels 
 Have tightly coupled operations 
 Share common understanding of goals among team members 
 Constant training in operations 
 Regular assessment of plans and execution 
 Redundant operations and safety checks reduce mistakes 
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 Operations are highly scrutinized by stakeholders and regulators 
 Allow autonomy among team members 
 Able to decentralize command 
 Show evidence of organizational learning 
 
 HRO research often focuses on mindfulness, which Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) 
define as a constant state of active awareness. The characteristics of mindfulness are  
a preoccupation with the potential for failure, a reluctance to simplify interpretations of 
potential crisis signs, a sensitivity to internal operations, a commitment to resilience and a 
deference to expertise.  
 The military fits into the concept of mindfulness in its operations, and further 
meets the other criteria of HROs. Specifically focusing on Air Force nuclear operations, 
units that handle nuclear weapons are preoccupied with the potential for failure. The 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) puts units through regular nuclear surety 
inspections, measuring a unit‘s ability to uphold nuclear security in an attack. Units are 
graded on the actions of the unit commanders and individual airmen in a variety of roles. 
The performance is then analyzed to provide a basis for constant improvement. In order 
for a unit to be authorized to protect, handle or transport nuclear weapons, it must be 
certified by the DTRA (Hoffman, 2008). 
 There is also a program in the military called the personnel reliability program 
(PRP), which is used to vet candidates who wish to work in certain fields. Before a 
member of the military can work in the storage and security of chemical or nuclear 
weapons, he/she must be approved in the PRP. This requires an extensive initial 
background check and continuing evaluations through employment. The focus on 
certifying units and vetting personnel above and beyond the standards of the majority of 
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the Air Force shows that the Air Force‘s nuclear operations are preoccupied with the 
potential for failure. 
 Air Force units are reluctant to simplify. Before moving weapons – especially 
nuclear weapons – a series of checks is required. Weapons are checked against an 
inventory by their identification numbers and visual inspections are conducted by a series 
of personnel, including flight crews if weapons are transported. Redundant checks by a 
series of personnel are designed to prevent accidents. It is a complicated system the Air 
Force relies on in the name of safety and security. 
 Air Force units are sensitive to operations, meaning leaders are concerned with the 
unexpected. Again, redundant security systems are in place to prevent accidents and 
operations are followed by after-action reports to indentify weaknesses, streamline 
operations and prevent mishaps. The Air Force Office for Lessons Learned exists as a 
central point for the study of operational mistakes and protocol for avoiding accidents. 
 The Air Force has a commitment to resilience. There is a hierarchical command 
structure that makes it easy for individual airmen to know from whom they should accept 
orders. Each airman does have decision-making authority in the absence of commanders, 
however, giving them the ability to react to the unexpected. Routines are established 
through constant training and rehearsals and airmen are expected to have a vast 
understanding of their respective roles. 
 Lastly, the Air Force defers to expertise. This is apparent in the specialization in 
jobs in the Air Force. The airmen put in charge of each facet of the mission are experts in 
their fields, whether it‘s security, air traffic control or administration. Decisions are not 
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always made at the top – sometimes they‘re made on the ground by the person with the 
most knowledge of the situation.  
 Expanding on the other characteristics of HROs, Air Force units have redundant 
safety operations, airmen at all levels are charged with decision-making, there is an active 
search for vulnerabilities, a constant focus on training and an understanding of common 
goals. Mission failure in Air Force operations leads to deaths, which is why the Air Force 
exhibits the other characteristics of high-reliability organizations. This paper will analyze 
the Air Force‘s response to the Bent Spear through the HRO lens. The HRO concept is 
important because of the nature of the mission in this case study – the safety and security 
of nuclear weapons and classified material. 
Military-Stakeholder Relationship 
 Again, another factor that plays heavily in an organization‘s ability to survive a 
crisis is its prior relationship with its stakeholders – its credibility. There is a lot to 
consider here, as the United States military was involved in two wars at the time of the 
Bent Spear. Lee (2008) says the media have a natural negative predisposition when 
covering institutions of the government, but research exists that shows the media are 
often more behind the government in times of war than in peacetime, which affects the 
status of the media-military relationship. The groundswell of the ―Support the Troops‖ 
movement among the public is another factor to consider, as the media and the citizenry 
are two of the Air Force‘s most important stakeholder groups. 
 Any history of the relationship between the military and the media has to go back 
at least to Vietnam. That was the war that the media brought into the living room of every 
American family that had a television. Many believe that the backlash in public opinion 
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against the war was caused by the media‘s unprecedented graphic coverage of Vietnam. 
Newspaper front pages bore images like those that came from the My Lai massacre and 
the nightly news brought moving images of the brutality of war to Americans‘ dinner 
tables. Some scholars point to this as what led to the backlash that ultimately led to 
America‘s defeat (Kumar, 2006).  
 Many scholars see the two military interventions in the 1980s, Grenada and 
Panama, as the military‘s revenge for what it saw as biased Vietnam coverage (Kumar, 
2006). Journalists weren‘t on the ground in Grenada, creating a complete blackout in 
coverage. In Panama in 1989, the invasion was announced only hours before 
commencing, preventing journalists from being on the ground for the onset of hostilities. 
The National Media Pool, born out of protests over the snubbing of the media in 
Grenada, was full of Washington experts who had little knowledge about the situation in 
Panama (Kumar, 2006). 
 The first gulf war was similar, with the military having great influence over where 
journalists went and what they saw, but more importantly, the military controlled what 
was released. Walter Cronkite testified before the Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs that the censorship being exercised by the military would create a hole in history 
where the conflict should be (Norris, 1991). Articles were submitted to military 
authorities for pre-publication approval, then held by military reviewers until the point 
that the information covered was no longer newsworthy. 
 In looking at these major conflicts preceding Operations Enduring Freedom and 
Iraqi Freedom, it‘s clear that there was a strained relationship between the military and 
the media. In Panama, then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said that he saw the 
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information flow from the war as a problem that he didn‘t trust the press to solve (Kumar, 
2006). Many scholars believe the control exerted by the military over the press was 
simply a way to prevent unflattering consequences of the war – civilian deaths, 
destruction, body counts – from being highlighted (Kumar, 2006; Norris, 1991).  
 This relationship with the media affected the military‘s relationship with 
numerous stakeholder groups, as the media represent the conduit through which 
information about the military reaches the public. It‘s important to understand that what 
can be perceived as a lack of credibility with the public could affect the way the public 
would react to bad news about the military. 
Strategic Crisis Communication Theory 
  Attribution theory states that ―people assign responsibility for negative, 
unexpected events,‖ (Coombs, 2007, p. 138). When something bad happens, people want 
someone/something to blame. Organizations pay attention to how stakeholders assign 
responsibility because of the potential affects blame can have on an organization‘s 
orientation. The level of responsibility for an incident that stakeholders attribute to an 
organization helps dictate how that organization should respond. Strategic crisis 
communication theory (SCCT) sets out communication strategies based on attribution. 
 There are three main considerations for gauging attribution. The organization‘s 
credibility ties in here. Prior reputation and crisis history, two points already discussed, 
are two of the main factors in estimating the amount of responsibility stakeholders will 
assign. The third factor is the type of crisis (Coombs, 2007). 
 According to SCCT, there are three types of crisis: victim, accidental and 
preventable. A victim crisis is one in which the organization is the victim of some act. 
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This could be anything from a crime, like the Tylenol poisoning mentioned earlier, to a 
natural disaster. These are crises that organizations can do little to prevent. There is little 
to no attribution of crisis responsibility in this type of crisis. 
 An accidental crisis also has a low crisis responsibility. An accidental crisis could 
be a plant fire, like the previous example that took place at Malden Mills.  
 The crisis with the highest level of attribution is a preventable crisis. A typical 
preventable crisis would be human error, and a good example is the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill (Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger, 2007). When oil companies began oil exploration in the 
Prince William Sound, environmental groups were loathe to accept it. When the Valdez 
ran aground in 1989, it proved many of the hesitations environmentalists held. Navigation 
errors by the ship‘s captain caused the ship to begin leaking oil into the sound. Then, 
Exxon‘s limited initial environmental response made the situation worse, allowing the oil 
to spread far and fast in a sensitive area. The public attributed the blame squarely on the 
shoulders of Exxon and the company was forced to deal with the situation for more than 
20 years after the spill, spending hundreds of millions of dollars in cleanup (Ulmer, 
Sellnow & Seeger, 2007). 
 The more attribution assigned to an organization, the more aggressive the 
communication strategy should be.  
The Bent Spear as a Crisis 
 In evaluating the definition of a crisis, we see that the Air Force found itself in a 
legitimate crisis in the latter part of 2007. The Bent Spear was an unpredictable event; no 
one knew it was coming. While leaders certainly recognized that nuclear-based 
operations were a potential vulnerability for the Air Force, few would have predicted, 
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given the redundant security measures in place, that it would have been possible to ship 
nuclear weapons across the country by accident. It would have perhaps been considered 
less likely for no one to even learn about the mistake for 36 hours. 
 The event certainly had a negative effect on Air Force operations. Once the 
incident was reported, Air Force nuclear operations halted. The Air Combat Command 
ordered a stand down of all units for personnel to analyze procedures. Nuclear handling 
units based at Minot and Barksdale were immediately stood down and the mandatory 
certifications the units need to handle nuclear weapons were revoked pending inspections 
of their procedures, an inspection which Minot‘s 5th Bomb Wing ultimately failed.  
 The initial investigation of the incident, completed in April 2008, led to the firing 
of three commanders who had reached the rank of colonel, one of whom was the 
commander of Minot Air Force Base. Some 65 airman of varying ranks who weren‘t 
fired had their status in the personnel reliability program revoked.  
 All of this was made worse with the later discovery that the Air Force shipped the 
Minuteman nosecones to Taiwan. This was a mistake that was actually made more than a 
year before the Bent Spear incident, but the mistake‘s discovery in 2008 proved to 
Department of Defense leadership that there was a pervasive problem within the Air 
Force. In June of 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced the resignations of 
the chief of staff and secretary of the Air Force, the two highest ranking people in the 
branch. This was a drastic move, but likely a necessary one in order to communicate to 
the public that the military genuinely recognized there was a problem. 
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The Study 
 So with the knowledge that the Bent Spear incident of 2007 was truly a crisis, it is 
possible to move forward with a case study analyzing the Air Force‘s crisis 
communication strategy. There are two primary questions to ask in this analysis: 
 
RQ1: What steps did the Air Force take as part of its crisis communication strategy? 
 
This question is important as part of any crisis communication case study. This paper 
will analyze the Air Force‘s steps at all three phases of the crisis lifespan – the 
precrisis, crisis event and recovery phases. The paper will analyze the evolution of 
media coverage from Aug. 29, 2007 – when the weapons in question were first 
removed from storage – up to June 5, 2008, when Air Force Secretary Michael Wynn 
and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Moseley were forced to retire. Since 
this is not a content analysis, these articles will be used to analyze the Air Force‘s key 
messages, how well those messages were emphasized, and how the Air Force reacted 
in communicating as the story evolved. Also used for the purpose of analyzing 
strategy will be transcripts of Air Force/DoD briefings and press conferences 
gathered from the Federal News Service. 
 
RQ2: How did regulations and the military command structure affect/potentially 
affect the execution of the Air Force‘s crisis communication strategy. 
 
It‘s important to recognize in this analysis that a branch of the military is different 
than a civilian organization. As discussed before, military command structure can get 
in the way of some doctrine when it comes to public affairs operations. Did the Air 
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Force leadership adhere to the doctrine of maximum disclosure with minimum delay? 
Did existing regulations get in the way of that doctrine? How did barricades to Air 
Force public affairs doctrine contribute to the situation becoming a crisis? Was the 
Air Force prepared for a situation like this? Was a crisis communication plan ready? 
 The timeline of the release of information relevant to the Bent Spear will be a 
crucial tool in answering these questions.  
Gathering Data  
 Using LexisNexis and the Military Times database, articles that covered the 
event were collected and monitored for the study. For the LexisNexis search, the terms 
―Air Force,‖ ―nuclear‖ and ―North Dakota‖ or ―Taiwan‖ were used and the timeframe 
was set to be between Aug. 29, 2007 and June 7, 2008. To narrow the field of results, 
sources were limited to the Washington Post and New York Times, domestic outlets with 
international exposure; the Bismarck Tribune, to provide a local perspective from the 
Minot, ND area; and the Federal News Service, to provide primary quotes from Air Force 
and DoD leadership from press conferences and briefings. The Military Times articles 
had to be gathered from the publication‘s online database. Articles were then combed 
through to make sure they contained relevant information about the Air Force‘s key 
messages and communication strategy throughout both the Bent Spear and the 
subsequent crisis regarding the Minuteman nosecones. 
  The paper will be structured to match the life of a crisis: precrisis, crisis event 
and recovery. The articles will be used to identify these stages in the Bent Spear incident 
and information from the articles and the interviews will provide insight into the 
communication strategy at each phase. These tactics will be compared to accepted 
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practices based on research literature and Air Force doctrine. Ultimately, this paper will 
provide insight into some of the weaknesses in military communication strategies and 
how improvements can be made. Discussion will include points regarding how the Air 
Force has applied lessons learned from this event to improve its communication practice. 
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Precrisis 
 
 As discussed earlier, the precrisis phase is a preparatory phase in the crisis 
communication effort. Organizations prepare for potential crises by identifying 
vulnerabilities, practicing issues management and preparing/practicing crisis management 
scenarios. Precrisis preparations are primarily internal, so it would be difficult to guess at 
what actions Minot units or Air Force command took without insight from public affairs 
officers within the service. Even without first-hand insight to the inner workings of Air 
Force public affairs, some idea of precrisis preparation can be gleaned by looking at Air 
Force policy and some other factors.  
Crisis Planning 
 Plausibility. 
 The Air Force had been in control of an arsenal of nuclear weapons for decades. 
The Strategic Air Command (SAC) had nuclear-armed B-52s continually flying over 
friendly soil throughout much of the Cold War, as a deterrent to Soviet nuclear 
aggression. These missions occurred largely without incident. The American citizenry 
grew confident in the abilities of the Air Force to secure the nation‘s most lethal weapons 
and the Air Force itself was likely similarly confident in its abilities. When mistakes were 
made, the public was able to accept them as an expected cost of deterrence. 
 As Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) would point out, government leaders had been 
promised for decades that the redundant security systems the Air Force had in place 
would never allow a nuclear mishap to take place. Minot‘s mission to retire the AGM-
129 missiles had been going on for more than three months by August 2007, with more 
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than 200 missiles shipped without incident. In their 2006 nuclear operations readiness 
inspection, the Warbirds of Minot‘s 5th Bomb Wing received an ―Excellent‖ rating. The 
officer in charge of the inspection team said the inspectors ―were truly impressed with the 
professionalism, devotion and dedication to the mission displayed throughout [the] 
inspection,‖ (Appendix B). 
 Crisis planning is contingent on the identification of vulnerabilities in an 
organization‘s mission. If the communication team does not recognize a vulnerability, it 
won‘t plan for the eventuality of a mistake. Their impressive record may have led 5th 
Bomb Wing leaders to lose sight of vulnerabilities, overly confident in the unit‘s ability. 
It‘s difficult to plan for an unforeseen situation, so if the Air Force let arrogance get in its 
way, that not only led to the mistake happening, but also the disjointed communication 
response to the mistake. 
 Another possibility is that the Air Force may have recognized the possibility of 
losing a nuclear weapon. After all, this wasn‘t the first time the service experienced a 
Bent Spear. In the past, though, constant nuclear options were a necessary evil in the face 
of standing up to the Iron Curtain. People were more likely to accept mistakes in 
recognition of that. In a post-Cold War era, though, the Air Force may have simply 
underestimated how much public perceptions changed when the threat of a nuclear-armed 
enemy diminished. A preliminary report regarding the Bent Spear conducted by Air 
Force officials shows that leaders were at least a little bit guilty of this (more on that 
later). The Air Force may have relied on an outdated response to handle a crisis in a new 
era.  
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Air Force doctrine. 
 Air Force Doctrine Directive (AFDD) 2-5.3 governs all public affairs actions for 
the Air Force. In regard to public affairs operations, the directive states that public affairs 
issues and requirements should be a part of planning in all areas of operation for the Air 
Force – both for wartime and peacetime.  
 The directive states that all operations need the integration of public affairs in 
planning and execution. This was put into practice for the operation to relocate and retire 
the AGM-129. For the operation to ship all of the aging ballistic missiles to Barksdale Air 
Force Base for retirement, the Air Force was active in informing the public. A March 
2007 Associated Press article explains the operation and its justification (Appendix A). 
There was not much press coverage, as this was probably expected to be a fairly 
uneventful mission in the midst of the Air Force‘s involvement in two wars in the Middle 
East. But the articles do show that the Air Force was seeking to inform the public about 
the operation in accordance with AFDD 2-5.3. 
 While there is an emphasis on strategic communication planning in the directive, 
there is no mention of the importance of crisis communication planning. The only 
mention of crisis in the document is in reference to military conflict. In the case of 
conflict, the directive explains the importance of superior performance in information 
operations and public affairs as being a weapon against the enemy. The crisis situation in 
this case study, however, did not have an enemy. There is no discussion of the 
importance of contingency planning for failure in non-combat operations.  
  With no onus in the Air Force‘s public affairs directive on preparing for crises in 
non-conflict operations, it is likely there was no crisis communication plan in place. Even 
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if there were a plan in place, why would it cover an area of operations that hasn‘t been 
identified as a vulnerability? 
Warning Signs? 
 Despite the overwhelming evidence that Air Force procedures and personnel made 
the likelihood of a nuclear mishap like what occurred at Minot appear minimal, there 
were signs that procedures in the nuclear realm were faltering. Joby Warrick and Walter 
Pincus reported in the Washington Post that the Bent Spear event ―came on the heels of 
multiple warnings -- some of which went to the highest levels of the Bush administration, 
including the National Security Council -- of security problems at Air Force installations 
where nuclear weapons are kept,‖ (Appendix C).  
 The Air Force was involved in two wars in 2007. This put a strain on all of the 
branches of the military, as service members were in constant rotation in and out of war 
zones. In 2003, when Operation Iraqi Freedom began, Minot‘s 5th Bomb Wing actually 
failed its nuclear surety inspection. Warrick and Pincus report that commanders cited the 
added stress of the second Middle East conflict as a contributing factor to the unit‘s 
failure.  
 The Air Force personnel situation compounded the stress from constant military 
operations. The service aimed to cut its size by 6.5 percent in 2007. Some airmen were 
offered money to leave the service early, others were forced into new jobs within the 
service. The uncertainty of deployment schedules and of restructuring within the service 
likely led many airmen to distraction, and may have hurt the morale of some members. 
On top of that, cutbacks in 2006 had already led to the termination of a unit that was 
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charged with tracking the inventory and maintenance of the American and NATO nuclear 
arsenal. So the Air Force was facing a heightened operational tempo, the uncertainty of 
personnel cutbacks and a decrease in oversight of nuclear operations. Future reports 
found that personnel issues had a direct impact on the service‘s ability to manage 
sensitive nuclear operations. 
Identifying hurdles. 
 The step in the precrisis phase that comes after planning is practicing. Putting the 
plan into motion allows an organization to identify hurdles and weaknesses, then correct 
for them in a pattern of continuous improvement. But without a plan in place, there is 
nothing to practice, meaning that the Air Force had no knowledge of potential hurdles in 
the way of communicating through a Bent Spear. As AFDD 2-5.3 points out, public 
affairs plans have to be integrated with the overall strategy in a given mission. This 
integration prevents conflicts between separate interests in an operation.  
 While planning is a first step in preventing conflicts between the informational 
and operational aspects of a mission, further conflicts and weaknesses can be identified 
by practicing responses to crisis situations. The fact that there was no planning for or 
rehearsing a crisis such as a Bent Spear proved costly when the situation arose in reality. 
The Precrisis Phase 
 Even without getting deep insight to the Air Force‘s precrisis planning regarding a 
domestic, non-combat related nuclear surety incident, it‘s clear the service failed in the 
precrisis phase.  
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 The Air Force‘s public affairs directive put minimal emphasis on crisis 
communication planning. The emphasis on planning requires that public affairs be 
included in the strategy and execution of operations, but, again, the disparity in rank 
between public affairs officers and operational commanders is often wide, which can lead 
to public affairs priorities being relegated to secondary. Despite mention of the 
importance of communication in combat and peacetime operations, the emphasis 
regarding crisis communication focuses solely on operations that include an enemy; the 
situation that would face the Air Force in 2007/2008 included no enemy. 
 The Air Force‘s history is full of successful nuclear-based operations, including 
the successful storage, movement and maintenance of nuclear weapons. In a different 
time – the Cold War – nuclear mistakes had less impact on operations for two reasons: 
First, there were more nuclear operations being conducted in the face of the Soviet 
nuclear threat. Second, people were more accepting of mistakes in the interest of 
countering the Soviet threat. Outside the Cold War, the nation isn‘t quite so accepting. 
Add to that the preoccupation with nuclear surety in the face of North Korea, Iran and the 
terrorism threat, and you have a difficult situation. If the U.S. can‘t secure its own nukes, 
how can other nations be expected to do so? 
 High-Reliability Organizations practice mindfulness, an obsession with the 
possibility of failure. Nuclear-handling units fit into this in that they are constantly going 
through inspections of their procedures. Training exercises and drills brought the 5
th
 
Bomb Wing back into certification after failing its inspection in 2003. It appears that in 
this case, the Air Force was focused on the possibility of failing its inspections rather than 
failing at its mission, leading it to be ill-prepared for such a failure. 
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Crisis Event 
 The crisis event begins with a trigger that signifies the start of a crisis. It‘s easy to 
decide the trigger here; what‘s interesting is how many times the trigger was pulled. After 
selecting the incorrect weapons in the storage bunker, Air Force personnel loaded them 
on to a plane, missed them on an inspection and missed them on an inventory check. 
Then it took almost two full days to realize that any of these mistakes had happened. Also 
interesting, it took so long for defense leaders to understand that these mistakes would 
lead to a crisis. Compounding that, another crisis trigger sat mislabeled in a box in a 
warehouse in Taiwan, waiting to make the situation worse for Air Force leadership.  
 It wasn‘t until almost a week after the 5th Bomb Wing mistakenly shipped six 
nuclear weapons that information about the mistake got out to the public. For the 
shipment to Taiwan of other nuclear-related classified material, it took  year after the 
mistake was made before anyone knew about it.  
 When a crisis is triggered, the expectation is for the organization to react by 
recognizing the crisis and acting to contain it. Procedurally, yes, Air Force leadership did 
take swift action to fix the problem within its ranks. Communicatively, though, the 
service and the Department of Defense repeatedly failed to effectively communicate the 
problem or the solution to the public. At every level, the operational mistakes that 
happened were completely preventable. The mistake of being slow and non-transparent in 
communicating the information to the public compounded the problem. The failure to 
adhere to the basic principle of disclosing information to the public quickly and 
accurately turned a bad situation into a worse one – one that threatened the perception 
stakeholders had of the organization, one that ended the careers of several airmen and one 
that put the Air Force in crisis. 
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September 
Before We Even Heard About It 
 An investigation was launched immediately after the incident was reported up the 
chain of command. Leaders began preparing a report about the incident. The munitions 
squadron commander, charged with maintaining accountability of all weapons stored on 
post, was relieved of duty within days of the incident. The Air Force placed a major 
general in charge of one investigation into the cause of the mistake; the DoD launched an 
investigation of its own. 
 Procedurally, the Air Force made all the right initial moves. Leaders looked into 
how the mistake was made and tried to fix it. The problem is that no one told the public 
about the mistake or how the Air Force was trying to fix it. The initial internal report 
about the incident showed that leaders expected the public to have little interest in the 
fact that the mistake even happened. That expectation, coupled with a longstanding 
policy of not discussing the location or movement of nuclear weapons, led to the decision 
by Air Force leaders to not disclose information about the mistaken shipment. 
The Leak 
 But word did get out about the shipment. The night of Sept. 4, the Military Times, 
a small civilian-produced military newspaper, broke the story based on information 
leaked from three anonymous Air Force officers (Appendix D). The article appeared in 
print the following morning. The reporter, Michael Hoffman, covered the Bent Spear 
incident through June 2008. In his first story, he cites the sources as saying that nuclear 
weapons were involved in the shipment, though the Air Force spokesman for the story, 
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the Pentagon‘s Lt. Col. Ed Thomas, would not confirm or deny that information, in 
observance of Air Force policy.  
 Thomas stuck to two major themes in his talking points for the Military Times 
article: safety and security. Within those two major themes were five talking points: 
 The transfer was conducted safely 
 There was never any danger to the American public 
 The weapons remained in Air Force hands at all times 
 Air Force standards are very exact regarding munitions handling 
 We have launched an investigation and are reviewing our procedures 
Out of the Bag 
 The day the story broke, reporters brought up the issue with Pentagon spokesman 
Geoff Morrell at the regular Defense Department briefing (Appendix E). Morrell stuck to 
the same talking points as Thomas in the briefing. He also would not confirm or deny that 
nuclear weapons were involved, adhering to what was becoming a moot policy; Morrell 
went on to explain that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and President Bush were 
informed of the incident and that Gates asked for daily briefings from Air Force Chief of 
Staff Gen. Michael Moseley. The accidental movement of conventional weapons would 
not garner presidential attention, leading the public to draw its own conclusions. 
 Morrell did not bring up the topic in his briefing, choosing instead to let it come 
up during questions. This shows the Pentagon was likely going along with the Air 
Force‘s conclusion that there would be little public interest in the event. To this point, 
there was no evidence to the contrary; the only news source that had reported about it was 
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a relatively small military newspaper. During the briefing, it was only one reporter who 
asked questions about it.  
Hitting the Big Time 
 The story first hit the national media the afternoon of Sept. 5. The Lede, a blog for 
the New York Times website, cited the Military Times story in reporting the incident to 
readers. It refers to a series of ―shocked headlines around the Web,‖ and calls the incident 
―a screw-up in the United States Air Force,‖ (Appendix F).  That certainly isn‘t the best 
press to hope for, but what appeared in actual papers wasn‘t initially as damning. In fact, 
the New York Times print edition didn‘t even have its own by-line for the story about the 
incident, printing a story from the Associated Press instead (Appendix G).  
 The Washington Post also put out a story about the incident on Sept. 6. Josh White 
covered the story, and he would write several additional articles about the incident 
through the life of the crisis, though the Post didn‘t dedicate one reporter or team of 
reporters to the topic (Appendix H). The Bismarck Tribune, the largest paper by 
circulation within 150 miles of Minot, didn‘t release a story on the incident until Sept. 7 
(Appendix I).  
Limited coverage 
 Initial coverage of the event shows that there wasn‘t much initial interest by the 
press. The Times story appeared on pg. 16, the Post story on pg. 10. The Bismarck 
Tribune, a paper with a number of readers who probably live in the flight path of the 
flight in question, didn‘t print the story until two days after it broke. Not only that, but the 
story was just a snippet combined with two other national news stories on page B5.  
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 These stories delivered many of the Air Force‘s key messages: that the public was 
not in danger, that the weapons remained in Air Force control and that an investigation 
had already begun. The Post and the Military Times (Appendix J) both reported that a 
munitions squadron commander had been fired as a result of the accident and that several 
Airmen had been suspended, which is positive reporting showing the Air Force was 
taking action. 
 The Military Times wrote a piece about Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne 
visiting Minot to review weapons handling procedures on Sept. 13 (Appendix K). It‘s 
only in this article that it comes out that the Pentagon confirmed nuclear weapons were 
involved in the incident. It‘s curious that no article in these sources put out a story saying 
that the Air Force made this admission. We know it took at least one week from the time 
the incident happened for anyone involved in the Department of Defense to make the 
confirmation.  
 There were only two more news articles printed in these publications in the month 
of September, which is to be expected as the Air Force and DoD investigations were 
being carried out. Both were published in the Post. One was a detailed summary of the 
incident (Appendix C) and the other a story covering the interim conclusions of the Air 
Force report into what went wrong (Appendix L).  
Problems Out of the Gate 
 Even though initial media coverage was light, one of the Air Force‘s major 
stakeholder groups did not seem to be pleased. The reports also delivered a lot of 
messages from members of Congress. Both the Times and the Post quoted Rep. Ike 
Skelton (D-Mo.) who called the event ―deeply disturbing.‖ Senators Carl Levin (D-
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Mich.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.) of the Armed Services Committee called it a ―matter 
of grave concern‖ in a joint statement. 
 It wasn‘t until Sept. 13 that any articles in these sources state that the Pentagon 
confirmed nuclear weapons were involved in the incident. Again, a longstanding policy 
prevented officials from confirming or denying the movement or locations of nuclear 
weapons. This is a perfect example of the conflict that is brought up in AFDD 2-5.3: A 
balance has to be struck between the priorities of informing the public and protecting 
sensitive national security information. Officials from the Air Force and the DoD adhered 
to this policy in the interest of national security, but this ultimately had a cost.  
 It was a foregone conclusion that nuclear weapons were involved. Anonymous 
sources within the service confirmed nukes were involved; the Pentagon told the media 
that the president and the secretary of defense had been alerted to the incident, which 
doesn‘t happen if a crate of grenades gets misplaced; and several members of congress 
alluded to the involvement of nuclear weapons in their comments in the early articles. 
The Air Force directive governing public affairs operations and the guidance from the 
National Incident Management System both call for organizations to release as much 
information as possible as quickly as possible. The policy forbidding discussion of the 
nukes should have been scrapped early in the name of transparency. This would have 
given the service some credibility and would have made future communication problems 
less detrimental. As it happened, it only gave the Air Force the wrong first impression.  
 The failure to communicate effectively compounded perceptions that were being 
bred in editorial sections of some newspapers – that the Air Force was overburdened by 
supporting two simultaneous wars, that the service was shirking its commitment to 
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protecting the country‘s most powerful but arguably least relevant weapons, and that Air 
Force leadership was failing at its responsibilities. A Bismarck Tribune editorial from 
Sept. 17 made these accusations when it compared the Bent Spear incident to the Abbott 
and Costello ―Who‘s on First‖ act (Appendix M). The paper argues that downsizing 
within the Air Force played a part in the incident, in that ―career military men,‖ who had 
the experience and professionalism to prevent such a situation, were forced out of the 
service following the Cold War and Desert Storm. It ultimately calls on the Air Force to 
make the major changes necessary to prevent further accidents, alluding to the fact that it 
is possible that similar mistakes have been made before. 
 Minot Mayor Curt Zimbelman argued against these points in an editorial 
published in the Tribune the same day (Appendix N). He points to a clean safety record 
for one of the bases that has stored and transported nuclear weapons for decades without 
incident. One can‘t say for certain that the mayor‘s intentions were anything but noble, 
but when Census 2000 data shows that one in six Minot residents was a part of the air 
base, it‘s fair to say the mayor had ulterior motives. Problems affecting bases in military 
communities can lead to problems for the communities themselves and the mayor had a 
town to look after. 
  The Air Force made it clear it was working swiftly and effectively in fixing the 
problem; articles in the all three sources examined here discussed the firing of the 
munitions squadron commander over the incident. What the Air Force didn‘t do was be 
quick and transparent about what the problem was, and this got the service off to a bad 
start in this situation. 
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October 
 Both the DoD and the Air Force were ordered to conduct investigations 
immediately following the incident. The Air Force completed its investigation first, and 
on Oct. 19, there was a special Defense Department briefing with Air Force Secretary 
Wynne and Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard Newton to announce the results of the 
investigation. Both the Military Times and the Washington Post pre-empted the briefing 
with stories on the 18
th  
(Appendix O and P).   
 Both articles said that five officers involved in the incident would be fired, likely 
for dereliction of duty. The Post had more details, saying that one officer was a colonel, 
that the punishment would also affect several enlisted members and that the personnel to 
be reprimanded were located both at Minot and at Barksdale.  
The Briefing 
 Secretary Wynne opened the briefing saying that he had (finally) decided to make 
an exception to the policy of not confirming or denying the involvement of nuclear 
weapons (Appendix Q). ―We would not be this upset with ourselves nor be striving to 
restore confidence if this did not involve nuclear weapons,‖ he said. He acknowledged 
the fact that both the media and the public had come to the obvious conclusion that nukes 
were involved, but he specifically noted that this was a ―one-time exception.‖  
 He reiterated the initial key messages the Air Force put out when the story first 
broke – that the Air Force maintained control of the weapons at all times, that the Air 
Force would continue to investigate what led to the problem and continue to take 
corrective actions. 
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 There was one additional key message Secretary Wynne put out in his brief 
remarks: that the Air Force would make everything right. ―We know America counts on 
us,‖ Wynne said. ―And through our steady, unwavering resolve and actions, our Air 
Force will live up to the expectations of our nation.‖ This message, that the Air Force 
would continue to find out details about what happened and ensure that these problems 
never came up again, was the right message to include. Air Force leaders promised an 
investigation all along, but to have said that ―we will make everything right‖ at the 
beginning of September would have been wholly premature and would have conveyed 
the unspoken message that the Air Force was minimizing the potential depth of the 
problem. Saying this at this point, after the service had completed a preliminary 
investigation, was right because leaders had begun to take action. They had earned back 
at least a little credibility. There was too much confusion in September as to the cause 
and depth of the incident for this message to have any gained any traction with the public. 
 Once Maj. Gen. Newton took the floor, one of the first things he made clear was 
that this was an isolated incident involving a limited number of airmen. This, no doubt, 
was in response to messages that had been delivered from several sources, including 
members of congress, the Washington Post and the Bismarck Tribune editorial that 
alluded to this being a symptom of a larger problem in the Air Force. Lt. Col. Thomas 
also said evidence pointed to the incident being an isolated mistake in September, but it 
was a point that needed to be emphasized based on press coverage.  
 Newton then detailed the series of consecutive mistakes that allowed the weapons 
to wind up in Louisiana. It was a series of five mistakes made by a group of different 
airmen. Several checks were overlooked or ignored, leading to the mistake. He echoed 
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Wynne‘s comment that this was an unacceptable error and that the Air Force is 
accountable to congress and the American people in its commitment to safety and 
security in weapons handling. 
 So the Air Force again stuck with consistent messages in its briefing. Messages 
delivered on Oct. 19 largely resembled those delivered in early September – mainly that 
the weapons never left Air Force control and that the public was never in danger. General 
Newton echoed Secretary Wynne in saying that the Air Force made a mistake, but only 
an isolated one. ―We owe the nation nothing less than adherence to the highest 
standards,‖ Newton said, with the implied message being that personnel did not deliver 
that in August of 2007.  
  During the question and answer portion of the briefing, Newton exhibited the 
behavior that helped contribute to the sour relationship that existed between the military 
and the media in the past. The following exchange with reporters, after it was disclosed at 
the briefing that the nuclear weapons in question were stored with conventional weapons 
in the bunkers at Minot, is an example: 
Q     So it is normal procedure, then, to keep nuclear weapons in the same 
place as conventional -- 
GEN. NEWTON:  These weapons were stored in the proper -- with proper 
procedures in the proper locations at the weapons storage area. 
Yes, ma'am. 
Q     I have a number of follow-up questions.  First of all, on what Peter was 
saying, did you have to get some sort of waiver?  Was a waiver required to 
store the warheads and the missiles in the same facility, in the same hangar? 
GEN. NEWTON:  The weapons were stored in the facilities per DOD 
guidelines and Air Force guidelines as well.  There was -- there was -- 
Q     (Off mike) -- but does it require a waiver to store them together? 
GEN. NEWTON:  The weapons again, as I've mentioned, were stored in the 
proper facilities and were within DOD guidelines and Air Force guidelines as 
well. 
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Q     Is there some reason you can't tell me specifically that -- I'm not 
understanding, because of my lack of knowledge -- is a waiver required to do 
that, or is a waiver not required to do that? 
GEN. NEWTON:  There was no waiver required in this instance because 
they were stored in a facility, in a weapons storage area in this case, under 
DOD guidelines and Air Force guidelines. 
Q     So when was it decided that that was an acceptable procedure?  And 
were the missiles at that point, in that sto-rage at that point in that hangar -- 
were they fully fueled?  Were those missiles actually active missiles? 
GEN. NEWTON:  These -- to consider them being missiles individually -- 
there were actually part of a pylon that was considered to be a package of six 
missiles that are attached to one pylon.  And so -- 
Q     Were any of those missiles fueled? 
GEN. NEWTON:  These missiles were packaged in a way that, again, met 
Air Force as well as DOD guidelines.  And so -- 
Q     Were any fueled? 
GEN. NEWTON:  They were packaged in the manner that is appropriate for 
them to be packaged for the mission; in this case, the tactical ferry operation 
for them to be transferred from -- 
Q     Was there any fuel in those -- 
GEN. NEWTON:  -- they were transferred from, again, from Minot down to 
Barksdale. 
Q     (Off mike.) 
GEN. NEWTON:  I'd rather not get into those technical details, but just to 
let you know that they were prepared for the tactical ferry operation, and they 
were also within the DOD and Air Force guidelines.  
 
Now, perhaps this is another example of when a member of the Air Force has to balance 
the informational needs of the public with national security, but it should have been 
obvious at this point that erring on the side of caution wasn‘t working thus far. Newton 
came off as confrontational and not transparent, giving off the impression that, again, the 
Air Force was hiding something. The entire briefing up to this point focused on the Air 
Force‘s initiatives in reviewing and changing procedures – why could this exchange with 
reporters not have gone back to that point?  Regardless of the message, repeating the 
same phrase over and over to each question is not only not transparent, it‘s also rude. 
44 
 
 It‘s certain that a public affairs officer provided talking points to both Wynne and 
Newton, but that direction should have come with instruction to be open and responsive, 
even if that meant divulging more information than would ordinarily come out.  
Attribution Theory. 
 As discussed earlier with strategic communication theory, there are several 
different types of crises – victim, accident and preventable. The Bent Spear incident was 
caused by human error, made in spite of numerous regulations and redundant checks put 
in place to prevent such an error. This situation is absolutely a preventable crisis. Again, a 
preventable crisis has the highest level of attribution, meaning that the general public is 
looking for someone on whom or something on which to assign blame.  
 In responding to a preventable crisis, two main steps to responding are admitting 
the mistake and apologizing (Coombs, 2007). Both Wynne and Newton did the right 
thing in accepting that a mistake was made. They pointed out that there was a failure to 
follow procedures, that it adversely affected confidence in the Air Force and that 
personnel were being relieved of duty. These are steps to accepting that the Air Force 
made mistakes. 
 These steps were followed by some pretty intense distancing tactics though. The 
main talking points consistently point out that the public was never in danger and that the 
weapons never left Air Force control. While it‘s true that the weapons were always under 
Air Force protection, they did not have the appropriate level of protection that nuclear 
weapons should have on a flightline. This was the impetus for another back-and-forth 
45 
 
during the briefing, as a reporter pressed Newton for details about the level of security 
around the weapons: 
Q     Can you tell us, to go back to Pauline's question, at what point in all of 
this were these warheads in a position that was something less secure than 
they would have been if they had been recognized at the time to be special 
weapons? 
GEN. NEWTON:  These weapons were never out of the hands of America's 
airmen.  They were always secure and they were, again, they were again 
under the security and control of airmen at all times. 
Q     (Off mike) -- position of less security than they would have been had 
they been understood to be nuclear war-heads? 
GEN. NEWTON:  These weapons were always secure at all times. 
 
Again, it had been published that nuclear weapons required added security, and that no 
one knew that nuclear weapons had been loaded onto the B-52 in question, so it stands to 
follow that the nuclear weapons did not have the appropriate level of protection while on 
the flightlines at Minot or Barksdale. Again, Newton‘s standoffishness in response to 
questions isn‘t consistent with the messages an organization should deliver when 
accepting responsibility for a mistake. 
 In fact, many of the talking points from this briefing did nothing but try to distance 
the Air Force as a whole from the mistake. Both Air Force representatives emphasized 
that this was an isolated incident that was counter to the proven techniques mandated by 
the Air Force. As Maj. Gen. Newton pointed out, this was ―an isolated incident involving 
a limited number of airmen.‖ While Secretary Wynne said that the incident led to the Air 
Force doing a strict examination of its procedures, this investigation didn‘t lead to any 
procedural changes. When questions about procedures like security and storage came up, 
Newton reacted defensively. In fact, all that this investigation led to and all that was 
announced at this briefing was the firing of several servicemembers involved in the 
incident. 
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  Air Force leadership only partially accepted responsibility for the mistake, so 
there was no apology to follow. The Air Force admitted that its personnel made the errors 
that led to the Bent Spear, but it was not taking the proper steps to react. Instead of 
accepting the blame that comes with a preventable crisis, the Air Force was deflecting 
responsibility onto the personnel whose dismissals were being announced. 
Continuing Coverage 
 Two news articles in the Military Times and Washington Post following the 
briefing were the last two news articles on the incident in 2007 (Appendix R and S). 
These articles covered the briefing and provided more details about who received 
disciplinary actions. Both articles also broke down the exact details of what went wrong, 
demonstrating the curiosity in the public as to how such a highly regulated operation 
managed to go awry. 
 The Military Times article, released on October 21, announced that the 5
th
 Bomb 
Wing had been decertified from handling nuclear weapons, Advanced Cruise Missiles or 
conducting ferry operations on weapons. 
 The other two pieces released that year were editorials in the Bismarck Tribune. 
The first, published on Oct. 26, accused the Air Force of not being transparent in 
discussing the Bent Spear (Appendix T). The editorial opened by saying, ―We need to be 
reassured by the U.S. Air Force as plainly and reliably as possible that there shouldn't be 
a repeat of a chain of events in August involving nuclear weapons.‖ It makes repeated 
reference to the military‘s history of being ―nuanced‖ in its communication to the public. 
Coming one week after the press briefing provided by Secretary Wynne and Maj. Gen. 
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Newton, it‘s likely that the editorial staff at the Tribune was frustrated by the way 
information was delivered at the briefing. The editorial also points out that more is 
needed than the changes in personnel announced at the briefing. 
 Importantly, the editorial asked for a ―front row seat‖ as the Air Force continued 
to fix the problem. It says that leaders went public from the start about the incident (not 
entirely accurate), but with its references to nuanced information, it‘s pretty clear that the 
editorial staff isn‘t impressed with the openness of Air Force communication. 
 The second Tribune editorial, published Dec. 14, discusses the fact that both 
nuclear-handling units at Minot – the 91st Space Wing and the 5th Bomb Wing – were 
ramping up for recertification in January (Appendix U).  It echoes the call for 
transparency that came from the Oct. 26 editorial. It calls for the base to work to rebuild 
the trust of the community. It also brought up some non-nuclear fears held in the 
community – namely that if the base did not regain certification for handling nuclear 
weapons, it could wind up being closed. Going back to Minot‘s mayor‘s letter to the 
editor from September, this shows that the mistake, and the Air Force‘s inability to be 
open with the public about the problem, was leading the community to worry. 
 ―Openness is necessary and will help the Minot installation regain the good 
reputation it has had in North Dakota,‖ the piece concluded. 
2008 
 The first two months of 2008 were somewhat quiet in coverage. Both the 91
st
 
Space Wing and the 5
th
 Bomb Wing – the two nuclear-handling units at Minot Air Base – 
were preparing for their nuclear surety inspections. The 91
st
 was due for its regular 
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inspection, which was mandated every 18 months. The 5
th
 Bomb Wing had to undergo 
the test as a result of being decertified after the Bent Spear.  
Releases 
 While these preparations were going on, the Air Force was preparing to release a 
document outlining new procedures governing the handling of nuclear weapons. On Jan. 
25, the Bismarck Tribune published an AP story announcing the publication of a 153-
page document that updated procedures and personnel assignments regarding nuclear 
operations (Appendix V). The document itself made no mention of the Minot incident, 
but the article points out that the release of the new directive came just months after what 
it refers to as the Air Force‘s ―blunder.‖ 
 Another task force was also wrapping up an investigation over what went wrong 
in August of 2007. The Washington Post reported on Feb. 13 that a task force found that 
there had been a ―‗precipitous decrease in attention‘ to the security and control of the 
U.S. nuclear arsenal.‖ (Appendix W) The task force, which was led by former Air Force 
Chief of Staff Larry Welch, and which reported its findings to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, echoed concerns that had been voiced by other sources, including the 
Bismarck Tribune (Appendix M) – that the nation and Air Force leadership were 
downgrading the importance of the nuclear mission.  
 A Military Times article on the report points out that Congressional leaders were 
still disappointed with Air Force efforts (Appendix X). ―The sloppiness and lack of 
discipline and lack of respect for the process didn‘t just happen overnight and fixing the 
problems are going to take awhile,‖ said Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla. The headline of the 
article captured the spirit of the event: ―Generals grilled on Minot nuclear mishap.‖ 
49 
 
 Neither the Post nor the Military Times quoted any members of the active duty Air 
Force, even though the majority of the task was composed of active Air Force generals. 
Lt. Gen. Daniel Darnell communicated one of the main Air Force talking points to the 
Senate members – that even though the weapons went unaccounted for, that they never 
left Air Force control and were never unsecured. This was the same point Maj. Gen. 
Newton repeated several times to reporters as they pressed him for details. The Senators 
did not agree with the Air Force‘s logic. 
 ―Absence of [increased] security represents a significant shortfall,‖ said Sen. Carl 
Levin (D-Mich.).  
 This article, along with the early articles that quoted reactions from congressmen, 
showed that one of the service‘s most important stakeholder groups, elected officials, 
were disappointed in the Air Force‘s actions. Darnell also announced to the group that 
during the investigations conducted on the incident, 132 recommendations on how to 
improve nuclear security had been made. Of those, 41 had been implemented. 
Take Two… or Part Two 
 In March, the Air Force learned that it had mistakenly shipped nuclear missile 
components to Taiwan in August 2006 – a year before the Bent Spear incident. The Air 
Force announced the mistake on March 25 in a press conference hosted by Secretary 
Wynne, Air Force Lt. Gen. Carter Ham and Undersecretary of Defense Ryan Henry 
(Appendix Y). These leaders told the media that the missile components, which were 
classified material but did not contain nuclear material, were erroneously marked as 
helicopter batteries by the Air Force and shipped to Taiwan. Taiwanese authorities 
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noticed the mistake and alerted U.S. authorities, who gained control of the equipment and 
returned it to the United States.  
  The Air Force‘s early reaction to this mistake was much different than during the 
Bent Spear. This time, it was defense leaders who let the country know about the mistake 
– high ranking leaders. Though Wynne was quick to point out that the equipment in 
question in this mistake was not fissile material, there were no minimization strategies 
this time. There were no messages about how the public was never in danger or that the 
materials were shipped to a friendly trading partner. The key messages were that there 
was a mistake, that leadership was concerned, and that an investigation was underway. 
 Henry told the press that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates ordered ―a 
comprehensive review of all policies, procedures as well as a physical site inventory of 
all nuclear and nuclear-associated material equipment across their respective programs.‖ 
The Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency already completed an inventory of 
components related to those that were shipped to Taiwan.  
White House Press Secretary Dana Perino was also asked about the issue in her 
regular press briefing on March 25 (Appendix Z). In response to a question, Perino said 
the president had been informed of the mistake, that he was pleased that the parts had 
been returned and that he appreciated that an investigation was underway. She further 
assured the press that the president still had faith in Air Force leadership despite the most 
recent nuclear-related mistake. 
 In looking at the life of the Bent Spear as a crisis, the obvious question is to ask if 
this Taiwan mistake is part of the same crisis or a new crisis. In analyzing it in this case 
study, it will be treated as part of the same crisis. The two events are so closely related 
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and happened in such a close timeframe that it would be tough to consider them 
separately.   
Coverage 
 The Washington Post reported about the press conference and the incident on 
March 26 (Appendix AA). In the story, it brings up the recent Bent Spear as context for 
this newly discovered incident. On March 27, the Post further reported that Taiwanese 
authorities notified the U.S. in early 2007 that the package in question did not contain 
helicopter batteries (Appendix AB). With Air Force leaders unaware of what was shipped 
instead, the Taiwanese were instructed to dispose of the components. It was much later, 
when the Taiwanese opened the crates and found packages marked ―Secret‖ that the Air 
Force began paying more attention and regained control of the material.  
 This looked really bad for the Air Force. This in itself was a preventable crisis, 
caused by human error. Even though this mistake happened more than a year earlier, its 
discovery came right on the coattails of another nuclear-related error. In both cases, 
something was misplaced, shipped in error and it took a while for anyone to even notice 
the components were missing. It was no longer possible for Air Force leaders to consider 
these mistakes as isolated. As had been mentioned in research reports and opinion pieces, 
it was obvious that there had been a decline in the attention that was being paid to nuclear 
operations. The secretary of defense agreed, as the Bismarck Tribune reported on March 
28 (Appendix AC). He ordered a complete military-wide inventory of all nuclear 
weapons and nuclear-related material. The Air Force‘s mistakes led to a break in 
confidence in nuclear operations throughout the entire military. 
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Back to Minot 
Not to let anyone forget about the first incident, two months after coverage of the 
Taiwan mistake, the Military Times reported that the 5
th
 Bomb Wing, the unit that 
shipped the nuclear weapons from Minot to Barksdale, failed its nuclear surety inspection 
(Appendix AD). This meant that the unit was found incapable of adequately performing 
its primary mission. Following the two nuclear-related incidents, this was a rather 
unfortunate situation. Not only did the unit fail, it failed after having spent months 
preparing. Every member of the unit knew when the inspection was coming. Everyone 
knew how much scrutiny would be on the inspection. Still, not everyone performed their 
jobs to standard. Inspectors attributed the failure to a lack of supervision and inadequate 
leadership.  
The Post also covered the unit‘s failure (Appendix AE). It included quotes from 
Air Force spokesman Maj. Thomas Crosson, who said the inspection showed there were 
inadequacies in the unit‘s operations. In what is a downright comical twist, Crosson said 
―that he would neither confirm nor deny the contents of the defense agency's report,‖ 
according to the article. He said the contents of the inspection report would not be 
released. 
Again, the Air Force failed to be transparent in its communication about a 
mistake. It took responsibility for the mistake, ordered inspections and investigations, but 
hid behind the guise of national security instead of transparency. And, again, there was 
no apology. 
Sacked 
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 All of the mistakes the Air Force had made culminated in a press conference 
hosted by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on June 5 (Appendix AF). In a prepared 
statement, Gates announced the conclusion of the investigation he ordered after the 
shipping of the weapons components to Taiwan. He began by highlighting the good news 
of the report – that no service members‘ health was put at risk, that there was no sacrifice 
of America‘s nuclear deterrence, and the classified components had not been tampered 
with.  
 He followed the good news with the actual results. The first and primary point 
was that there were commonalities between the Taiwan incident and the Bent Spear. 
Second was that both accidents were preventable, but the oversight and regulating 
authorities in the Air Force were not doing their jobs. Importantly, Gates pointed out the 
lack of a culture of self assessment in the service – a trait that should be endemic to a 
high-reliability organization. 
 Gates pointed out that two actions were necessary: First, procedural changes 
needed to be made, as prior investigations and a couple of editorials pointed out already. 
Second, Gates said accountability was necessary. Several Air Force leaders had lost their 
jobs already, but in the light of a second mistake, consequences needed to go higher. 
Gates announced that he had accepted the resignations of Secretary Wynne and Air Force 
Chief of Staff Gen. Buzz Moseley. 
 He closed his statement on a personal note, saying that the Air Force was his 
branch of service, having served in the past. He affirmed his respect, support and 
commitment to the service. He admitted his regret that the mistakes that had been made 
led him to accept the resignations of the service‘s leaders. 
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 Though he expressed a personal message and regret about the situation, he, like 
other officials, did not apologize. What he did do, was unequivocally accept 
responsibility for the mistakes on behalf of the Air Force. By bringing accountability to 
the highest level of the Air Force and by taking an unprecedented corrective action, 
Secretary Gates showed that the Defense Department was committed to making sure that 
another mistake didn‘t follow the two that were already made. He showed that the 
department was willing to finally be honest. This move was a necessary attempt to bring 
closure to the crisis and begin the recovery process. 
Discussion 
Recovery? 
 Again, the recovery phase is the end of the crisis, when an organization looks 
back on its crisis strategy, assesses its successes/failures and addresses weaknesses in the 
strategy. Not all organizations that experience crisis make it to this phase. The Air Force 
as an organization survived, but not without injury. Airmen lost their jobs, the 5
th
 Bomb 
Wing lost its certification to perform its main mission, the Air Force‘s reputation took a 
major hit with its stakeholder groups and its two highest ranking officers were sacked. 
Certainly not a flawless escape from crisis. 
 But the question needs to be asked – was this the end of the crisis? As of June 5, 
when Secretary Wynne and Gen. Moseley resigned, the 5
th
 Bomb Wing still had not 
passed its nuclear surety inspection. It finally passed its re-inspection in August, but then 
failed another inspection in September 2009, leading to the firing of its new commander. 
There were other nuclear mishaps to follow, including sleeping staff members, unsecured 
codes and missing equipment. Nothing was as serious as the incidents mentioned in this 
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case study, and most of the mainstream media gave up on coverage of these issues after 
June 2008. So, for the communication strategy, the resignation of the Air Force‘s top 
personnel is a logical stopping point for this case study. 
Assessment 
 The mistaken shipment of nuclear weapons across the country was a disaster. The 
mistaken shipment of nuclear weapons components to Taiwan was another one. As Air 
Force leaders repeatedly pointed out, these mistakes led to service-wide investigations 
and massive changes in how the service was to handle nuclear weapons.  
 These investigations and the majority of the changes that came from them are part 
of the crisis recovery process. These steps didn‘t address the crisis response, but they did 
contribute to the precrisis phase – preparing for the future and looking at ways to prevent 
future crises. As Lt. Gen. Darnell pointed out in the February defense briefing, there was 
a bundle of revisions put in place regarding the handling of nuclear weapons. Secretary 
Gates announced that more procedural changes would be put into place and that they 
would come under new Air Force leadership. This is an analysis of weaknesses and an 
attempt to repair them. It‘s the heart of the recovery process. 
It‘s important to look at weaknesses and procedures in an attempt to prevent 
crisis; it‘s the process of identifying and attempting to react to vulnerabilities – something 
the Air Force didn‘t do enough of prior to August 2007. But it‘s impossible to prevent 
mistakes forever. The reason crisis communication is so important is because an 
organization needs to be able to respond to accidents and emergencies and prevent them 
from turning into crises. In order to do that, crisis communication has to be part of an 
organization‘s operational strategy.  
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Air Force Doctrine Directive 2-5.3 calls for communication strategy to be part of 
operational strategy. The doctrine as it was written in 2007 did not put an emphasis on 
crisis communication though. Military regulations are constantly updated to adapt to new 
operations, so part of the recovery process should have been an analysis of the directive 
to identify and correct weaknesses in communication strategy. But the doctrine has not 
been updated since 2005, meaning that the same directive and guidance that led to the 
deficiencies of this crisis response are still governing today‘s public affairs operations.  
That‘s not to say that the public affairs policy was necessarily the problem 
though. Other policies in place hampered the communication effort more – namely, the 
policy of hiding information in the name of national security. The security of the nation is 
obviously a high priority, but so is the confidence of the nation. It‘s a priority for the 
military to make sure the public believes it can protect the nation‘s security. 
Communication is key in that effort. It‘s hard to miss the irony in the fact that the Air 
Force chose to err on the side of security in a situation in which Air Force mistakes 
actually could have sacrificed it. As the New York Times pointed out, lax nuclear security 
represents the same risks that Americans faced during the Cold War. The recovery phase 
should have been when Air Force leaders looked back at this policy and how it fails to 
address the importance of crisis communication. 
That said, there are some notable differences in the way leadership responded to 
the shipment of nuclear components to Taiwan and the response to the Bent Spear. First, 
leaders were proactive with the Taiwan issue; there was a press conference before there 
was press coverage. As Ryan Henry pointed out, the priority was to be transparent. 
Proactivity was a great start, and communications did become more transparent during 
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the Taiwan incident, but there remained a reluctance to accept responsibility within the 
Air Force until Gates‘ press conference. There remained an inability to confirm or deny 
anything regarding the incident at Minot, whether it was the nature of materials being 
shipped or the results of an inspection. There remained the lack of a sincere apology, but 
there was improvement in practice, if not necessarily in policy. 
Momentum 
 Communication requires momentum. In this field, momentum is like credibility. 
San Diego Fire Chief Jeff Bowman‘s strategy of being open and honest with stakeholders 
from the start made it easier for his entire organization to survive a crisis that it was 
operationally ill-prepared for. In a communicative capacity, it could hardly have been 
more prepared. 
 Momentum is a strength because of what it represents; it means things are in 
motion, and objects in motion tend to stay in motion. If you put your car in neutral and 
try to push it a few feet, the hardest part is getting it started. Once it‘s going, however, it‘s 
easy to keep it moving. That‘s momentum.  
 The Air Force – and the military as a whole – went into 2007 with mixed 
credibility. On the one hand, there was the past strained relationship between the media 
and the military, which more than likely had an effect on how the military was portrayed 
to the public. It affected the way individual servicemembers, like Maj. Gen. Newton, 
interacted with reporters.  
 On the other hand, individual troops might had more credibility in 2007 than at 
any other point in history. As the military fought two wars, Americans had their cars 
58 
 
covered in yellow magnets, they gave up their first-class seats on airplanes for young 
troops, they sent care packages, they remembered the troops.  
Conclusion 
 The military is a microcosm of the country. Without credibility and support, it 
doesn‘t accomplish its mission. It doesn‘t exist. The military‘s relationship with the 
public might be the most important relationship between an organization and a 
stakeholder group ever. As AFDD 2-5.3 points out, transparent communication efforts 
aid in public support and recruitment. When the messages the Air Force puts out harm the 
organization‘s credibility, it‘s counter to the goals AFDD seeks to accomplish. 
 What we saw in the response to this crisis is that policy stood in the way of good 
communication. The problem with policy is that it‘s not adaptive. Communicators, on the 
other hand, have to be adaptive, especially during a crisis. There was probably a number 
of Air Force communicators advising from the beginning of the Bent Spear that leaders 
should cop to the fact that nuclear weapons were involved. The problem was that the only 
person who could grant an exception to that policy was the secretary of the Air Force – 
the highest ranking person in the service. Having to go that high up the chain hinders 
adaptation. Reaction time is limited during a crisis because the onus is on communicating 
rapidly. Policies block the ability to react quickly. 
 Two important traits of high-reliability organizations are relevant here: decision-
making authority at every level of the organization and a deference to expertise. Policy is 
obviously important, but it stands in the way of these two important abilities of HROs. 
Were public affairs officers given more authority and more decision-making ability, 
policies like the one that prevented officials from admitting that nuclear weapons were 
involved in the Minot incident would not harm Air Force credibility. Public affairs 
59 
 
officers are the ones with the communication expertise, so they should be the ones 
making decisions about communication efforts.   
 In order for that to happen, there needs to be a sea change in rank structure. In 
order for public affairs officers to have more authority, they need more rank. That‘s 
happening in the Air Force, as the current chief of public affairs is a general officer for 
the first time in 11 years. In the Army, it‘s a two-star general who governs public affairs. 
It‘s something to value deference to expertise, but sometimes it can be hard for a 
commander to defer to the advice of an officer who ranks three or four grades lower than 
him – especially during a crisis, where it‘s the commander‘s career on the line if 
something goes wrong. 
 The military has a hill to climb. An ingrained hostility toward the media will 
always be in the way of transparency. Policy is in the way also. In order for the public to 
be informed and continue to support the military, there needs to be a constant flow of 
information out of the Air Force and the other branches of service. The way out of this is 
for military leaders to be open. Open communication will lead to more favorable 
coverage. More favorable coverage will cut down on the hostility toward the media, and 
that will also lead to even more openness. A military that has the support of its 
stakeholder – all of its stakeholders – is ultimately a stronger fighting force. It‘s time for 
leaders to recognize that. 
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Appendix A 
 
Air Force is scrapping its fleet of nuclear stealth missiles 
 
Robert Burns 
March 7, 2007 
AP Newswire 
 
The Air Force said Wednesday it will retire the most modern cruise missile in the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal, a "stealth" weapon developed in the 1980s with the ability to evade 
detection by Soviet radars. 
Known as the Advanced Cruise Missile, the weapon is carried by the B-52 bomber and 
was designed to attack heavily defended sites. It is the most capable among a variety of 
air-launched nuclear weapons built during the Cold War that remain in the U.S. inventory 
even as the Pentagon is reducing its overall nuclear arms stockpile. 
The Air Force had said as recently as February 2006 that it expected to keep the missile 
active until 2030.  
If the retirement is carried out as planned, the Advanced Cruise Missile will be the first 
group of U.S. nuclear weapons to be scrapped since the last of the Air Force's 50 MX 
Peacekeeper land-based missiles was retired in September 2005. 
The decision to retire the Advanced Cruise Missile fleet has not been publicly announced. 
It was brought to light by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the nuclear information project 
at the Federation of American Scientists. He noticed that funds for the program were cut 
in the Air Force budget request for 2008, and that no money is budgeted for it beyond 
2008; when he inquired, the Air Force acknowledged the retirement decision. 
An Air Force spokeswoman, Maj. Morshe Araujo, confirmed it on Wednesday. She and 
other Air Force public affairs officials were unable to provide additional details, 
including the rationale for the decision. 
Araujo indicated that the retirement was part of a "balanced force reduction" being 
carried out to reduce the number of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 
2,200 by Dec. 31, 2012, as required under a U.S.-Russia arms reduction deal signed in 
Moscow in May 2002. 
The treaty does not require that any specific group of nuclear weapons be retired, only 
smarck Tribu1,700-2,200. The Russians still have a nuclear-tipped cruise missile in 
active service, according to Robert S. Norris, an expert in American, Soviet and Chinese 
nuclear weapons. 
The decision to get rid of the Advanced Cruise Missile comes amid U.S. efforts to 
modernize what remains of the nuclear arsenal, even as it presses Iran and North Korea to 
abandon their nuclear programs. 
Last week the Bush administration took a major step toward building a new generation of 
nuclear warheads, selecting a design that is being touted as safer, more secure and more 
easily maintained than today's arsenal. A team of scientists from Lawrence Livermore 
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National Laboratory will proceed with the weapons design with an anticipation that the 
first warheads may be ready by 2012 as a replacement for Trident missiles on 
submarines. 
As a matter of policy the Defense Department does not confirm the location of nuclear 
weapons, but Kristensen and other private nuclear experts said the fleet of more than 400 
Advanced Cruise Missiles is located at the only two B-52 bomber bases: Minot Air Force 
Base, N.D., and Barksdale Air Force Base, La. 
The Air Force originally planned to field 1,500 of the missiles, which were put on the 
drawing board in 1982 after U.S. officials determined that its predecessor, known as the 
AGM-86 air-launched cruise missile, which has no stealth capabilities, would soon be too 
easy to detect by air- and ground-based defenses. 
Kristensen said there are about 1,300 of the older air-launched nuclear cruise missiles still 
in the Air Force inventory. 
Norris, a nuclear weapons expert at the Natural Resources Defense Council, said it 
appears likely the Air Force will further shrink its inventory of air-launched nuclear 
weapons in the years ahead. He estimates that there are about 3,000 air-launched gravity 
bombs in the nuclear arsenal, based mostly in the United States. 
The other main element of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is the Navy's fleet of nuclear-armed 
Trident submarines. 
Norris estimates that the United States now has about 5,000 strategic nuclear weapons, 
including the Advance Cruise Missiles, so it will take further reductions to get down to 
the 1,700-2,200 level set by the 2002 treaty. 
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Appendix B 
 
Warbirds receive 'excellent' NORI rating  
 
Danny Monahan 
May 5, 2006 
Minot Air Force Base Public Affairs 
 
5/5/2006 - MINOT AIR FORCE BASE, N.D.  -- The 5th Bomb Wing‘s Nuclear 
Operational Readiness Inspection rating was announced to a full house at Dock 7 April 
28.  
 
After 10 days of around the clock hard work and weeks of preparation, the labor put forth 
by the Minot‘s Warbirds finally earned the wing an Excellent rating from the Air Combat 
Command Inspector General Team.  
 
―We noticed a tremendous sense of pride throughout the 5th Bomb Wing that directly 
impacted the warfighting capability,‖ said Col. David McFaddin, ACC IG team chief 
before presenting a slide show highlighting Minot‘s top performers.  
 
As each name graced the screen, the audience cheered with sirens, whistles and even 
bullhorns.  
 
After the results were read, the 5th BW Commander, Col. Eldon Woodie took the stage 
saying he was tickled to be the commander and thanked everyone for their hard work and 
coming out.  
 
―To the warriors of the ACC IG team I thank you for the tough scrub,‖ said Colonel 
Woodie. ―You are truly are leaving us better than you found us. Sweating during training 
prevents bleeding on the battle field,‖ Colonel Woodie thanked not only the Airmen and 
Department of Defense civilians, but the members of the local community, reminding the 
crowd that none of this would be possible without them as well.  
 
―We were truly impressed with the professionalism, devotion and dedication to the 
mission displayed throughout this inspection,‖ said Colonel McFaddin. ―We‘d be proud 
to go to war and fight side by side with your unit any day. I want to congratulate you on a 
successful completion of this inspection.‖ 
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Appendix C 
Missteps in the Bunker 
 
Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus 
Sept. 23, 2007 
Washington Post 
 
Just after 9 a.m. on Aug. 29, a group of U.S. airmen entered a sod-covered bunker on 
North Dakota's Minot Air Force Base with orders to collect a set of unarmed cruise 
missiles bound for a weapons graveyard. They quickly pulled out a dozen cylinders, all of 
which appeared identical from a cursory glance, and hauled them along Bomber 
Boulevard to a waiting B-52 bomber. 
The airmen attached the gray missiles to the plane's wings, six on each side. After 
eyeballing the missiles on the right side, a flight officer signed a manifest that listed a 
dozen unarmed AGM-129 missiles. The officer did not notice that the six on the left 
contained nuclear warheads, each with the destructive power of up to 10 Hiroshima 
bombs. 
That detail would escape notice for an astounding 36 hours, during which the missiles 
were flown across the country to a Louisiana air base that had no idea nuclear warheads 
were coming. It was the first known flight by a nuclear-armed bomber over U.S. airspace, 
without special high-level authorization, in nearly 40 years.  
The episode, serious enough to trigger a rare "Bent Spear" nuclear incident report that 
raced through the chain of command to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and President 
Bush, provoked new questions inside and outside the Pentagon about the adequacy of 
U.S. nuclear weapons safeguards while the military's attention and resources are devoted 
to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Three weeks after word of the incident leaked to the public, new details obtained by The 
Washington Post point to security failures at multiple levels in North Dakota and 
Louisiana, according to interviews with current and former U.S. officials briefed on the 
initial results of an Air Force investigation of the incident. 
The warheads were attached to the plane in Minot without special guard for more than 15 
hours, and they remained on the plane in Louisiana for nearly nine hours more before 
being discovered. In total, the warheads slipped from the Air Force's nuclear safety net 
for more than a day without anyone's knowledge. 
"I have been in the nuclear business since 1966 and am not aware of any incident more 
disturbing," retired Air Force Gen. Eugene Habiger, who served as U.S. Strategic 
Command chief from 1996 to 1998, said in an interview. 
A simple error in a missile storage room led to missteps at every turn, as ground crews 
failed to notice the warheads, and as security teams and flight crew members failed to 
provide adequate oversight and check the cargo thoroughly. An elaborate nuclear 
safeguard system, nurtured during the Cold War and infused with rigorous accounting 
and command procedures, was utterly debased, the investigation's early results show. 
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The incident came on the heels of multiple warnings -- some of which went to the highest 
levels of the Bush administration, including the National Security Council -- of security 
problems at Air Force installations where nuclear weapons are kept. The risks are not that 
warheads might be accidentally detonated, but that sloppy procedures could leave room 
for theft or damage to a warhead, disseminating its toxic nuclear materials. 
A former National Security Council staff member with detailed knowledge described the 
event as something that people in the White House "have been assured never could 
happen." What occurred on Aug. 29-30, the former official said, was "a breakdown at a 
number of levels involving flight crew, munitions, storage and tracking procedures -- 
faults that never were to line up on a single day." 
 
Missteps in the Bunker  
The air base where the incident took place is one of the most remote and, for much of the 
year, coldest military posts in the continental United States. Veterans of Minot typically 
describe their assignments by counting the winters passed in the flat, treeless region 
where January  temperatures sometimes reach 30 below zero. In airman-speak, a three-
year assignment becomes "three winters" at Minot. 
The daily routine for many of Minot's crews is a cycle of scheduled maintenance for the 
base's 35 aging B-52H Stratofortress bombers -- mammoth, eight-engine workhorses, the 
newest of which left the assembly line more than 45 years ago. Workers also tend to 150 
intercontinental ballistic missiles kept at the ready in silos scattered across neighboring 
cornfields, as well as hundreds of smaller nuclear bombs, warheads and vehicles stored in 
sod-covered bunkers called igloos. 
"We had a continuous workload in maintaining" warheads, said Scott Vest, a former Air 
Force captain who spent time in Minot's bunkers in the 1990s. "We had a stockpile of 
more than 400 . . . and some of them were always coming due" for service. 
Among the many weapons and airframes, the AGM-129 cruise missile was well known at 
the base as a nuclear warhead delivery system carried by B-52s. With its unique shape 
and design, it is easily distinguished from the older AGM-86, which can be fitted with 
either a nuclear or a conventional warhead. 
Last fall, after 17 years in the U.S. arsenal, the Air Force's more than 400 AGM-129s 
were ordered into retirement by then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. Minot was 
told to begin shipping out the unarmed missiles in small groups to Barksdale Air Force 
Base near Shreveport, La., for storage. By Aug. 29, its crews had already sent more than 
200 missiles to Barksdale and knew the drill by heart. 
The Air Force's account of what happened that day and the next was provided by multiple 
sources who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the government's investigation 
is continuing and classified. 
At 9:12 a.m. local time on Aug. 29, according to the account, ground crews in two trucks 
entered a gated compound at Minot known as the Weapons Storage Area and drove to an 
igloo where the cruise missiles were stored. The 21-foot missiles were already mounted 
on pylons, six apiece in clusters of three, for quick mounting to the wings of a B-52. 
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The AGM-129 is designed to carry silver W-80-1 nuclear warheads, which have a 
variable yield of between 5 and 150 kilotons. (A kiloton is equal to the explosive force of 
1,000 tons of TNT.) The warheads were meant to have been removed from the missiles 
before shipment. In their place, crews were supposed to insert metal dummies of the same 
size and weight, but a different color, so the missiles could still be properly attached 
under the bomber's wings. 
A munitions custodian officer is supposed to keep track of the nuclear warheads. In the 
case of cruise missiles, a stamp-size window on the missile's frame allows workers to 
peer inside to check whether the warheads within are silver. In many cases, a red ribbon 
or marker attached to the missile serves as an additional warning. Finally, before the 
missiles are moved, two-man teams are supposed to look at check sheets, bar codes and 
serial numbers denoting whether the missiles are armed. 
Why the warheads were not noticed in this case is not publicly known. But once the 
missiles were certified as unarmed, a requirement for unique security precautions when 
nuclear warheads are moved -- such as the presence of specially armed security police, 
the approval of a senior base commander and a special tracking system -- evaporated. 
The trucks hauled the missile pylons from the bunker into the bustle of normal air base 
traffic, onto Bomber Boulevard and M Street, before turning onto a tarmac apron where 
the missiles were loaded onto the B-52. The loading took eight hours because of unusual 
trouble attaching the pylon on the right side of the plane -- the one with the dummy 
warheads. 
By 5:12 p.m., the B-52 was fully loaded. The plane then sat on the tarmac overnight 
without special guards, protected for 15 hours by only the base's exterior chain-link fence 
and roving security patrols. 
Air Force rules required members of the jet's flight crew to examine all of the missiles 
and warheads before the plane took off. But in this instance, just one person examined 
only the six unarmed missiles and inexplicably skipped the armed missiles on the left, 
according to officials familiar with the probe. 
"If they're not expecting a live warhead it may be a very casual thing -- there's no need to 
set up the security system and play the whole nuclear game," said Vest, the former Minot 
airman. "As for the air crew, they're bus drivers at this point, as far as they know." 
The plane, which had flown to Minot for the mission and was not certified to carry 
nuclear weapons, departed the next morning for Louisiana. When the bomber landed at 
Barksdale at 11:23 a.m., the air crew signed out and left for lunch, according to the probe. 
It would be another nine hours -- until 8:30 p.m. -- before a Barksdale ground crew 
turned up at the parked aircraft to begin removing the missiles. At 8:45, 15 minutes into 
the task, a separate missile transport crew arrived in trucks. One of these airmen noticed 
something unusual about the missiles. Within an hour, a skeptical supervisor had 
examined them and ordered them secured. 
By then it was 10 p.m., more than 36 hours after the warheads left their secure bunker in 
Minot. 
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Once the errant warheads were discovered, Air Force officers in Louisiana were alarmed 
enough to immediately notify the National Military Command Center, a highly secure 
area of the Pentagon that serves as the nerve center for U.S. nuclear war planning. Such 
"Bent Spear" events are ranked second in seriousness only to "Broken Arrow" incidents, 
which involve the loss, destruction or accidental detonation of a nuclear weapon. 
The Air Force decided at first to keep the mishap under wraps, in part because of policies 
that prohibit the confirmation of any details about the storage or movement of nuclear 
weapons. No public acknowledgment was made until service members leaked the story to 
the Military Times, which published a brief account Sept. 5. 
Officials familiar with the Bent Spear report say Air Force officials apparently did not 
anticipate that the episode would cause public concern. One passage in the report 
contains these four words: 
"No press interest anticipated." 
 
'What the Hell Happened Here?'  
The news, when it did leak, provoked a reaction within the defense and national security 
communities that bordered on disbelief: How could so many safeguards, drilled into 
generations of nuclear weapons officers and crews, break down at once? 
Military officers, nuclear weapons analysts and lawmakers have expressed concern that it 
was not just a fluke, but a symptom of deeper problems in the handling of nuclear 
weapons now that Cold War anxieties have abated. 
"It is more significant than people first realized, and the more you look at it, the stranger 
it is," said Joseph Cirincione, director for nuclear policy at the Center for American 
Progress think tank and the author of a history of nuclear weapons. "These weapons -- the 
equivalent of 60 Hiroshimas -- were out of authorized command and control for more 
than a day." 
The Air Force has sought to offer assurances that its security system is working. Within 
days, the service relieved one Minot officer of his command and disciplined several 
airmen, while assigning a major general to head an investigation that has already been 
extended for extra weeks. At the same time, Defense Department officials have 
announced that a Pentagon-appointed scientific advisory board will study the mishap as 
part of a larger review of procedures for handling nuclear weapons. 
"Clearly this incident was unacceptable on many levels," said an Air Force spokesman, 
Lt. Col. Edward Thomas. "Our response has been swift and focused -- and it has really 
just begun. We will spend many months at the air staff and at our commands and bases 
ensuring that the root causes are addressed." 
While Air Force officials see the Minot event as serious, they also note that it was 
harmless, since the six nuclear warheads never left the military's control. Even if the 
bomber had crashed, or if someone had stolen the warheads, fail-safe devices would have 
prevented a nuclear detonation. 
But independent experts warn that whenever nuclear weapons are not properly 
safeguarded, their fissile materials are at risk of theft and diversion. Moreover, if the 
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plane had crashed and the warheads' casings cracked, these highly toxic materials could 
have been widely dispersed. 
"When what were multiple layers of tight nuclear weapon control internal procedures 
break down, some bad guy may eventually come along and take advantage of them," said 
a former senior administration official who had responsibility for nuclear security. 
Some Air Force veterans say the base's officers made an egregious mistake in allowing 
nuclear-warhead-equipped missiles and unarmed missiles to be stored in the same 
bunker, a practice that a spokesman last week confirmed is routine. Charles Curtis, a 
former deputy energy secretary in the Clinton administration, said, "We always relied on 
segregation of nuclear weapons from conventional ones." 
Former nuclear weapons officials have noted that the weapons transfer at the heart of the 
incident coincides with deep cuts in deployed nuclear forces that will bring the total 
number of warheads to as few as 1,700 by the year 2012 -- a reduction of more than 50 
percent from 2001 levels. But the downsizing has created new accounting and logistical 
challenges, since U.S. policy is to keep thousands more warheads in storage, some as a 
strategic reserve and others awaiting dismantling. 
A secret 1998 history of the Air Combat Command warned of "diminished attention for 
even 'the minimum standards' of nuclear weapons' maintenance, support and security" 
once such arms became less vital, according to a declassified copy obtained by Hans 
Kristensen, director of the Federation of American Scientists' nuclear information project. 
The Air Force's inspector general in 2003 found that half of the "nuclear surety" 
inspections conducted that year resulted in failing grades -- the worst performance since 
inspections of weapons-handling began. Minot's 5th Bomb Wing was among the units 
that failed, and the Louisiana-based 2nd Bomb Wing at Barksdale garnered an 
unsatisfactory rating in 2005. 
Both units passed subsequent nuclear inspections, and Minot was given high marks in a 
2006 inspection. The 2003 report on the 5th Bomb Wing attributed its poor performance 
to the demands of supporting combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Wartime 
stresses had "resulted in a lack of time to focus and practice nuclear operations," the 
report stated. 
Last year, the Air Force eliminated a separate nuclear-operations directorate known 
informally as the N Staff, which closely tracked the maintenance and security of nuclear 
weapons in the United States and other NATO countries. Currently, nuclear and space 
operations are combined in a single directorate. Air Force officials say the change was 
part of a service-wide reorganization and did not reflect diminished importance of nuclear 
operations. 
"Where nuclear weapons have receded into the background is at the senior policy level, 
where there are other things people have to worry about," said Linton F. Brooks, who 
resigned in January as director of the National Nuclear Security Administration. Brooks, 
who oversaw billions of dollars in U.S. spending to help Russia secure its nuclear 
stockpile, said the mishandling of U.S. warheads indicates that "something went seriously 
wrong." 
68 
 
A similar refrain has been voiced hundreds of times in blogs and chat rooms popular with 
former and current military members. On a Web site run by the Military Times, a former 
B-52 crew chief who did not give his name wrote: "What the hell happened here?" 
A former Air Force senior master sergeant wrote separately that "mistakes were made at 
the lowest level of supervision and this snowballed into the one of the biggest mistakes in 
USAF history. I am still scratching my head wondering how this could [have] happened." 
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Appendix D 
B-52 mistakenly flies with nukes aboard 
 
Michael Hoffman 
Sept. 4, 2007 
Military Times 
A B-52 bomber mistakenly loaded with six nuclear warheads flew from Minot Air Force 
Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., on Aug. 30, resulting in an Air Force-wide 
investigation, according to three officers who asked not to be identified because they 
were not authorized to discuss the incident. 
The B-52 was loaded with Advanced Cruise Missiles, part of a Defense Department 
effort to decommission 400 of the ACMs. But the nuclear warheads should have been 
removed at Minot before being transported to Barksdale, the officers said. The missiles 
were mounted onto the pylons of the bomber‘s wings. 
Advanced Cruise Missiles carry a W80-1 warhead with a yield of 5 to 150 kilotons and 
are specifically designed for delivery by B-52 strategic bombers. 
Air Force spokesman Lt. Col. Ed Thomas said the transfer was safely conducted and the 
weapons were in Air Force custody and control at all times. 
However, the mistake was not discovered until the B-52 landed at Barksdale, which left 
the warheads unaccounted for during the approximately 3 1/2 hour flight between the two 
bases, the officers said. 
An investigation headed by Maj. Gen. Douglas Raaberg, director of Air and Space 
Operations at Air Combat Command Headquarters, was launched immediately to find the 
cause of the mistake and figure out how it could have been prevented, Thomas said. 
Air Force officials wouldn‘t officially specify whether nuclear weapons were involved, in 
accordance with long-standing Defense Department policy regarding nuclear munitions, 
Thomas said. However, the three officers close to the situation did confirm the warheads 
were nuclear. 
Officials at Minot immediately conducted an inventory of its nuclear weapons after the 
oversight was discovered, and Thomas said he could confirm that all remaining nuclear 
weapons at Minot are accounted for. 
―Air Force standards are very exacting when it comes to munitions handling,‖ he said. 
―The weapons were always in our custody and there was never a danger to the American 
public.‖ 
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At no time was there a risk for a nuclear detonation, even if the B-52 crashed on its way 
to Barksdale, said Steve Fetter, a former Defense Department official who worked on 
nuclear weapons policy in 1993-94. A crash could ignite the high explosives associated 
with the warhead, and possibly cause a leak of the plutonium, but the warheads‘ elaborate 
safeguards would prevent a nuclear detonation from occurring, he said. 
―The main risk would have been the way the Air Force responded to any problems with 
the flight because they would have handled it much differently if they would have known 
nuclear warheads were onboard,‖ he said. 
The risk of the warheads falling into the hands of rogue nations or terrorists was minimal 
since the weapons never left the United States, according to Fetter and Michael 
O‘Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, an independent research and 
policy think tank in Washington, D.C. 
The crews involved with the mistaken load at the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot have been 
temporarily decertified from performing their duties involving munitions pending 
corrective actions or additional training, Thomas said. 
Air Combat Command will have a command-wide mission stand down Sept. 14 to review 
their procedures in response to this oversight, he said. 
―The Air Force takes its mission to safeguard weapons seriously,‖ he said. ―No effort will 
be spared to ensure that the matter is thoroughly and completely investigated.‖ 
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Appendix E 
Defense Department Briefing Regarding Mistaken Shipment of Weapons 
 
Presenter: Geoff Morrell 
Sept. 5, 2007 
Federal News Service 
 
SECTION: DEPARTMENT DEFENSE BRIEFING 
(Only relevant part included) 
Q     This story that we now learned about, the Air Force inadvertently transporting six 
nuclear warheads from North Dakota to Louisiana -- how is it that these warheads were 
missing from Minot Air Force Base for some three or four hours and nobody apparently 
knew about it? 
MR. MORRELL:  Well, I think as you all know, it's long-standing policy of this 
department not to talk about nuclear weapons, so I can't confirm or deny that indeed the 
nuclear weapons were involved in the incident which you relayed to me. 
I can, however, tell you that the Air Force is currently investigating an error made last 
Thursday in the transfer of munitions, as you mentioned, from Minot Air Force Base to 
Barksdale Air Force Base aboard a B-52 Stratofortress. 
I can also tell you furthermore that Secretary Gates was quickly informed of this incident.  
He was called, I believe, early Friday morning and he has been receiving daily briefings 
from General Buzz Moseley, the Air Force chief of staff, on actions that the Air Force is 
taking and the progress of their investigation.  Furthermore Secretary Gates has been 
assured by General Moseley that the munitions were part of a routine transfer between 
the two bases and at all times, they were in the custody and control of Air Force 
personnel, and at no time was the public in danger. 
Q     But I mean, apparently we've had the commander relieved of his command.  We've 
had some airmen who have been suspended.  Can you -- I mean, how serious an incident 
was this?  And was there, at any time, any real danger on the ground? 
MR. MORRELL:  I'm not aware of any disciplinary action that's been taken.  I am told 
however that the Air Force should complete a full report on this matter, including any 
prospective corrective actions which need to take place, and that should be delivered to 
the secretary by the end of next week.  With regards to how important of how 
troublesome this is, I forget how you characterize it.  Well, it's clearly important enough 
that the secretary was informed of it and that he has requested daily briefings from 
General Moseley as to what they are doing to fix the problem and to get to the bottom of 
the problem.  I can also tell you that it's important enough that President Bush was 
notified of it, so it's clearly important.  But I cannot as a matter of policy as I've stated 
before discuss whether or not nuclear weapons were involved. 
Q     You said very early in the morning.  When?  Was he actually awakened to the -- 
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MR. MORRELL:  I'm not clued in on the secretary's sleep patterns just yet.  But I am told 
he was told early in the morning that Friday morning. 
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Appendix F 
Loose Nukes: Warheads in the Sky 
 
Mike Nizza 
Sept. 5, 2007 
The Lede Blog by New York Times 
The Military Times brings word of a screw-up in the United States Air Force that has already 
cost a squadron leader his command and sent shocked headlines around the Web.  
On Aug. 30, a B-52 bomber took off from Minot Air Force base in North Dakota with 
between five and six nuclear warheads, the report says. They were supposed to be detached 
from cruise missiles before the flight. 
The good news: the plane did not embark on some rogue mission straight out of TV‘s 
―24,‖ instead landing safely and without the intervention of Jack Bauer at Barksdale Air 
Force Base in Louisiana.  
The bad news: the weapons were missing from Minot during the three-hour flight, and no 
alarms sounded. At first glance, that‘s extremely scary — loose nukes! — but there was ―never 
a danger to the American public,‖ according to one official quoted by the Military Times. 
Even if the bomber crashed, there would be no nuclear detonation:  
A crash could ignite the high explosives associated with the warhead, and possibly cause 
a leak of the plutonium, but the warheads‘ elaborate safeguards would prevent a nuclear 
detonation from occurring, [Steve Fetter, a former Defense Department official who 
worked on nuclear weapons policy in 1993-94,] said. 
―The main risk would have been the way the Air Force responded to any problems with 
the flight because they would have handled it much differently if they would have known 
nuclear warheads were onboard,‖ he said. 
The military immediately sent alerts up the chain of command, including President Bush 
and Gen. Peter Pace , the chairman of the joint chiefs, Agence France Presse said.  
And the Air Force launched an immediate investigation ―to find the cause of the mistake 
and figure out how it could have been prevented,‖ the Military Times said. It evidently 
faulted the squadron commander, as a fairly damning quote — ―the Air Force has lost all 
confidence in his ability to handle nuclear weapons‖ — suggests in an NBC News report. 
Friday, 9:03 a.m. Eastern Arms Control Wonk notices a news release from Minot Air Force Base 
with a headline that is extremely funny in hindsight: ―Enjoy a safe Labor Day weekend.‖ 
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Appendix G 
Flight of Nuclear Warheads Over U.S. Is Under Inquiry 
 
AP Newswire 
Sept. 6, 2006 
New York Times 
 
A B-52 bomber was mistakenly armed with six nuclear warheads and flown for more 
than three hours across several states last week, prompting an Air Force investigation and 
the firing of one commander, Pentagon officials said Wednesday.  
  The incident was so serious that President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates 
were quickly informed, and Mr. Gates has asked for daily briefings on the Air Force 
inquiry, said Geoff Morrell, a press secretary at the Department of Defense.  
  ''At no time was the public in danger,'' Mr. Morrell said. 
  The plane was carrying advanced cruise missiles from Minot Air Force Base in North 
Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana on Aug. 30, said the officials, who 
spoke on condition of anonymity because of a Defense Department policy not to confirm 
information on nuclear weapons. 
  The missiles, which are being decommissioned, were mounted onto pylons on the 
bomber's wings, and it is unclear why the warheads had not been removed beforehand. 
  Representative Ike Skelton, Democrat of Missouri and the chairman of the House 
Armed Services Committee, called the mishandling of the weapons ''deeply disturbing'' 
and said the committee would press the military for details. Representative Edward J. 
Markey, Democrat of Massachusetts and a senior member of the Homeland Security 
Committee, said the incident was ''absolutely inexcusable.'' 
  ''Nothing like this has ever been reported before, and we have been assured for decades 
that it was impossible,'' said Mr. Markey, the co-chairman of the House task force on 
nonproliferation. 
  The Air Combat Command has ordered a commandwide stand down on Sept. 14 to 
review procedures, officials said. They said there was minimal risk to crews and the 
public because of safety features designed into the munitions. 
  The munitions squadron commander has been relieved of his duties, an official said, and 
crews involved with the mistaken load, including ground crew workers, have been 
temporarily decertified for handling munitions. 
  The investigation is expected to take several weeks. 
  The incident was first reported by The Military Times newspaper group. 
  ''There is no more serious issue than the security and proper handling of nuclear 
weapons,'' Mr. Skelton said in a statement Wednesday. ''The American people, our 
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friends and our potential adversaries must be confident that the highest standards are in 
place when it comes to our nuclear arsenal.'' 
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Appendix H 
In Error, B-52 Flew Over U.S. With Nuclear-Armed Missiles 
 
Josh White 
Sept. 6, 2006 
Washington Post 
 
An Air Force B-52 bomber flew across the central United States last week with six cruise 
missiles armed with nuclear warheads that were mistakenly attached to the airplane's 
wing, defense officials said yesterday. 
The Stratofortress bomber, based at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, was 
transporting a dozen Advanced Cruise Missiles to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana 
on Aug. 30. But crews inadvertently loaded half of them with nuclear warheads attached. 
Air Force officials said the warheads were not activated and at no time posed a threat to 
the public. But a timeline of the episode supplied by the Air Force yesterday to House 
and Senate lawmakers indicated that the missiles in question sat on a runway in Louisiana 
for nearly 10 hours before workers noticed that the nuclear warheads were inside.  
Military officials also said they were concerned that the warheads were unaccounted for 
several hours while the missiles were in transit. The missiles never left Air Force control, 
they said. 
The cruise missiles -- part of an Air Force fleet of more than 400 of their kind -- are being 
retired and usually would not carry nuclear warheads while being transported. Defense 
officials said the B-52's mission last week did not include training runs, so the missiles 
were never meant to be launched. The cruise missiles have a range of about 2,000 miles 
and are designed to hit precision targets well behind a potential enemy's lines. 
Two defense officials said it is unclear how stringent safeguards for the handling of 
nuclear weapons were skirted, allowing the missiles with the warheads to be loaded onto 
a pylon that was then attached to the underside of the B-52's wing. Air Force officials 
said the mistake was a serious breach of rules and that an investigation began 
immediately. 
Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.) and Sen. John 
McCain (Ariz.), the panel's ranking Republican, yesterday jointly called the episode "a 
matter of grave concern" and, in a letter to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, requested 
an investigation of the incident by the Pentagon's inspector general. 
The aircraft's pilots and other crew members were unaware that they were carrying 
nuclear warheads, officials said. "Essentially, this is an issue of a departure from our very 
exacting standards," said Lt. Col. Edward Thomas, an Air Force spokesman at the 
Pentagon, who declined to confirm that nuclear warheads were involved. "The Air Force 
maintains the highest standards of safety and precision, so any deviation from these well-
established munitions procedures is very serious, and we are responding swiftly." 
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The incident, first reported by the Military Times, prompted senior leaders to relieve a 
munitions squadron commander of his duties. Other airmen have been temporarily 
suspended from duties. 
"Nothing like this has ever been reported before, and we have been assured for decades 
that it was impossible," said Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), co-chairman of the 
House Bipartisan Task Force on Nonproliferation. "The complete breakdown of the Air 
Force command and control over enough nuclear weapons to destroy several cities has 
frightening implications not only for the Air Force, but for the security of our entire 
nuclear weapons stockpile." 
The Air Force's Air Combat Command has ordered a stand-down for its bases next week 
to review procedures and prevent a repeat of the mistake. "All evidence seems to point to 
this being an isolated mistake," Thomas said. 
Geoff Morrell, a Pentagon spokesman, told reporters at a news conference yesterday that 
Gates was informed of the incident early last Friday and has been receiving daily 
progress reports. Morrell said President Bush was also notified. 
In a statement yesterday, Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), chairman of the House Armed 
Services Committee, said he found the reports "deeply disturbing." 
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Appendix I 
Bismarck Tribune News Roundup 
 
Staff Report 
Sept. 7, 2007 
Bismarck Tribune 
 
A lot of Americans unexpectedly learned where Minot Air Force Base is this week when 
a B-52 bomber accidentally left the base with nuclear weapons aboard. Reports of the 
nuclear-armed plane, which flew between Minot and a base in Louisiana on Aug. 30, first 
surfaced Wednesday in the Army Times. 
Upon learning that the headline-making flight originated from their state, members of 
North Dakota's Democratic congressional delegation found themselves doubly involved. 
Both Sens. Byron Dorgan and Kent Conrad were briefed on the matter Tuesday, a day 
before it made national headlines. 
Dorgan said he was "very concerned" about the flight and immediately called for a full 
classified briefing to learn more. Conrad said it was "a very serious matter" and Rep. Earl 
Pomeroy called the incident "very troubling." 
After the briefing, which occurred Thursday, Conrad said he was reassured that the Air 
Force was trying to do the right thing to prevent this from happening again. He said Air 
Force officials told him that they will be taking a number of steps, including the dismissal 
of the base's munitions officer, a full review of the incident and a "stand down" day for 
Air Force personnel to receive more training in the handling of nuclear weapons. 
Pomeroy said he was assured during the briefing that the incident will not result in any 
changes in the role of B-52 bomber operations at Minot Air Force Base. 
Hoeven chairs summit 
Gov. John Hoeven traveled to Denver Wednesday to host a summit of the Interstate Oil 
and Gas Compact Commission, a group of governors and other officials who deal with 
state regulation of the energy industry. 
Hoeven is chairman of the group for 2007. 
Wednesday's summit specifically dealt with strategies for improving market conditions 
for domestic oil producers and consumers in the Rocky Mountain and Upper Great Plains 
regions. 
"That means working together to build more pipeline infrastructure to get crude to 
refineries, as well as increased refinery capacity and finished pipeline to get more fuel to 
consumers," Hoeven said in a statement. 
Jurisdiction meeting 
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Extraterritorial jurisdiction, a fancy term for cities having a say in the governing of areas 
at their fringes, is causing some heartburn for a local contractor. 
Brian Bitner argued unsuccessfully during the last legislative session that state law 
governing this issue needed to be changed. Bitner is now looking to schedule a 
community meeting on the issue to "provide a unified voice" to legislators who are 
studying it in the interim. 
The meeting will be held at 7 p.m. Wednesday at the Bismarck Rural Fire Department, 
which is located east of Bismarck on Highway 10. 
(Reach reporter Jonathan Rivoli at 223-8482 or jonathan.rivoli@bismarcktribune.com.) 
Bomber flight grabs attention 
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Appendix J 
 
Commander disciplined for nuclear mistake 
 
By Michael Hoffman  
Sept. 7, 2007  
Military Times 
 
The Air Force continued handing out disciplinary actions in response to the six nuclear 
warheads mistakenly flown on a B-52 Stratofortress bomber from Minot Air Force Base, 
N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., on Aug. 30. The squadron commander in charge 
of Minot‘s munitions crews was relieved of all duties pending the investigation. 
It was originally reported that five nuclear warheads were transported, but officers who 
tipped Military Times to the incident who have asked to remain anonymous since they 
are not authorized to discuss the incident, have since updated that number to six. 
Air Force and defense officials would not confirm the missiles were armed with nuclear 
warheads Wednesday, citing longstanding policy, but they did confirm the Air Force was 
―investigating an error made last Thursday during the transfer of munitions‖ from Minot 
to Barksdale. 
The original plan was to transport non-nuclear Advanced Cruise Missiles, mounted on 
the wings of a B-52, to Barksdale as part of a Defense Department effort to 
decommission 400 of the ACMs. It was not discovered that the six missiles had nuclear 
warheads until the plane landed at Barksdale, leaving the warheads unaccounted for 
during the approximately 3 1/2 hour flight between the two bases, the officers said. 
President Bush was immediately alerted to the mistake and the Air Force launched a 
service-wide investigation headed by Maj. Gen. Douglas Raaberg, director of Air and 
Space Operations at Air Combat Command Headquarters, said Air Force spokesman Lt. 
Col. Ed Thomas. 
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Appendix K 
Wynne heads to Minot to review nuke procedure 
 
The Associated Press 
Sept. 13, 2007 
Military Times 
MINOT, N.D. — The secretary of the Air Force, Michael Wynne, is expected to visit 
Minot Air Force Base on Friday to go over procedures for handling nuclear weapons 
there. 
The visit comes after Pentagon officials confirmed Air Force Times reports that a B-52 
bomber from Minot was mistakenly armed with six nuclear warheads and flown across 
several states last month. 
―Secretary Wynne takes the recent breakdown in the munitions system very seriously and 
is committed to ensuring munitions processes are safe, secure and absolutely reliable,‖ a 
statement from the base said. 
―I don‘t think this can be considered routine,‖ said Sen. Kent Conrad, D-N.D. ―This is the 
secretary of the Air Force coming because there has been a very serious matter develop. 
He is an outstanding person and I think he wants to hear, as he should, what happened 
here to make certain it never happens again. ― 
The Air Combat Command has ordered a command-wide stand down Friday to review 
procedures in response to the Aug. 30 incident. Officials there was minimal risk to crews 
and the public because of safety features designed into the weapons. 
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Appendix L 
Errors Behind Warheads' Flight Unfold; Nuclear and Nonnuclear Missiles Were 
Stored in Same Bunker, Lawmaker Says 
 
Walter Pincus 
Sept. 28, 2007 
Washington Post 
 
An Air Force decision to store nuclear-armed cruise missiles in the same North Dakota 
bunker as missiles containing dummy warheads played a key role in the unrecognized 
transport of six nuclear devices from North Dakota to Louisiana last month, according to 
the head of a congressional oversight committee. 
Rep. Ellen O. Tauscher (D-Calif.), chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee 
on strategic weapons, said the decision "created a mistake waiting to happen."  
Tauscher said she has been briefed on the interim conclusions of two Air Force 
investigations into the troubled Aug. 30 flight of a B-52 bomber over the country with six 
nuclear-armed, air-launched AGM-129 cruise missiles under its wing. "We still don't 
know exactly what happened," she added. 
It was the first known flight by a nuclear-armed bomber over U.S. airspace without 
special authorization in nearly 40 years. As previously reported in The Washington Post, 
the six nuclear warheads, each with the explosive power of more than 10 Hiroshima 
atomic bombs, were unnoticed -- and without safeguards -- for 36 hours. 
Tauscher said her subcommittee will hold hearings in the next two weeks to examine the 
results of two Air Force investigations now underway. "We are going to be looking into 
inventory controls of the weapons," she said. She referred to the elaborate nuclear 
safeguards, requiring  multiple orders and checklists supervised by trained personnel, that 
have governed any nuclear weapon's movements. 
Summing up the briefings to date, Tauscher described as the "antecedent problem" the 
dismantling of some AGM-129s whose nuclear warheads were replaced with metal 
dummies of the same size and weight. 
"You can't leave them in the same facility [as missiles with nuclear warheads] and expect 
people to tell the difference, . . . not from five feet away," she said. 
One focus of her inquiry will be when and why the Air Force dropped a policy of keeping 
nuclear weapons separate from nonnuclear ones. Another will be how related security 
protections "fell apart at two different bases," Tauscher added. "We are going to check 
the checkers," she said. 
She said the committee also plans to look at the process of decommissioning nuclear 
weapons. In the past, retired nuclear weapons were sent to the Pantex facility in Texas, 
where the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 
oversees the assembly and the disassembly of warheads. 
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In this case, the W80 warheads being removed from AGM-129s were stored by the Air 
Force before they were turned over to the NNSA. 
"I want to see NNSA involved in this process," Tauscher said. In addition, she plans to 
look at why the Air Force turned the delivery of the missiles into a training flight. 
The B-52 crew that flew from Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana to Minot Air Force 
Base in North Dakota to pick up the missiles did not include personnel trained in the 
handling of nuclear weapons. Tauscher confirmed that one of the crew members 
performed an inadequate check of the missiles after they were loaded onto the plane, 
looking only at those without the warheads and skipping the nuclear-armed missiles on 
the other side. 
The most important person in the flight crew, she said, was the one assigned to look 
through a five-eighths-inch hole in each missile to determine whether the warhead inside 
was a dummy or a nuclear one. 
Referring to the series of errors, Tauscher said: "We are lucky it didn't happen before." 
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Appendix M 
Nukes not 
 
Opinion 
Sept. 17, 2007 
Bismarck Tribune 
Bud Abbott and Lou Costello were a legendary comedy duo. They would both be on 
their feet if they were competing in the television reality show, "Last Comic Standing." 
Quite a feat, since they've been dead for years. 
But one piece of their genius - Who's on First - could arguably be applicable to what 
happened recently when a B-52 bomber flew from Minot Air Force Base to Louisiana 
mistakenly armed with six nuclear warheads. 
Costello: Well then, who's on first? Abbott: Yes. Costello: I mean the fellow's name. 
Abbott: Who. Costello: The guy on first. Abbott: Who. Costello: The first baseman. 
Abbott: Who. Costello: The guy playing... Abbott: Who is on first! Costello: I'm 
asking YOU who's on first. Abbott: That's the man's name. Costello: That's who's 
name? Abbott: Yes. Costello: Well go ahead and tell me. Abbott: That's it. Costello: 
That's who? Abbott: Yes. 
The city of Minot, the base and the military might not like that characterization; maybe 
it isn't even completely fair or perfectly applicable. But here's a fact: There is no room 
for error when nukes are involved. And here's a question: Who - not the first baseman 
- was responsible, or even more importantly, "what" was responsible? 
Make no mistake. This was a big mistake, big enough to be brought to the attention of 
the president and the secretary of defense. Big enough to have many high ranking 
officials and politicians falling all over themselves in efforts to "fix" the problem 
and/or gain publicity. 
Words such as "deeply disturbing," "absolutely inexcusable," "impossible," "serious 
issue," "full investigation" have been used. That's good. 
Certainly, many would like the publicity of the incident to go away. That effort 
included contextualizing the news by making it known that the public was never in 
danger and that the weapons were designed with safety features that would not have 
allowed detonation upon impact. That is not the issue. This is: If a mistake of this 
magnitude can occur, what other mistakes have - or will - occur in the future, which 
could - or already did - lead to real safety concerns. 
Past policies, especially during the Cold War years, have included strict guidelines to 
ensure no one person could ever gain access or control of a dangerous weapon. 
Weapon storage areas, weapon movement and loaded airplanes have long been heavily 
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guarded by special police. Munitions specialists have followed strict guidelines when 
working on, moving or loading weapons. And crewmembers have followed two-man 
and two-officer policy controls when preparing for flights and managing weapons. 
The key to safety and consistency always has been constant training and practice, 
checks and double checks. So, with this huge mistake, the public deserves to know 
how it happened and how potential mistakes will be avoided in the future. This time, 
the words "trust me" aren't enough. 
This was not something that just happened. The conditions leading to the gaff took 
some time. Imagine this scenario. Rewind to the end of the Cold War and the return 
home from Desert Storm when the Air Force began extensive downsizing, based more 
than likely on political decisions rather than on what was best for the Air Force and its 
mission to defend the country. 
While career military men were being "kicked out" - or to be politically correct, 
downsized - it would be hard to argue that this hasn't led to an erosion of policy, 
guidelines and proper training, exacerbated by the demand for ever-increasing 
missions to support our recent battles abroad. 
Any investigation into what happened should not be an individual witch hunt, looking 
to burn at the stake a few enlisted men or officers responsible. The investigation 
should, however, uncover the necessary redundancy systems, policies and procedures 
that have been altered - and by whom - that made it easier for this and future human 
error to go undetected. Then changes need to be made. 
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Appendix N 
Minot AFB safety record tops 
 
Curt Zimbelman 
Sept. 17, 2007 
Bismarck Tribune 
 
We all know and have heard that there is an ongoing investigation into the incident 
involving the transportation of strategic munitions from Minot to Barksdale Air Force 
Base, La. From what we have read and heard in the media, the focus of the study is on 
how the incident occurred; in other words, it is an investigation that will result in 
systemic improvements to the procedures of the Air Force. The focus is not on an 
accident or on an issue of safety. I have heard nothing but support for Minot Air Force 
Base from every part of the Minot community. 
As our friends from around the country as well as national media outlets make statements 
that call into question the professionalism of the airmen at the Minot AFB, consider the 
following facts: 
3 The B-52s at Minot AFB were dedicated to strategic deterrence during the Cold War 
and flew with strategic munitions onboard for more than 30 years until the early '90s. 
3 The B-52s have been at Minot AFB since the '60s and have never had an accident with 
munitions on a plane, either conventional or strategic. 
3 Both the 5th Bomb Wing and the 91st Space Wing are evaluated by an exhaustive 
inspection called the Nuclear Surety Inspection, which is a pass/fail inspection. Both 
wings have consistently passed that inspection, and individual units within each wing 
have been recognized with superior accomplishments. Passing the NSI inspection is the 
national license to work with nuclear devices. 
3 The airmen at the Minot AFB are highly trained individuals who have their safety, the 
safety of their North Dakota neighbors and the defense of our nation in the forefront of 
their minds. 
3 When the B-52 deploys to areas of regional conflict to support the objectives of our 
country, they deploy loaded with munitions and have done so safely without incident. 
3 The B-52s travel to practice ranges to drop live ordnance, and those missions involve 
flying loaded with the munitions that will be dropped on the range. Those missions have 
occurred without incident. 
3 The munitions, whether strategic or conventional, are all treated the same in the loading 
process and in the flying mission. Safety is job one, and again, there has never been an 
accident. 
Minot and Minot AFB have been called a team and referred to as one big community. We 
all know that when a member of a team or our community needs help, we pull together to 
help our team or neighbor. This is one of those times when the community of Minot will 
stand with our friends and neighbors at Minot AFB. 
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5 to be fired for Minot nuclear mistake 
 
Pauline Jelinek -  
Oct. 18, 2007 
Military Times (Associated Press story) 
The Air Force is planning to fire at least five officers for an incident in which nuclear-
armed missiles were mistakenly loaded on a B-52 bomber and flown across the U.S. — 
the worst known violation of nuclear security rules in decades. 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates is scheduled to be briefed Friday on the plan to fire the 
officers and other results of a six-week Air Force probe into the Aug. 30 incident. No one 
noticed for hours that the weapons were on the bomber, several Defense Department 
officials said. 
One said the investigation found long-established procedures for handling the munitions 
were not followed and it recommends that five or more officers be relieved of their 
duties. 
All spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak on the 
record. Two also said parts of the report were still being reviewed by senior Air Force 
officials, though it was unclear whether any changes in it were planned. 
The Air Force planned a press conference for 3 p.m. Friday to discuss the matter, a 
spokesman said. 
The service said last month that one munitions squadron commander was fired shortly 
after the August flight and that ground crews and others involved had been temporarily 
decertified for handling weapons. 
In an embarrassing incident that lawmakers called very disturbing, the B-52 mistakenly 
armed with six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles flew from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to 
Barksdale Air Force Base, La., with the missiles mounted under one of the bomber‘s 
wings. 
The officials declined to say what procedures were not followed. But the mishandling in 
August would have required not one mistake, but a whole series of lapses by a number of 
people in order for armed weapons — as opposed to unarmed ones — to be inadvertently 
taken out of a storage bunker, mounted on the B-52, misidentified on a flight manifest 
and flown across the country for some three hours without anyone noticing. 
The plane also sat on a runway with the missiles for hours after arriving in Louisiana 
before the breach was known — meaning a total of 36 hours passed before the missiles 
were properly secured, officials have said. 
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The Air Combat Command ordered a command-wide stand-down — instituted base by 
base and completed Sept. 14 — to set aside time for personnel to review procedures, 
officials said. 
The incident was so serious that President Bush and Gates were quickly informed. 
The Air Force said there was never any danger to the public because the weapons are 
designed with multiple safety features that ensure the warheads do not detonate 
accidentally. 
But officials also have asserted over the years that such a mistake could not happen 
because there were numerous procedures in place to ensure the safe handling of nuclear 
weapons. 
An Air Force spokesman, Lt. Col. Edward Thomas, declined to confirm Thursday 
morning what punishments were planned or give any details of the probe‘s findings, 
saying Gates had not gotten the full report and those to be disciplined were not to be 
notified until later Thursday. 
Three other defense officials said the Air Force planned to formally announce its 
investigation results and the punishments at Pentagon press conference Friday. But two 
of them said that could be delayed if, for instance, Gates wants further information after 
he is briefed or more senior officials in the Air Force, who were still discussing the 
report, disagree with the decision. 
The anticipated disciplinary actions would be the most severe ever brought in the Air 
Force in connection with the handling of nuclear weapons, The Washington Post said in 
Thursday editions, quoting an unidentified official who said that was aimed at sending a 
message about accountability. 
The weapons involved were the Advanced Cruise Missile, a ―stealth‖ weapon developed 
in the 1980s with the ability to evade detection by Soviet radars. The Air Force said in 
March that it had decided to retire the Advanced Cruise Missile fleet soon, and they said 
after the breach that the missiles were being flown to Barksdale for decommissioning but 
were supposed to be unarmed ones. 
Three weeks into the Air Force investigation, Gates also asked for an outside inquiry to 
determine whether the incident indicates a larger security problem on the transfer of 
weapons. Official said his request for the inquiry, which is still under way, did not reflect 
any dissatisfaction with how the Air Force was conducting its investigation. 
White House press secretary Dana Perino said Thursday that President Bush ―appreciates 
the fact that Secretary Gates [had moved quickly] to find out what went wrong, make 
sure it doesn‘t happen again, and hold people to account if anyone did something wrong.‖ 
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Appendix P 
Tough Punishment Expected for Warhead Errors; Officers May Lose Commands 
After Nuclear Missiles Were Flown on Bomber 
 
Thomas E. Ricks and Joby Warrick 
Oct. 18, 2007 
Washington Post  
 
The Air Force has decided to relieve at least five of its officers of command and is 
considering filing criminal charges in connection with the Aug. 29 "Bent Spear" incident 
in which nuclear-armed cruise missiles were mistakenly flown from North Dakota to 
Louisiana, two senior Air Force officials said yesterday. 
Although senior Defense Department officials have not been fully briefed on the results 
of an Air Force probe of the incident, the sources said that at least one colonel is expected 
to lose his position and that several enlisted personnel will also be punished as part 
disciplinary actions that could be among the toughest meted out by the Air Force in years.  
The measures are expected to be formally announced tomorrow along with the detailed 
findings of an internal, six-week investigation into how a B-52 bomber crew mistakenly 
flew from one military air base to another with six nuclear warheads strapped to its 
wings. Air Force veterans have described the Aug. 29 incident as the one of the worst 
breaches in U.S. nuclear weapons security in decades. 
A senior Air Force official familiar with the investigation said officers will be relieved at 
both installations involved in the incident: Minot Air Force Base, N.D., and Barksdale 
Air Force Base, La. A colonel commanding one of the Air Force wings is likely to be the 
highest-ranking officer to be relieved, the official said. 
In addition, the official said, letters of reprimand will be issued to several enlisted service 
members. The personnel actions may be followed by criminal charges against one or 
more people, but that course of action is still being discussed at the highest levels of the 
Air Force, he added. The most likely such charge, he said, would be either dereliction of 
duty or willful disobedience of an order. 
The anticipated personnel and disciplinary actions would be the most severe ever brought 
in the Air Force in connection with the handling of nuclear weapons, one of the officials 
said. The intention is to send the message that "the Air Force is getting back to the roots 
of accountability," the other official said. Both officials spoke on the condition of 
anonymity because the investigation remains active. 
The August event triggered a rare "Bent Spear" nuclear incident alert that was sent to 
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and President Bush. Although some details are not 
yet publicly known, officials familiar with the investigation say the problem originated at 
Minot when a pylon carrying six nuclear-armed cruise missiles was mistaken for one 
carrying unarmed missiles. Minot had been in the midst of shipping unarmed cruise 
missiles to Barksdale for decommissioning. 
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That initial mistake was followed by many other failures, ultimately allowing six nuclear 
warheads to slip outside the Air Force's normal safeguards for more than 36 hours. The 
warheads were airborne for more than three hours and sat for long periods on runways at 
both air bases without a special guard. Air Force officials say there was little risk that the 
warheads could have been detonated, but the lapses could theoretically have led to 
warheads being stolen or damaged in a way that could have disseminated toxic nuclear 
materials. 
One official noted yesterday that the service is determined to handle the case better than 
it did a 1994 incident in which two Air Force F-15C pilots shot down two Army UH-60 
Black Hawk helicopters that were in northern Iraq's "no-fly" zone, killing 26. Few 
disciplinary actions resulted then, an outcome that some generals said should not be 
repeated. 
Gen. John D.W. Corley, who on Oct. 2 became chief of the Air Combat Command, 
traveled to Washington this week to discuss his planned actions with senior Air Force 
officials. Gates is scheduled to be briefed on the Air Force moves tomorrow. 
Officials cautioned, however, that an announcement could be delayed because of 
continuing discussions among top officials over whether the disciplinary action should go 
even higher up the command chain, perhaps to include some generals. 
Both the 5th Bomb Wing, which is based at Minot, and the 2nd Bomb Wing, based at 
Barksdale, are part of the 8th Air Force, which is also based at Barksdale. The 5th Wing 
has been commanded since June of this year by Col. Bruce Emig, according to an Air 
Force Web site. The 2nd Wing is led by Col. Robert Wheeler, who took command in 
July. They are the Air Force's only two B-52 units. 
The 8th Air Force, historically the service's main bomber force, is overseen by Lt. Gen. 
Robert J. Elder Jr., a veteran B-52 pilot. 
91 
 
Appendix Q 
Special Defense Department Briefing Regarding the B-52 Nuclear Weapons 
Incident 
 
Maj. Gen. Richard Newton, Briefer  
Oct 19, 2007 
Federal News Service 
 
MICHAEL WYNNE (secretary of the Air Force):  Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.  
My name is Mike Wynne, and I'm the secretary of the United States Air Force.  I want to 
thank you for being here. 
Normally it is our policy to neither confirm nor deny as to whether were nuclear weapons 
involved.  In this particular instance, I'm going to make an exception, a one-time 
exception.  You know that it would not -- we would not be this upset with ourselves nor 
be striving to restore confidence if this did not involve nuclear weapons.  And that's 
where I think the exception to policy has to go.  
Thank you for being here this afternoon.  The American public has placed great trust and 
confidence in its Air Force to safeguard our country's strategic weapons.  We have for the 
past 60 years and will continue to execute this important mission of providing security for 
all weapons. 
However, as you know, nearly two months ago, a series of apparent errors led to a 
breakdown in munitions-handling procedures, and it resulted in our improper and 
unauthorized transfer of six weapons. This was an unacceptable mistake and a clear 
deviation from our exacting standards.  We hold ourselves accountable to the American 
people and want to ensure proper corrective action has been taken. 
As you know, when the incident occurred, we immediately established that there was 
never an unsafe condition and reported it our national leadership, including the secretary 
of Defense as well as the president. 
At the same time, we promised the American public we would conduct a thorough 
investigation and present the findings of the investigation to our leadership, to our elected 
leaders and to you, the public. 
General Ronald Keys, who was then commander of Air Combat Command, directed 
Major General Doug Raaberg to conduct a commander- directed investigation to find out 
the facts, to determine the causes and to identify corrective action.  The report is 
complete, and we briefed the findings to the secretary of Defense this afternoon. 
Today Major General Richard Newton -- goes by "Dick" -- is here to talk to you about 
the Minot incident. 
But before I turn the podium over to General Newton, I want to assure everyone that 
additional decisive actions are being taken to aggressively examine and implement 
corrective measures at all levels of our Air Force. 
92 
 
The Air Force directed unlimited nuclear surety inspections at every nuclear-capable unit 
in our Air Force.  Our major command Inspector General Offices are methodically 
conducting the investigations now. 
Secretary Gates has asked retired Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry Welch to lead 
an ongoing Defense Science Board standing task force on nuclear weapon surety to 
review security procedures and look more broadly at DOD policies and procedures to 
ensure all factors that led to this incident are explored and addressed. 
Also, Congress requested a top-to-bottom review of the Department of Defense and 
Department Energy nuclear procedures.  In addition to these, General Moseley and I 
charted an Air Force Blue Ribbon Review to examine all aspects of our nuclear weapons 
policy and procedure across all levels of our Air Force.  We have asked Major General 
Polly Peyer to chair this Blue Ribbon Review and make recommendations as to how we 
can improve the Air Force's capability to safely and securely perform our nuclear 
weapons responsibility. 
In regard to the command-directed investigation report, I received an outbrief two days 
ago and have had a chance to review the report myself.  I personally went to Minot and 
Barksdale Air Force Bases to see the process and ensure continued safe and disciplined 
operations.  I spoke with Major General Rayberg (sp) en route, and we agreed that his 
investigation would be paramount.  I firmly believe he has conducted a thorough and 
rigorous investigation.  He provided us a solid understanding of what happened at Minot 
and at Barksdale, and we are making all appropriate changes to ensure that this has a 
minimal chance of ever happening again, but we would really like to ensure it never 
happens again. 
General Newton is currently the assistant deputy chief of staff for Operations, Plans and 
Requirements here at headquarters.  He's a command pilot with flight time in the B-2, the 
B-1 and the B-52. Additionally, he was commander of the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot from 
February of 2000 to December of 2001, so he is very familiar with the mission of our 
bomb wings and specifically operations at Minot. 
He is here today to speak with you about what happened at Minot in late August, to 
discuss what accountability actions have occurred and to answer your questions. 
Before I leave, I must stress that nothing in military procedures is more important than 
ensuring the control and custody of our weapons.  We will determine areas that need to 
be held to higher account and hold those accountable who fall short of our standards. 
We're determined to understand exactly what mistakes were made and what changes are 
needed to ensure that they will not be repeated. 
We know America counts on us.  And through our steady, unwavering resolve and 
actions, our Air Force will live up to the expectations of our nation. 
Thank you.  And now I'll turn it over to General Newton. 
GEN. NEWTON:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 
This afternoon I will share with you what I can about how the weapons transfer error 
occurred, our corrective actions and our efforts to ensure accountability.  The countless 
times our dedicated airmen have transferred weapons in our nation's arsenal, nothing like 
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this has ever occurred.  This was a failure to follow procedures, procedures which have 
proven to be sound.  It involved a limited number of airmen at two bases. 
Our extensive six-week investigation found that this was an isolated incident and that the 
weapons never left the custody of airmen, were never unsecured; but clearly, this incident 
is unacceptable to the people of the United States and to the United States Air Force.  We 
owe the nation nothing less than adherence to the highest standards. 
In addition, our investigation found that there has been an erosion of adherence to 
weapons-handling standards at Minot Air Force Base and at Barksdale Air Force Base.  
We have acted quickly and decisively to rectify this. 
Because of this error, we are aggressively examining and implementing corrective 
measures to our weapons-handling and transfer process. Corrective actions will ensure 
our munitions are handled precisely and safely 100 percent of the time. 
This week, the commander of Air Combat Command relieved several officers.  Minot's 
Wing commander and Maintenance Group commander and Barksdale's Operation Group 
commander received administrative action and were relieved of command. 
The commander of Air Combat Command also took four other specific actions to date at 
the group and squadron level, lieutenant colonel and below.  But for privacy reasons we 
will not discuss specific positions, individuals or actions. 
As you know, the Munitions Squadron commander at Minot Air Force Base was relieved 
shortly after this incident.  The commander of Air Combat Command carefully 
considered individuals at all ranks and levels for accountability.  In addition, he also took 
actions to temporarily or permanently decertify specific individuals from the Personnel 
Reliability Program.  The Air Force Personnel Reliability Program ensures the reliability 
of Air Force personnel who handle, guard and move our most sensitive weapons. 
The commander of Air Combat Command also tasked the 12th Air Force commander, 
Lieutenant General Seip, to review the report and independently assess the culpability of 
all Air Force members who were involved with the weapons transfer.  Should the 12th 
Air Force commander determine disciplinary or adverse administrative action is 
appropriate for selected individuals, arrangements will be made to place those individuals 
under the jurisdiction of the 12th Air Force commander.  As the general court-martial 
convening authority, Lieutenant General Seip has a variety of options at his disposal. 
With that said, I'll provide you an explanation of the incident and then I'll take your 
questions. 
First off, a series of procedural breakdowns and human errors led to the loading and 
transportation of weapons, weapons that should not have been moved, from Minot Air 
Force Base, North Dakota, to Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana.  A Barksdale-
assigned B-52 was on the ground August 29th at Minot prepared to fly 12 cruise missiles 
back to Louisiana.  In accordance with international treaties, the Air Force was 
consolidating advanced cruise missiles for eventual elimination. 
Let me walk you through the five procedural errors that occurred in conjunction with that 
mission that facilitated this serious and unprecedented incident. 
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As you see here, if we'll bring up slide 1, please, on the morning of August 29th, a team 
of Minot airmen was dispatched to the base weapons storage area to pick up and transport 
two pylons to a Barksdale B-52 aircraft. 
For those of you unfamiliar with the term "pylon," for our purposes today, a pylon is a 
self-contained package of six cruise missiles that can be quickly mounted to the wing of a 
B-52. 
What set this in motion, our investigation found, is that one of the two pylons for this 
flight, a tactical ferry mission, had not been properly prepared.  Part of Air Combat 
Command's investigation determined that the reason it was not properly prepared was the 
fact that a formal scheduling process, for tracking the status of the missiles, had been 
subverted in favor of an informal process that did not identify this pylon as prepared for 
the flight. 
Okay, so let's talk about what happened on August 29th.  On that day, the first procedural 
error occurred around 8:20 in the morning, when airmen assigned to the weapons storage 
are failed to examine all the pylons located in the storage area.  The second procedural 
failure occurred when the crew operating the trailer that was moving the pylons to the 
aircraft began hooking up while the required pylon inspection was still underway.  The 
third failure occurred when the crew failed to verify the payload before hooking it up to 
the trailer for transport.  The crew is required to inspect the munitions before departing.  
They did not do that. 
The fourth failure occurred when the Minot munitions control center failed to verify the 
status of the pylons being loaded at about 9:25 in the morning.  The munitions control 
center failed to assess a database, as required, that would have alerted them that one of 
the pylons was not properly prepared for transfer.  At this point, the wrong weapons, 
already in transit to the flightline, and several critical safeguard procedures had been 
disregarded.  The Minot munitions handlers then loaded the pylons onto the B-52, and 
they remained there overnight on a secure flightline. 
A fifth failure occurred the next morning, when the Barksdale- assigned B-52 instructor 
radar navigator neglected to check all missiles loaded for transport, as required. 
The instructor radar navigator performed only a spot check, and only on the right pylon, 
the one that had been properly prepared for transport.  The pylon carrying the wrong 
weapon was never inspected. Those factors and disregard for procedures collectively 
contributed to this serious incident. 
The B-52 took off at 8:40 on the following day and arrived at Barksdale Air Force Base 
at 11:23 that very same morning. 
At Barksdale, the munitions personnel followed the correct procedures.  They unloaded 
the weapons between 7:20 and 8:30 that evening, inspected them and immediately 
reported the mistake and established appropriate security.  Officials at Barksdale then 
notified the chain of command. 
We want to give you also a visual to help understand the sequence of events.  On the 
screen to my left is a slide that depicts the points of failure.  Moving clockwise, and 
starting in the upper right- hand side, you see a standard hangar.  This is where the 
procedural errors began.  The doors opened, our crews entered, and did not perform the 
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required inspection.  The truck then pulls up too soon. At this point, inspections still have 
not been completed. 
At the bottom of the slide are images of the actual pylons leaving the hangar.  This shows 
the pylon that should have been inspected and identified as not prepared for transfer. 
Also depicted on the slide is a B-52 loaded and prepared for departure.  Again the proper 
inspections and checklist procedures did not occur.  This was the last opportunity for our 
airmen to identify the error before the aircraft took off. 
Now let me address our response.  The Air Force acted swiftly when the incident 
occurred.  Our actions have included:  We've conducted an Air Force-wide stockpile 
inventory and verified no additional discrepancies.  The commander of Air Combat 
Command, then General Ron Keys, directed this investigation be led by Major General 
Raaberg. 
As I stated, commanders have been relieved.  Air Force Secretary Wynne directed 
nuclear surety inspections for nuclear-capable units with oversight of the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency. 
All units inspected to date have received a satisfactory rating, the highest rating possible. 
The commander of Air Combat Command decertified the 5th Bomb Wing from specific 
missions and suspended tactical ferry operations.  We ordered a one day stand-down of 
appropriate Air Force units, and the commander of Air Combat Command directed a one-
day stand-down of his entire command. 
The secretary of the Air Force and chief of staff sent messages to all airmen, emphasizing 
the critical importance of discipline, attention to detail and responsibility.  Senior Air 
Force leadership chartered a blue ribbon review, which is examining policies and 
procedures across all levels of organization, not just in Air Combat Command, but 
through the entire force. 
To conclude, this was an unacceptable error that resulted in an unprecedented stream of 
procedural failures.  We are accountable to Congress and we are accountable to the 
American people.  I can assure everyone we're taking the corrective actions and 
continuing to examine our policies and our procedures to ensure the integrity of our 
mission.  From all levels, the Air Force is committed to safely, securely and reliably 
handling of our nation's weapons. 
And with that, I'll take your questions. 
Q     General, you used the words, I think secured flightline. Does that mean that while 
the plane sat in Minot overnight, it was secured to the level that it would have been had it 
been known that nuclear weapons were on it? 
GEN. NEWTON:  The aircraft when it was at Minot Air Force Base on the 29th and the 
30th was in a secure environment because it was on a secure Air Force flightline at Minot 
Air Force Base.  And so it was secure. 
Yes? 
Q     Two-part question.  The first -- you mentioned early in your briefing that there's 
been -- there was an erosion of adherence to the procedures.  Were you able to find out 
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why that had been?  Is this something that became so routine that people just sort of 
flippantly  weren't paying attention to the rules? 
GEN. NEWTON:  This was -- this is a serious error.  We've determined through a very 
thorough and rigorous investigation that it is an isolated incident due to lack of attention 
to detail, adherence to well-established both Department of Defense and Air Force 
guidelines, technical orders and procedures.  And the fact that this event occurred, we 
have determined again that it was an isolated incident to a limited number of airmen, both 
at Barksdale Air Force Base and at Minot Air Force Base. 
Q     By saying there was an erosion in the adherence to the rules made it seem that there 
was a gradual decline in attention to these regulations that led to this thing, as opposed to 
it being sort of a one-off thing. 
GEN. NEWTON:  Let me couch it this way as well.  Again, this being an isolated 
incident -- but the fact that the lack of attention to detail, the lack of professionalism, the 
lack of rigor with applying well-founded Air Force checklist procedures and not 
following those checklist procedures indicate to us from this very thorough and rigorous 
investigation that it was a -- certainly a lack of application of those checklist procedures, 
again, for this isolated incident at Minot. 
Q     Can I ask one (sub ?) question?  The -- but to a layman, the issue of having nuclear 
weapons in the same hangar as conventional weapons seems a bit -- took us, I think -- 
took me, anyway, a bit aback that they would even be stored in the same place.  Is that a 
common procedure, or are they normally stored in separate places so this kind of mix-up 
doesn't happen? 
GEN. NEWTON:  Where the weapons were stored, they were stored in the facilities, as I 
mentioned, and they were stored within DOD guidelines and Air Force guidelines as 
well. 
Q     So it is normal procedure, then, to keep nuclear weapons in the same place as 
conventional -- 
GEN. NEWTON:  These weapons were stored in the proper -- with proper procedures in 
the proper locations at the weapons storage area. 
Yes, ma'am. 
Q     I have a number of follow-up questions.  First of all, on what Peter was saying, did 
you have to get some sort of waiver?  Was a waiver required to store the warheads and 
the missiles in the same facility, in the same hangar? 
GEN. NEWTON:  The weapons were stored in the facilities per DOD guidelines and Air 
Force guidelines as well.  There was -- there was -- 
Q     (Off mike) -- but does it require a waiver to store them together? 
GEN. NEWTON:  The weapons again, as I've mentioned, were stored in the proper 
facilities and were within DOD guidelines and Air Force guidelines as well. 
Q     Is there some reason you can't tell me specifically that -- I'm not understanding, 
because of my lack of knowledge -- is a waiver required to do that, or is a waiver not 
required to do that? 
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GEN. NEWTON:  There was no waiver required in this instance because they were 
stored in a facility, in a weapons storage area in this case, under DOD guidelines and Air 
Force guidelines. 
Q     So when was it decided that that was an acceptable procedure?  And were the 
missiles at that point, in that storage at that point in that hangar -- were they fully fueled?  
Were those missiles actually active missiles? 
GEN. NEWTON:  These -- to consider them being missiles individually -- there were 
actually part of a pylon that was considered to be a package of six missiles that are 
attached to one pylon.  And so -- 
Q     Were any of those missiles fueled? 
GEN. NEWTON:  These missiles were packaged in a way that, again, met Air Force as 
well as DOD guidelines.  And so -- 
Q     Were any fueled? 
GEN. NEWTON:  They were packaged in the manner that is appropriate for them to be 
packaged for the mission; in this case, the tactical ferry operation for them to be 
transferred from -- 
Q     Was there any fuel in those -- 
GEN. NEWTON:  -- they were transferred from, again, from Minot down to Barksdale. 
Q     (Off mike.) 
GEN. NEWTON:  I'd rather not get into those technical details, but just to let you know 
that they were prepared for the tactical ferry operation, and they were also within the 
DOD and Air Force guidelines. 
Q     Can you tell us, to go back to Pauline's question, at what point in all of this were 
these warheads in a position that was something less secure than they would have been if 
they had been recognized at the time to be special weapons? 
GEN. NEWTON:  These weapons were never out of the hands of America's airmen.  
They were always secure and they were, again, they were again under the security and 
control of airmen at all times. 
Q     (Off mike) -- position of less security than they would have been had they been 
understood to be nuclear warheads? 
GEN. NEWTON:  These weapons were always secure at all times. 
Yes. 
Q     Can you say how many individuals have been disciplined so far? 
GEN. NEWTON:  I referred to it in my earlier remarks, that the commander at Minot Air 
Force Base -- the 5th Bomb Wing commander and the Maintenance Group commander 
were relieved of command, along with the 2nd Operations Group commander at 
Barksdale Air Force Based, were relieved of command.  And so there are a number of 
other individuals who have been relieved of their duties as well, but I'd just like to leave 
it at that, if I may. 
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Q     Is it possible that -- do you foresee criminal prosecutions? 
GEN. NEWTON:  I'd rather not go into any type of Uniform Code of Military Justice 
issues.  But as I -- I'll stay in my remarks that the commander of Air Combat Command, 
General Corley, has provided convening authority to the 12th Air Force commander, 
General Seip. 
Q     And one last question if I might, just as you look back on this incident, is it safe, 
again in lay terms, to characterize it as kind of a trainwreck in the sense that once the 
initial error was made of loading real weapons instead of dummy weapons, the other 
errors sort of fell into place behind that?  Is that really what happened here? 
GEN. NEWTON:  How I would characterize it is I would go back to the point that this is 
an isolated incident, in the fact that there are a number of procedural errors that occurred.  
There are a number of errors that occurred by airmen who should have been following 
DOD and Air Force guidelines, technical order procedures and policies and so forth.  The 
fact that they did not follow these procedures, the fact that they did not follow these 
guidelines for technical order -- simple checklist, for instance, leads us to believe that -- 
and through this very thorough investigation, we determined that those policies and those 
guidelines and those tech order procedures and checklists remain sound.  It's the fact that 
our airmen did not follow those checklist procedures. 
Q     Why didn't they follow it?  What have you learned about why they didn't follow it?  
How did this happen, is what I'm asking you. 
GEN. NEWTON:  It is a -- again, the investigation will lead you to the point that these 
airmen again lacked an attention to detail. 
It was a lack of effective supervision, a lack of effective leadership, and the fact that they 
were not following nor did they adhere to these very strict checklist guidelines 
procedures. 
Q     Why were they -- 
Q     I'm sorry.  Can I just ask you a question?  I don't think we're getting to the heart of 
this.  When you asked them, "Why did not you follow these procedures," what was their 
answer? 
GEN. NEWTON:  The reason they didn't follow these procedures, as we've discovered, is 
again to their lack of a attention to detail.  It was due to the fact that they -- for a variety 
of reasons:  they were passive in terms of how they should have been following these 
checklist procedures; the fact that they did not apply the rigor, the same standards that we 
ask of all our airmen to follow through, with certain tech order procedures and checklists. 
It also goes back to not following a formal scheduling process, particularly in the 
weapons storage area. 
Q     I understand that, but my question is, I mean, did you ask them were they aware of 
these procedures?  And when you said, "Why did you not follow them," what was their 
response? 
GEN. NEWTON:  Yes.  They were aware of the checklist procedures. They were aware 
of the technical order procedures.  We have gone back and taken a look at how they were 
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trained and also the qualifications. And so these airmen had been trained.  They had been 
following at some period of time in their careers these checklist procedures and tech 
order procedures.  And again, through their lack of professionalism and attention to detail 
-- and again, leadership and supervision played a role in this as well. 
Yeah? 
Q     But again, did they say, "I was too busy, I had too much work, I didn't care, I didn't 
think those procedures were important"? What did they say? 
GEN. NEWTON:  They -- again, it was one where they -- based on, again, their lack of 
attention to detail in the case of following a variety of checklist procedures and -- is 
where the failure occurred. 
Q     Did you find substance abuse with any case -- (off mike)? 
GEN. NEWTON:  The investigation doesn't lead us to any of that -- that issue at all. 
Yes, sir? 
Q     You narrated a series of mistakes by which these various airmen failed to discover 
that this one pylon had inappropriate weapons.  Was there a prior mistake made in 
preparing this pylon in the first place?  In other words, there were two pylons. 
GEN. NEWTON:  Right. 
Q     One of them had inappropriate weapons.  Through this series of errors, it wasn't 
noticed.  But how did that pylon with inappropriate weapons get placed in there and 
identified to go on this B-52 in the first place?  Didn't somebody make a mistake before 
all this? 
GEN. NEWTON:  The -- yes.  The root cause of what kicked off this incident was a 
breakdown in formal scheduling processes or the lack of formal scheduling process 
within the munitions complex.  It became apparent that the fact that there was no formal 
scheduling process, the fact that the day-to-day mission out in the weapons storage area, 
under the munitions control, was lackadaisical -- it again lacked the attention to detail.  It 
lacked a formal process to the point where it became an informal process.  And again, 
this is where the breakdown of attention to detail, which then led to the procedural errors, 
had the event occur. 
Q     But there were two pylons, six missiles each.  Both pylons are supposed to contain 
missiles without nuclear -- any nuclear warheads.  One of them contained six missiles 
with nuclear warheads. How did that pylon with nuclear warheads get identified in the 
first place as -- to be transported from -- 
GEN. NEWTON:  In this case, we're talking about the left pylon. The left pylon -- again, 
why it arrived in the condition that it was, was -- it started with that simple breakdown in 
-- and the lack of a formal scheduling process within the weapons storage area. 
And then it processes over into airmen who are not doing their job, following well-
established checklist procedures and (takeover ?) procedures. 
Yes.  Yes. 
Q     (Off mike) -- the warheads and -- 
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GEN. NEWTON:  I'm sorry? 
Q     Was some supposed to remove the warheads from those six missiles and failed to do 
that? 
GEN. NEWTON:  Airmen did not do their job following (takeover ?) procedures and 
checklists; that would have prevented this incident from occurring. 
Q     Is that a yes or -- 
GEN. NEWTON:  That's a yes. 
Q     (Laughs.) 
Q     You mentioned the -- what's happening to the top leaders. Can you tell us what has 
happened to the individual -- the airmen involved?  How many were actually involved in 
this at both bases?  Are they still being given -- do they still have these jobs that they did 
before this nuclear weapons accident? 
GEN. NEWTON:  Right now the 5th Bomb Wing is decertified from conducting its 
wartime missions.  And so we have gone through -- as I mentioned in my remarks, we 
have decertified a number of individuals from performing their duties day to day, both at 
Minot Air Force Base and at Barksdale Air Force Base. 
Q     Do you have a breakdown of how many individuals that actually is? 
GEN. NEWTON:  I'd have a rough number for you.  It's several many -- it's certainly less 
than a hundred, but that's a ballpark number. And so -- 
(Cross talk.) 
GEN. NEWTON:  I don't have the specific numbers, but it's less than a hundred. 
Q     (Off mike) -- people that were -- 
Q     Will you take that question, sir? 
GEN. NEWTON:  Let me do this.  Let me take that question, and we'll get back to you as 
soon as we get more of those details. 
Go ahead. 
Q     (Off mike) -- what's going to happen -- 
Q     (Off mike) -- I mean, the Air Force has to know how many. Can you take that 
question? 
GEN. NEWTON:  (Inaudible.) 
Q     (Off mike) -- as far as the involvement of the DOD Inspector General's Office -- are 
they conducting their own separate investigation of the incident?  And if this was a(n) 
isolated incident and just kind of a situation where processes were overlooked, why the 
blue-ribbon, I guess, commission or group to relook at the Air Force procedures overall, 
if it wasn't a problem of the actual procedures (that ?) took place? 
GEN. NEWTON:  I don't have any knowledge of the Department of Defense inspector 
general -- whether or not they have kicked off a formal investigation.  I'm sure we can, 
you know, talk to DOD or we can perhaps get back to you on that. 
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But I do know that the commander-directed investigation, as thorough and as rigorous as 
it was -- it lasted over last weeks.  When I first met with our chief of staff in the early 
morning of the 31st of August and we discussed this, the first thing -- one of the first 
things he mentioned was the fact -- the need to do a very thorough commander-directed 
investigation led by a two-star general. 
Among the many topics we had that morning -- but the second thing he also mentioned 
was he wanted a very thorough, broader review of this incident, and the fact that -- not 
only a broader review that would go beyond just Air Combat Command but through the 
entire United States Air Force.  And so he also, at that point, wanted an outside look.  
And what we have done as part of our blue-ribbon review that Secretary Wynne referred 
to has asked the chief of Naval Operations to provide Navy personnel to be part of this 
overarching blue-ribbon review that will look beyond just Air Combat Command but 
throughout the entire Air Force. 
And so that's -- that is -- as we look forward, as the commander- directed investigation 
report is now complete -- as we look forward, we will have this blue-ribbon review that 
will be overarching. 
Secretary Wynne mentioned that General Peyer is leading that blue- ribbon review.  She 
will report out to our chief of staff by on or about 15 January. 
Yes? 
Q     You said three were relieved of duty, but then several more.  Why the reluctance to 
give us the total number of how many were relieved of duty? 
GEN. NEWTON:  Well, I wanted to underscore the fact that General Corley, the 
commander of Air Combat Command, has relieved senior leaders in this case; as I 
mentioned, the commander of the 5th Bomb Wing and 5th Maintenance Group 
commander at Minot, as the well as the 2nd Operations Group commander.  I also wanted 
to underscore the fact that not only is it with senior leaders; there are other who are 
involved that are lieutenant-colonel and below, as I mentioned. 
The other fact is that we are -- General Corley has provided convening authority for 
UCMJ actions to 12th Air Force.  And so that aspect of this incident will then move on 
into the UCMJ (realm ?). And I'd just like to leave it at that, please. 
Q     (Off mike.) 
GEN. NEWTON:  Three colonels in this case that I mentioned were relieved of duty. 
Yes? 
Q     You said that they were -- the weapons were never left unsecured, and I -- we 
understand that there was some level of security at all times.  But I guess what we need to 
clarify is, what is the difference between the level of security within the hangar and 
outside the hangar where the B-52s spent the night? 
GEN. NEWTON:  Having been the commander at Minot Air Force Base, I, you know, 
appreciate the fact that it's a very safe, secure environment at Minot on our flightlines.  
These weapons, as I mentioned, were never out of  the hands of America's airmen, the 
fact that they were never left unsecured.  The level of security that they were afforded 
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kept these weapons safe and secure.  Not up to the standards that we would have liked, 
but the fact that these weapons were never out of the hands of America's airmen and they 
were secure at all times. 
Yes, sir? 
Q     Minot's got both cruise missiles with and without warheads. Are they stored 
together?  You're talking -- you keep talking about they came out of the hangar.  Do you 
store weapons with nuclear warheads in hangars? 
GEN. NEWTON:  Our weapons across the Air Force, and specifically at Minot Air Force 
Base, are stored within DOD standards and policies and guidelines.  And so they are 
safely and securely stored within the -- and the investigation determined that they were 
stored within all applicable DOD guidelines as Air Force guidelines as well. 
Q     But nuclear weapons storage areas are different from ammo dumps.  Right? 
Yes. 
Q     (Off mike) -- they didn't follow the schedule, the schedule for what?  The schedule 
to have the warhead removed or the schedule to be shipped to Barksdale? 
GEN. NEWTON:  They did not follow the formal scheduling processes that would allow 
them to do the proper maintenance and handling of those weapons, not only in 
preparation for the ferry flight but also to make sure that they were the proper and they 
were the appropriate weapons to be transferred. 
MR.     :  We have time for one more, please. 
Q     (Off mike.) 
GEN. NEWTON:  They did -- not only was the scheduling process broken and not 
followed -- the fact that they did not follow those checklist guidelines and procedures is -
- again this incident occurred because of the number of those errors. 
Last question, I'm sorry.  Go ahead, I'm sorry.  (Cross talk.) 
Q     Other than removing the nuclear weapons, what needs to be done to properly 
prepare one of these pylons for transport? 
GEN. NEWTON:  You go through a number of checklist procedures and -- which will -- 
if you follow the checklist procedures, it will lead you to the point where you will safely 
transfer these weapons in an appropriate manner, and the fact that they will be transferred 
-- again that they were authorized to be transferred in. 
Q     (Off mike) -- done in hours?  Does it take days to do that? 
GEN. NEWTON:  To process, it goes from weeks to days to hours in this case.  And 
those processes broke down. 
Sure. 
Q     And if I may, if this bomb wing has been decertified from doing these tactical ferry 
missions, is there another bomb wing that's doing them in the interim?  Or have you 
suspended -- 
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GEN. NEWTON:  No, all Air Force tactical ferry missions for these cruise missiles has 
been suspended.  (Cross talk.) 
So let me -- can I just leave you with this?  This is a serious error that was caused by a 
breakdown of procedural discipline by airmen.  We're accountable and we will assure the 
American people that the Air Force standards they expect are being met. 
Our wings at Barksdale and Minot are units with a proud heritage. They've had a history 
of excellence.  And we've made some tough decisions but now, we need to restore the 
confidence in these units and move ahead.  And I rest assured, we will.  Thank you. 
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Appendix R 
4 Colonels Lose Their Air Force Commands; 65 Others Also Pay For Nuclear Error 
 
Walter Pincus 
Oct. 20, 2007 
The Washington Post 
 
Four Air Force colonels have been relieved of their commands and more than 65 lower-
ranking officers and airmen have been disciplined over a series of errors that led to a B-
52 flight in August from North Dakota to Louisiana with six nuclear-armed cruise 
missiles that no one realized were under the plane's wing. 
"This was an unacceptable error that resulted in an unprecedented string of procedural 
failures," Maj. Gen. Richard Y. Newton III, assistant deputy chief of staff for operations, 
said yesterday in reporting on a six-week Air Force probe. "Our investigation found that 
there has been an erosion of adherence to weapons handling standards" at Minot Air 
Force Base in North Dakota, where the flight began, and at Barksdale Air Force Base in 
Louisiana, Newton said.  
Rep. Ellen O. Tauscher (D-Calif.), chairman of the House Armed Services strategic 
forces subcommittee, said yesterday that she is "satisfied" with the report and impressed 
that Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has asked the department's science board to take 
a wider view. 
Newton said the problems began with a breakdown in the formal scheduling process used 
to prepare the AGM-129 cruise missiles in question for decomissioning. The AGM-129 
missiles carry nuclear weapons and have stealth capability. But in March, the Pentagon 
decided to retire it in favor of an older AGM-86, which can carry nuclear or  
conventional weapons. 
Part of the preparation involved removing the W-80 nuclear warhead and replacing it 
with a steel dummy on missiles to be flown aboard B-52s to Barksdale for destruction. 
An electronic scheduling system was employed to keep track of the missiles -- using the 
identification numbers of racks containing six of them -- so that crews knew which 
missiles had had their nuclear warheads removed and were ready to be shipped out, 
several sources said. 
On the morning of Aug. 29, the loading crew at Minot used a paper schedule that was out 
of date when they picked up 12 missiles from a guarded weapons storage hangar, six with 
dummy warheads and six that they did not realize had nuclear warheads. 
Newton told reporters the trailer that would carry the pylons to the B-52 arrived early, 
and its crew did not inspect the missiles as they should have before loading them on the 
trailer. The driver called the munitions control center to verify the numbers, but the staff 
there failed to check them. 
At the aircraft, the crew that loaded the pylons, one under each wing, failed again to 
check the missiles, which have a small glass porthole to make clear whether a dummy or 
nuclear warhead is installed. The next morning, Aug. 30, the plane's navigator failed to 
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do a complete check of the missiles, as required, looking under only one wing and not the 
one where the nuclear-armed missiles were. 
"We hold ourselves accountable to the American people and want to ensure proper 
corrective action has been taken," Air Force Secretary Michael W. Wynne, who made an 
inspection trip out to Minot, said yesterday. 
Newton said that the 5th Bomb Wing commander at Minot, Col. Bruce Emig, was 
removed from command, along with his chief munitions officer and the operations officer 
of the B-52 unit at Barksdale. The munitions squadron commander at Minot was relieved 
of command shortly after the incident. The flight in question was the sixth of 12 planned 
ferrying missions, but the rest have been suspended. 
Air Force Major Gen. Polly A. Peyer has been asked to examine potential individual 
culpability, Newton said. He did not rule out other disciplinary action, including courts-
martial. 
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Appendix S 
Wing decertified, COs sacked for nuke mistake 
 
Michael Hoffman  
Oct, 21, 2007 
Military Times 
The widespread disregard for nuclear weapons safety standards by airmen at Minot and 
Barksdale Air Force bases led to the unprecedented ―Bent Spear‖ incident in which six 
nuclear warheads were mistakenly loaded onto a B-52 and flown from North Dakota to 
Louisiana on Aug. 29-30, Air Force officials said Friday after an intensive six-week 
investigation. 
The Air Force relieved the 5th Munitions Squadron commander at Minot immediately 
after the incident. On Friday, it announced that three more commanders have been 
sacked. They are: 
** Col. Bruce Emig, wing commander, 5th Bomb Wing, Minot Air Force Base; 
** Col. Cynthia M. Lundell, commander, 5th Maintenance Group, Minot Air Force Base; 
and 
** Col. Todd C. Westhauser, commander, 2nd Operations Group, Barksdale Air Force 
Base. 
Emig is also the installation commander at Minot. 
An ―erosion of adherence to weapons-handling standards‖ at the two bases led to five 
major procedural errors at Minot, which resulted in a weapons loading crew accidentally 
loading a pylon of nuclear armed air-launched cruise missiles on the wing of a B-52 
bomber. The mistake wasn‘t discovered for 36 hours, long after the plane had touched 
down at Barksdale, said Maj. Gen. Richard ―Dick‖ Newton, deputy chief of staff for 
operations, plans and requirements, and a former 5th Bomb Wing commander, who was 
tasked to brief the findings. 
Since Aug. 30, some 65 airmen of varying ranks — lieutenant colonel and below — have 
lost their certification in the personnel reliability program, which the Air Force uses to 
oversee the character of airmen who handle nuclear weapons, said Lt. Col. Ed Thomas, 
an Air Force spokesman. The large-scale nature of the disciplinary actions points to the 
widespread nature of the problem. 
Lt. Gen Norman Seip, commander of 12th Air Force and Air Forces Southern Command, 
has been tasked by the head of Air Combat Command to review the investigation and 
look into whether any airmen involved in the incident should be charged with a crime 
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or if other disciplinary actions are warranted. 
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In addition, the 5th Bomb Wing has been decertified from handling Advanced Cruise 
Missiles or nuclear warheads and suspended from any tactical ferry operations, Newton 
said. 
―This was a failure to follow procedures, procedures which have proven to be sound,‖ 
Newton said. 
Five steps to failure 
Using the same briefing presented to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates earlier Friday, 
Newton summarized the five mistakes made by airmen that led to the incident and 
offered a timeline of events. 
The first mistake occurred at the beginning of an operation to transport 12 Advanced 
Cruise Missiles on a B-52 Stratofortress bomber from Minot to Barksdale, part of a 
Defense Department program to decommission 400 of these missiles in the U.S. 
stockpile. 
On the morning of Aug. 29, airmen assigned to the Minot weapons storage area were 
supposed to pick up and transport two pylons to a B-52 assigned to Barksdale. Each 
pylon is a self-contained package of six cruise missiles that can be quickly mounted to 
the wing of a Stratofortress. But the pylon had not been properly prepared, and the 
airmen failed to examine all the warheads on the missiles mounted to the pylons. 
Newton confirmed after the briefing that cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads are 
not stored with cruise missiles armed with conventional warheads. Simply, certain pylons 
of cruise missiles have nuclear warheads, while others have dummy warheads that are 
essentially dead weight. 
The second error occurred when ―crews operating the trailer that was tasked with moving 
the pylons to the B-52 began hooking up while the required pylon inspection was still 
underway,‖ Newton said. 
This played a part in mistake No. 3, when the airmen failed to verify the payload of the 
missiles mounted on the pylon that they hooked up to be transported to the B-52, Newton 
said. 
Then, before the cruise missiles should have been transported to the aircraft, the 
munitions control center ―failed to assess a database, as required, that would have alerted 
them that one of the pylons was not properly prepared for transfer,‖ Newton said. 
Due to the first four mistakes, the nuclear warheads were unknowingly towed out to the 
flight line at 9:44 a.m. on Aug. 29 without any of the increased security initiatives used 
when nuclear warheads leave a storage facility. 
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The warheads were loaded onto the B-52 and sat on the flight line, which officials said 
was secure. 
Airmen did have one last chance to catch their mistake before the B-52 took off, but ―the 
Barksdale-assigned B-52 instructor radar navigator neglected to check all missiles loaded 
for transport as required,‖ Newton said. ―The instructor radar navigator performed only a 
spot check and only on the right pylon, the one that had been properly prepared for 
transport.‖ This marked the fifth and final error, according to the Air Force investigation. 
At 8:40 a.m. on Aug. 30, the B-52 took off on its 1,100-mile flight to Louisiana, landing 
there at 11:23 a.m. It sat on the flight line with the nuclear warheads still on its left wing 
for more than eight hours before munitions personnel, who followed correct procedures, 
unloaded the weapons and discovered the enormous mistake. 
Despite the severity of the problems discovered, Air Force officials continue to reassure 
the public that the nuclear weapons were never out of airmen‘s hands, but they 
acknowledged that the standard security procedures for handling nuclear weapons did not 
occur. 
The investigation found this to be an isolated incident, and corrective measures are being 
taken to ensure it doesn‘t happen again. 
―This was an unacceptable mistake and a clear deviation from our exacting standards,‖ 
said Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne, who led off the press briefing. ―We hold 
ourselves accountable to the American people and want to ensure proper corrective action 
is taken.‖ 
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Appendix T 
The Bismarck Tribune - Opinion 
 
Oct. 26, 2007  
Bismarck Tribune 
 
We need to be reassured by the U.S. Air Force as plainly and reliably as possible that 
there shouldn't be a repeat of a chain of events in August involving nuclear weapons, 
events that began in North Dakota and ended in Louisiana.  
The military has a longstanding institutional custom of giving nuance to the information 
about itself it communicates to the civilian world. 
Hardly anything lately has been more nuanced than information made known about the 
response of the Department of Defense and the Air Force to the flight of a B-52 bomber 
from Minot Air Force Base to a base in Louisiana. Through what the Air Force has called 
lack of attention to detail and failure to conduct a required examination, nuclear-armed 
missiles made the trip on the B-52. 
It's not that the incident was able to be hushed up. The response of the DOD all the way 
up to Defense Secretary Robert Gates was a public one: Five Minot AFB officers were 
relieved of their duty, and more than 60 personnel were "decertified." That's military-
speak for being taken off the job, the job of transferring munitions. Reportedly they had 
other duties to keep them busy, but located nowhere close to the advanced cruise missile. 
More is needed, even, than the assignment of replacement officers to the Air Force base, 
where there are new commanders of the bomb wing and the maintenance group. 
Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne must follow up on an assurance that changes 
are being made so that there's only a remote chance of a repeat involving nuclear arms. 
There was talk when the secretary was in Minot recently of a blue-ribbon review panel to 
look into Air Force guidelines and procedures on weapons handling. 
Fair enough, but the civilian citizenry needs to have a front row seat in the audience. If a 
panel finds the regs need to be replaced, rather than merely beefed up, we need to know. 
It "was a rare mistake," said Col. Paul Bell, who now commands the bomb wing. 
Americans aren't inclined to hear the word, mistake, in connection with nuclear weapons. 
Rare? Make it much more rare than rare. 
Reassigning some officers might have been necessary to uphold military discipline. It's 
hard to penetrate the opaqueness of the investigation to know if there was scapegoating, 
whether careers, in effect, are ended. 
That's a personnel issue. The public interest is safety. 
The Air Force may have high regard for its procedures. There probably are duties in the 
Air Force in which an informal approach toward following procedures is not the end of 
the world. 
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We don't want sloppiness when nukes are involved. 
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Appendix U 
The Bismarck Tribune - Opinion 
 
Dec. 14, 2007  
Bismarck Tribune 
 
The Air Combat Command of the Air Force has commenced the process that might lead 
to Minot Air Force Base's bomb wing being recertified for the mission of handling 
nuclear weapons.  
It would be reassuring if a report were released that says what went wrong in August 
when a B-52 bomber was loaded with nuclear weapons for a flight from Minot to an Air 
Force base in Louisiana. 
The Air Force must know. Shudder the thought if it doesn't. 
There was a six-week investigation, and the flight was deemed an "unacceptable 
mistake." Some officers were relieved of duty and replaced, including the bomb wing 
commander. More than 60 airmen were disciplined and barred from handling nuclear 
weapons. 
It wouldn't be surprising if the military holds the report on the incident as classified 
information, even if there is no good reason other than it can. But it could tell us 
something, even if in generalities. 
The 5th Bomb Wing was at fault, and it, along with the 91st Space Wing at the Minot 
base will undergo a regular Nuclear Surety Inspection in January. The space wing has 
charge of 150 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles. The bomb wing is 
gearing up to satisfy an Initial Nuclear Safety Inspection starting Monday. 
There's no precise indication when in 2008 the decision about the base's mission will be 
made. 
The Air Force can talk itself blue in the face to try to make us believe that there was 
never any possibility of a nuclear event or accident when the bomber flew from Minot to 
Barksdale AFB in August. But the incident was consequential enough to demand the 
attention of Pentagon top brass and the secretary of defense, along with every elected 
official with real or perceived interest or connection. 
So, now the Air Force has some work to do to demonstrate a high level of competence in 
handling nukes at Minot. 
If what happened was serious enough to take Minot out of an important aspect of its 
assigned mission for at least several months, it calls for some trust rebuilding. 
Reportedly the bomb wing has been carrying on the majority of its duties. But it won't 
bode well for Minot AFB during the next Base Realignment and Closure round if it hasn't 
regained its full wartime mission. 
It would not be the best thing if the base were to regain its ability to handle nuclear 
weapons and the status not be made public. The base command has been good about 
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keeping the media informed about developments since early September. But it can't be 
forgotten that for a short time after the incident of the armed flight, an attempt was made 
to hush it up. 
Openness is necessary and will help the Minot installation regain the good reputation it 
has had in North Dakota. 
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Appendix V 
New procedures issued for nukes 
 
Jan. 25, 2008 
Bismarck Tribune 
 
WASHINGTON (AP) - The Air Force has issued detailed new procedures and 
requirements for the handling of nuclear weapons in the wake of the blunder last August 
when six nuclear-tipped missiles were flown across the country. 
The 153-page instruction requires that a single munitions officer be responsible for 
custodial duties involving the weapons, and it adds new inspection mandates. It also 
clarifies storage and labeling requirements on all nuclear and non-nuclear munitions, and 
details procedures for transportation or changes in custody of the weapons. 
The new procedures outlined in the order, dated Jan. 17, will be implemented within 45 
days of that date. 
The August incident is not mentioned in the new procedures. But they come after months 
of investigations, reviews, and disciplinary actions for what Air Force Secretary Michael 
W. Wynne described as an "unacceptable mistake and a clear deviation from our exacting 
standards." 
During the Aug. 29-30 incident, a B-52 bomber was inadvertently armed with six 
nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and flown from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to 
Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana without anyone noticing the mistake for more 
than a day. Air Force issues new procedures for handling of nuclear weapons after cross-
country blunder 
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Appendix W 
Panel Cites Drop in U.S. Attention to Nuclear Arsenal;  
B-52's 2007 Flight With Warheads Prompted Review 
 
Walter Pincus 
Feb. 13, 2008 
Washington Post 
 
The Defense Department is displaying a "precipitous decrease in attention" to the security 
and control of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, according to a Defense Science Board task force 
that examined the broader causes behind the U.S. flight in August of a B-52 bomber that 
inadvertently carried six cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads. 
"The decline in DoD focus has been more pronounced than realized and too extreme to 
be acceptable," the task force said in a report released yesterday by its chairman, retired 
Air Force Gen. Larry D. Welch, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.  
Welch, who served in the 1980s as head of the Strategic Air Command and later as Air 
Force chief of staff, told the senators about his concern that "the nation and its leadership 
do not value the nuclear mission and the people who perform that mission." 
The six cruise missiles, which were mistakenly believed to be carrying dummy warheads, 
were loaded on an Air Force B-52 and flown 1,400 miles from Minot Air Force Base in 
North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. 
"No one knew where they were, or even missed them, for over 36 hours," said Sen. Carl 
M. Levin (D-Mich.), chairman of the Senate committee. "This entire episode really is a 
wake-up call." 
The Welch panel pointed out that Air Force colonels, Navy captains and mid-level 
civilians are now responsible for managing the Pentagon's nuclear programs -- a task that 
during the Cold War was handled by senior flag officers or senior civilians. One of the 
panel's recommendations is the appointment of an assistant secretary of defense for 
nuclear enterprise reporting directly to the defense secretary, as well as the naming of 
flag officers in each of the services who would focus solely on nuclear weapons. 
The task force's findings were reflected in a statement made before the committee by 
three senior Air Force officers who had supervised two other inquiries after the B-52 
flight. They said the Air Force's once-central focus on its nuclear mission "has 
diminished since 1991," after the end of the Cold War. At the same time, they said, "the 
Air Force began 17 years of continuous combat including conventional air power 
commitments" using aircraft, such as B-52s, once reserved for nuclear operations. 
The Defense Science Board is made up of experts from the private sector and from 
research groups who are assigned by the defense secretary to study complex technology 
and research problems facing the Pentagon. It found that almost the entire B-52 bomber 
force is focused on conventional missions "as the accepted permanent or semi-permanent 
state of affairs." There is a "widespread perception in both the Navy and Air Force that a 
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nuclear forces career is not the highly promising opportunity of the past era," the panel of 
experts said. 
In the wake of the August incident, seven officers, including the wing commander at 
Minot and two group commanders, were removed from their positions; 90 airmen were 
decertified, some temporarily, from working on nuclear-related jobs. 
The Air Force is also reviewing its inspection process for units charged with nuclear 
weapons maintenance; the unit at Minot Air Force base had received a favorable 
inspection rating shortly before the incident. Air Force Lt. Gen. Daniel J. Darnell, deputy 
chief of staff for operations, told the Senate committee that the Air Force is considering 
reducing the advance notice that units receive before inspections. 
Air Force Maj. Gen. Polly A. Peyer, director of resource integrations, said that nuclear 
safeguards were restored after the incident but that more funding will be sought in the 
fiscal 2010 budget. 
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Appendix X 
Generals grilled on Minot nuclear mishap 
 
Michael Hoffman  
Feb. 12, 2008  
Military Times 
Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee grilled Air Force leaders over how 
six nuclear warheads could mistakenly get loaded onto a B-52 Stratofortress bomber 
flown across the country. 
At a Tuesday hearing, Committee Chair Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., called last August‘s 
nuclear accident a ―wake up call‖ saying that ―no breach of nuclear procedures of this 
magnitude has ever occurred.‖ 
Three Air Force generals and retired Gen. Larry Welch, Air Force chief of staff from 
1986 to 1990, took questions from the senators who expressed concern over how far the 
service‘s nuclear program may have eroded. 
―The sloppiness and lack of discipline and lack of respect for the process didn‘t just 
happen overnight and fixing the problems are going to take awhile,‖ said Sen. Bill 
Nelson, D-Fla. 
Lt. Gen. Daniel Darnell, deputy chief of staff for air, space and information operations 
assured the committee the warheads never migrated off the wings of the B-52 and was 
always under Air Force control. However, Darnell did confirm that appropriate security 
was not present to protect the nukes while all six sat on the runway for close to 36 hours 
first at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., and then at Barksdale Air Force Base, La., before a 
2nd Bomb Wing airman discovered the mistake at Barksdale. 
―Absence of that security represents a significant shortfall,‖ Levin said. 
The intent of the late August mission that went awry was to fly a dozen Advanced Cruise 
Missiles from Minot to Barksdale to be decommissioned. But instead of loading two 
pylons of six non-nuclear missiles each under the B-52‘s wings, the 5th Bomb Wing 
airmen at Minot rolled out one pylon loaded with nuclear warheads and strapped it onto 
one of the wings. 
Maj. Gen. Douglas Raaberg, director of operations of Air Combat Command, testified 
that airmen failed to comply with five specific procedures designed for handling nuclear 
weapons, and committed three scheduling errors, which led to the accident. 
Immediately after the accident was discovered, 90 airmen lost their certification to handle 
nuclear weapons and four high ranking officers lost their jobs, including 5th Bomb Wing 
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Commander Col. Bruce Emig. After further review Raaberg said the Air Force found 25 
airmen directly responsible. 
The Air Force and Defense Department issued separate reports Tuesday on two of three 
investigations launched after the accident occurred. One was prepared by the Blue 
Ribbon Review directed by Maj. Gen. Polly Peyer, director of resource integration in the 
office of the deputy chief of staff for logistics, installations, and mission support; the 
other by the Defense Science Board . 
Between the two reports and the Command Directed Investigation released earlier, the 
Air Force has amassed 132 recommendations to improve its nuclear program. So far, 
Darnell said 41 of those changes have been made. 
In an odd exchange, Levin also asked the four Air Force generals whether the nuclear 
tipped missiles could have leaked plutonium if they had been dropped from the B-52 
during its flight from North Dakota to Louisiana. 
Not one of the officers could answer the Senator‘s question confidently before Nelson, 
and later Levin, pointed out how a B-52 crashed over Spain in 1966 with nukes aboard 
causing the missile‘s high explosives to detonate spewing plutonium into the soil. 
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Appendix Y 
Special Defense Department Briefing Regarding Missile Parts Shipment to Taiwan  
 
Michael Wynne, Lieutenant General Carter Ham, Ryan Henry - Briefers 
March 25, 2008 
Federal News Service 
 
 SPECIAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING SUBJECT: MISSILE PARTS 
SHIPMENT TO TAIWAN BRIEFERS: MICHAEL WYNNE, SECRETARY OF THE 
AIR FORCE; LIEUTENANT GENERAL CARTER HAM, UNITED STATES ARMY, 
DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; RYAN HENRY, 
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 
LOCATION: PENTAGON BRIEFING ROOM, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA TIME: 
10:30 A.M. EDT DATE: TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 2008 
SEC. WYNNE:  Ladies and gentlemen, good morning.  My name is Michael Wynne, and 
I'm the secretary of the Air Force. 
Last week, the Department of Defense learned that four non- nuclear nose cone 
assemblies and their associated electrical components for a ballistic missile where 
mistakenly shipped to Taiwan in the fall of 2006.  These items were originally shipped in 
March 2005 from F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming to the Defense Logistics 
Agency warehouse at Hill Air Force Base in Utah.  There are no nuclear or fissile 
materials associated with these items.  
Upon learning of the error, the U.S. government took immediate action to acquire 
positive control of the components and arranged for their safe and secure recovery to the 
United States.  These items have now been safely returned to the United States. 
(To staff.)  Please bring up the slide, so I can offer a visual perspective.  Okay.  The 
graphic on the slide indicates approximately the size of the device in the shipping 
container.  It's about 22 inches long.  And I brought with me a little plastic model -- this 
is not to scale -- but to tell you that this is what is on there.  And it's a -- fuse assembly is 
a battery-powered electrical fuse.  I'd like to point out that the assembly is classified, 
when it's real, but it does not contain any nuclear or fissile material. 
The DOD has initiated an investigation to determine what happened and how.  
Preliminary information indicates that a shipment took place in response to a Foreign 
Military Sales Order from Taiwan for helicopter batteries.  The Defense Logistics 
Agency mistakenly shipped these items instead of the requested batteries.  It is our 
understanding that the shipment was placed in storage upon receipt. 
The investigation will determine the integrity of the shipping containers and their 
contents during the foreign military sales process. 
The United States is making all appropriate notifications in the spirit of candor and 
openness in an effort to avoid any misunderstanding.  Lieutenant General Carter Ham 
will talk you through the procedures followed during recovery. 
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Carter. 
GEN. HAM:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 
As the secretary indicated, when we became fully aware of the circumstances of these 
misshipped items, U.S. personnel took action to first secure and then to regain custody of 
the items.  This was accomplished within a few hours of our becoming aware, fully 
aware, of the circumstances. 
U.S. Pacific Command then initiated actions to recover the items, maintaining U.S. 
custody, and then to transport the items back to U.S. control.  The items are now back 
under positive control at a U.S. base.  I'll be followed by the principal deputy 
undersecretary of Defense, Mr. Ryan Henry. 
MR. HENRY:  I'm here on behalf of Secretary Gates, who has made it a personal priority 
to effectively deal with this matter.  The department will determine the facts and take 
appropriate corrective action regarding this regrettable incident. 
When informed this past Friday morning, the secretary directed the immediate return of 
the equipment to U.S. custody and to its positive control.  The president was 
subsequently notified that day. 
Secretary Gates further ordered the equipment to be expeditiously returned to a secure 
facility in the United States.  And as Carter has let you know, that has now been 
accomplished. 
Additionally the department has initiated a complete physical inventory of all of these 
devices.  The secretary is further directing the secretary of the Air Force and the secretary 
of the Navy to conduct a comprehensive review of all policies, procedures as well as a 
physical site inventory of all nuclear and nuclear-associated material equipment across 
their respective programs. 
Finally the secretary signed out, this morning, a memorandum directing Admiral 
Kirkland Donald, director, Navy Nuclear Propulsion, with the support of the 
undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, to conduct a 
comprehensive investigation, to determine the facts, into how this error occurred and who 
is accountable throughout the chain of command. 
This tasking memo will be available at the conclusion of this briefing. 
Admiral Donald will be assisted by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service and 
elements of the intelligence community. Subject to his statutory obligation, this will be 
his principal tasking for the duration of the investigation. 
The appropriate congressional oversight authorities have been notified, beginning 
yesterday.  The government of China and the authorities in Taiwan have also been 
notified.  This intended shipment to Taiwan of batteries for a utility helicopter was 
consistent with our one China policy, the three joint U.S.-China communiques and the 
Taiwan Relations Act.  Our security assistance to Taiwan is defensive in character and 
makes available defensive articles and services as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to 
maintain a sufficient self- defense capability.  Our policy on Taiwan arms sales have not 
changed. This specific incident was an error in process only, and is not indicative of our 
policies, which remain unchanged. 
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Lastly, I cannot emphasize forcefully enough how strong the secretary feels about this 
matter and how disconcerting it is to him. In an organization as large as DOD, the largest 
and most complex in the world, there will be mistakes.  But they cannot be tolerated in 
the arena of strategic systems, whether they are nuclear or only associated equipment, as 
was in this case. 
We will now be glad to take your questions. 
SEC. WYNNE:  Please. 
Q     Bottom line is that this sounds like a, for lack of a better way to put it, a real screw-
up in the nation's nuclear program, of course, coming after the incident with the missiles 
that flew on the B-52s.  How confident should we be in the security of our nuclear- 
related technology? 
SEC. WYNNE:  Well, actually, the Air Force shipped this device in March of 2005, well 
before the other nuclear incident.  But as Secretary Ryan Henry indicated, the secretary of 
Defense is taking this very seriously.  We are all taking this very seriously.  And it -- and 
though this was not in -- could not be construed as being nuclear material, it is a 
component for a -- you know, the fuse in the nose cone for a nuclear system. 
And so I would tell you that we are very concerned about it.  It was a different supply 
chain that was involved in that whole procedural analysis.  So we are going to conduct 
now a review of all -- under the guidance of the secretary of Defense, both the secretary 
of the Air Force and the secretary of the Navy, among all non-nuclear componentry that 
goes into the nuclear weapons characterization. 
Yes, ma'am. 
Q     Was there anything about this component that is -- that they could glean any 
information out of?  And could they take it and then build one on their own?  And how 
can you be certain it was kept in storage and not at some point analyzed? 
SEC. WYNNE:  That'll come out, I think, as a part of the investigation.  We feel like the 
authorities inside Taiwan acted very responsibly.  I would leave that to Secretary Ryan 
Henry to dispose of, but right now there's no indication. 
Tony? 
Q     How did they act responsibly?  Can you expand on that? 
MR. HENRY:  Yes.  We have no indications from a site inspection of the item that it has 
in any way been tampered with, but that will be part of the further investigation.  That's 
one of the reasons for bringing the intelligence services in, to be able to determine that. 
But again, all our dealings with the Taiwan authorities have been up front and they have 
in no way tried to be uncooperative in any sort of way. 
Additionally, these are first indications, but our communication with experts indicate that 
this is a system that was built and designed in the '60s, and so therefore the technology 
that is in there is quite dated.  But nonetheless, we're taking this extremely seriously and 
we feel quite confident we'll be able to determine if there has been any tampering or 
exploitation. 
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Q     Yes, two quick questions.  A, why isn't the DLA director here?  This doesn't seem 
like an Air Force issue; it's a DLA shipping issue.  And B, why did it take two years to 
find out that these things were shipped improperly? 
MR. HENRY:  The purpose of the investigation Admiral Donald will be conducting is to 
determine where the accountability is.  We've had a team of people who since Friday 
morning have been working very hard on this, worked through the weekend to try to 
determine things.  We are in the process of being able to piece together different elements 
and trying to gain an understanding of what happened.  There are multiple players.  There 
are multiple parties involved. 
And we are -- we'll do a thorough investigation, and those who are responsible will be 
held accountable.  The secretary is quite forceful in this. 
And the different players involved, the director of DLA and other people that are in the 
supply chain, both the Air Force and the regular Defense Department, they are working 
and trying to understand the details.  This was not meant to be a detailed brief; it was to 
give you the facts as we know them for sure today.  Everything else, we're trying to 
gather facts.  Many times they don't -- they don't indicate the same outcome.  And so 
we're trying to eliminate that confusion with the investigation. 
SEC. WYNNE:  Second row. 
Q     Yeah, thank you very much.  A small question, then a bigger question.  What missile 
was this warhead designed for? 
SEC. WYNNE:  The component was aimed at a Minuteman. 
Q     And a larger question.  Even if this was an error, even if it wasn't intentional, has the 
United States by this shipment violated international law, treaty obligations or such 
vehicles as the Missile Technology Control Regime? 
MR. HENRY:  That's under analysis now.  The Missile Technology Control Regime is 
self-enforcing, as you're aware.  We are looking at the different items of that.  If there 
was a violation, we are coming forth with it as soon as we became aware of it.  We are 
being totally transparent.  We have corrected the situation.  And if there was something 
that was amiss, it clearly was not intentional.  The United States stands up to its treaty 
obligations.  And we're dealing with this in the most straightforward manner we can. 
SEC. WYNNE:  Yes, ma'am? 
Q     Can you say what -- how this came to light?  How did the United States find out that 
this happened?  Did the Taiwanese government come forward?  And can you also say 
what reaction China has had to this? 
SEC. WYNNE:  I can tell you that it was very responsible on the part of the Taiwanese 
that when they realized what they had, they notified the right authorities and started the 
recovery process. 
MR. HENRY:  Yeah, I would say -- and these are just initial gathering of information -- 
it appears from the -- fairly early on the Chinese indicated to us that they did not have in 
receipt what they had asked for.  We still thought -- 
Q     (Off mike.) 
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MR. HENRY:  Excuse me, I apologize.  The Taiwan authorities indicated that they didn't 
have in possession what they anticipated getting.  We on our side thought we were 
talking about different sorts of batteries.  There was an effort to resolve and to reimburse 
them. It wasn't until this past week that we became aware that they had something akin to 
a nose cone assembly, at which time elements in the field worked that for a couple days 
to get resolution. 
Once we thought we understood what the part number was, the Pentagon became aware 
of that, on Thursday.  And again I've taken you through the sequence of events since 
then. 
So there were early communications, but we thought we were hearing one thing.  In 
reality, they were saying something different. 
Q     And China's reaction? 
MR. HENRY:  We have spoken to the Chinese authorities and we will continue to have 
dialogue with them.  Again we've been very clear that we think that this is -- that our 
policy has not changed, that there was an error.  There was a mistake in execution, and 
we've notified them as soon as we became aware of it. 
Q     When was that notification from Taiwan, that they had the wrong package? 
MR. HENRY:  Those dates and specific dates will be part of the investigation.  And -- 
Q     Are we talking 2006 or are we talking 2008? 
MR. HENRY:  Again we have different pieces of information.  And as far as when 
people became aware of them, that will be part of the job of Admiral Donald.  Again 
you'll be able to see his tasking memo when he'll be reporting back to the secretary.  And 
as soon as we have definitive answers on those things, we will make them available. 
(Cross talk.) 
Q     Can I just crawl through that timeline again?  I mean, things were shipped in March 
of 2005.  What's the fall 2006? 
SEC. WYNNE:  In fall 2006 is when DLA picked them out of the warehouse, in 
fulfillment of the FMS order, and shipped them to the Republic of China, Taiwan. 
Q     Okay. 
So Taiwan was in, well, had these all the way -- 
SEC. WYNNE:  They put them right into storage, right. 
Q     In storage until Friday. 
SEC. WYNNE:  Until they came out with it. 
And I think the rest of the timeline has to be done by Admiral Donald.  But I would say 
that late last week was when we realized that they were in fact fuses from nose cone 
assemblies. 
Q     But a period before that was when there was ongoing discussion that they had the 
wrong part.  So at least for some period of time before last week, there were ongoing 
discussions between the United States and Taiwan about them not having the right part. 
123 
 
SEC. WYNNE:  I believe so but I'd like for that to come out during Admiral Donald's 
investigation. 
(Cross talk.) 
Q     You may have already covered this. 
Does the fuse, are you able to explain, does the fuse assembly that you're talking about 
involve a firing circuit, a trigger, an igniter?  What exactly are the components of this 
assembly? 
SEC. WYNNE:  Well, there you have it. 
This is the warhead.  This is the electrical component that is the fuse.  And that's what's 
on here. 
Q     Right, but -- I'm so sorry -- was only the fuse shipped, or was the whole -- 
SEC. WYNNE:  Just this. 
Q     So only the electrical component was shipped.  And is that a firing mechanism in 
and of itself -- not in and of itself, but is that an actual firing -- 
SEC. WYNNE:  Well, the fuse is a -- a fuse is a -- it has a small battery in it, and so it is 
the firing mechanism.  But it does not -- obviously, separated, it has no nuclear material 
associated with it. 
MR. HENRY:  So for total accuracy, it sends a simple electrical signal to the weapons 
package, which has its own triggering mechanism. So this is just to tell the triggering 
mechanism within the weapons package to start its sequence of events.  But it's a very 
simple electrical signal.  This is similar to what we find in artillery shells.  It's in many, 
many conventional weapons.  It has to do with sensing proximity to the ground and 
saying when you get within a certain distance to the ground, it sends out the simple single 
-- signal. 
Q     And is there anything about this that is similar in physical appearance to the 
helicopter batteries that Taiwan thought it was buying? 
SEC. WYNNE:  I would say once you set them side by side, no. 
Q     And are these inventoried items?  In other words, are you -- 
SEC. WYNNE:  Yes.  We have these in inventory both at the bases where they're in use 
and at DLA. 
Yes, sir. 
Q     How were they recovered? 
SEC. WYNNE:  How were they recovered? 
GEN. HAM:  Thanks, Mr. Secretary. 
When we became aware of this, of the misshipment and the Taiwanese had these items 
under their control, U.S. military personnel serving a liaison function were able to 
coordinate at the warehouse which these items were stored, to -- first, again, to establish 
security for those items and then later to transport them to a site where they could be 
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under U.S. control until such time as air transportation could be arranged to move them 
on further. 
Q     And so this was all coordinated with the Taiwanese? 
GEN. HAM:  This was with the -- U.S. Pacific Command, at our end, had the lead for 
this, to coordinate through the liaison offices that exist there, yes. 
Q     Could I -- I'm still confused on this fuse.  This fuse has no nuclear components, but 
it could detonate a nuclear warhead, correct? 
SEC. WYNNE:  Well, it is the electrical firing mechanism that allows the rest of the 
system to detonate. 
So I mean, that's what it's used as, just like a fuse on a piece of dynamite. 
Q     (Off mike) -- nuclear weapon? 
SEC. WYNNE:  It has no nuclear material associated with it.  It is an electrical 
component called a fuse. 
MR. HENRY:  It could set off -- (off mike) -- a separate component inside the weapons 
package.  This sends the electrical signal to that trigger to say that it can start its 
sequence. 
Q     This tells the trigger it's time to start firing.  So it's part of the triggering mechanism. 
SEC. WYNNE:  Yes, ma'am? 
(Cross talk.) 
Q     (Off mike.) 
SEC. WYNNE:  Not for me. 
Q     Is it a yes or -- Mr. Henry?  Is it part of the triggering mechanism? 
MR. HENRY:  It is a fuse, the same sort of fuse that you would have in a conventional 
artillery shell, that would send a signal to the explosive charge.  So it is a generic sensing 
proximity fuse for the ground with the battery to help send that electrical signal out. 
The weapons package itself is a -- it's a very complex sequence of events, and that is 
contained in the weapons package, which is immediately behind the fuse assembly. 
SEC. WYNNE:  That was this one. 
Q     That's a yes, right? 
Q     Is this fuse unique to nuclear weapons? 
SEC. WYNNE (?):  No. 
MR. HENRY:  The specific manufacturing of this is done to be made specifically with 
this weapons package.  So you would not be able to use this in any other weapons 
system, nuclear or non-nuclear.  But the mechanism itself is common to many, many 
different weapons. 
Q     But it would only work on that nuclear warhead. 
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MR. HENRY:  This specific one will only work on this weapons package, the Mark-12, 
and no other weapons package. 
Q     And Mark-12 is a nuclear warhead? 
MR. HENRY:  And this is -- yes. 
Q     But the simple question was if it's part of the triggering mechanism, and the answer 
is yes, it is part of the triggering -- 
MR. HENRY:  It's a matter of how you use your definitions, and it depends -- triggering, 
to us, and in the nuclear arena means something very specific.  Okay.  This does say that 
the weapons package can become active.  So it depends.  If you're defining it in layman's 
terms, the specific way we define it, the triggering mechanism is confined within the -- in 
the weapons package.  But it's a matter of whether you're using our military definitions or 
if you're using a layman's definition. 
SEC. WYNNE:  Yes, ma'am? 
Q     (Off mike) -- can you work out the timeline again?  First you mentioned is March 
2005.  Is that the day Taiwan was notified to -- 
SEC. WYNNE:  No, that was when we declared it excess at FE-1, and if you have excess 
in your storehouse, then you ship it to a central location, which was the Defense Logistics 
Agency warehouse at Hill Air Force Base. 
They maintain the larger stock, and they have control over it.  So we maintain what we 
would call on-site stock, which is a smaller set. And the larger buffer, if you will, in a 
supply sense, is at Hill. 
Q     So Taiwan actually received that in 2006 -- 
SEC. WYNNE:  So then in 2006, then the Defense Logistics Agency picked up this 
shipping container, four of them, and shipped it to Taiwan in response to a foreign 
military sales case for helicopter batteries. 
Q     Well, since there's -- you know, there is no nuclear material associated, what -- can 
you tell us the impact, you know, why this becomes so sensitive? 
SEC. WYNNE:  Well, I would say, first of all, as was indicated before, this is a part and 
parcel of our strategic weapons systems. We had an incident.  We want to be very 
sensitive to that nuclear incident.  We did control all of the nuclear aspects, and here we 
have something that is, as you say, non-nuclear component.  And the question before the 
secretary, which he'd like answers to, is, should we and do we monitor and proctor this 
side of the nuclear components? And there's a lot of different components that would, if 
you will, comprise our totals.  And that's why he's asked not just the Air Force but also 
the Navy to follow through. 
Yes, ma'am? 
Q     So you say there were four of those together? 
SEC. WYNNE:  There were four batteries asked for and there were four containers 
shipped. 
Q     And all four had this in them? 
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SEC. WYNNE:  All four had the same device in them. 
Q     Can you say at this point whether -- first of all, they were sent to this other facility 
because they were in excess where they were.  So was it -- was it these nose cones that 
were in excess, or was it helicopter batteries that were in excess and the mistake was 
made there? 
SEC. WYNNE:  That's for the -- for Admiral Donald to discern. 
I can't -- I can't go into that right now because I'm -- we're looking at it. 
Q     Was it one fuse in each container, or there's more than one in each container? 
SEC. WYNNE:  No.  There's one fuse in each container. 
(Cross talk.) 
Yes, sir. 
Q     How closely are these normally monitored, these assemblies? And what were they -- 
what was supposed to happen to them at DLA once they were shipped? 
SEC. WYNNE:  I'm going from memory now because I'm not Defense Logistics Agency. 
But when they arrive at a shipping dock, there's a classified storage and an unclassified 
storage.  And these went to the unclassified storage.  They should have gone to the 
classified storage.  There is a classified storage there. 
Q     And how carefully are they normally monitored? 
SEC. WYNNE:  We reconcile quarterly to, and each location is reconciled quarterly, to 
make sure that there's been no pilferage or loss.  So that's what the secretary is very 
concerned about, is that this clearly is an escape from that process. 
MR. HENRY:  I might add that we have had the opportunity to have a team working this 
through the weekend, giving up their Easter holiday to try to understand this. 
We -- it was not crystal clear exactly what happened.  We took this to the secretary, let 
him know that there were some differences in understanding what the records mean.  
There were some differences in understanding what the sequence of events are.  And 
therefore we suggested, and he readily took the -- went forward with the idea that we do a 
real investigation into this. 
And so as you start to ask all these logistics questions and what went where, when is, 
there are bits and piece of information, indicate it might have happened one way.  But we 
really don't know and we really think it's too early to start to speculate exactly what the 
sequence of events were, what the interactions were between multiple agencies.  That's 
the purpose of the investigation. 
The secretary has tasked Admiral Donald to move with alacrity, to get back to him with 
an interim report very quickly.  And as we understand these things, and we can come to 
you with rather than what may have been, what actually is, then we'll come forward, 
those things.  But to continue to dig into the little bits and pieces we know right now, we 
really don't think is helpful, because many of them could be proved wrong as we gather 
more facts. 
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Q     Just to be clear about what has been said today already, I think what I've heard is 
that March 2005, they were shipped to the DLA and put in unclassified storage when they 
should have been put in classified storage.  Is that correct?  And who made that error? 
SEC. WYNNE:  That actually is some speculation on my part as to what their transit was.  
And as to your second part of your question, that's what Admiral Donald is empowered 
for. 
Q     So we don't know who's doing that shipment, who's moving them at that point in 
2005? 
SEC. WYNNE:  What we do know is they were shipped from F.E. Warren to Hill Air 
Force Base.  And as I said, that was some speculation on my part that they -- they have 
classified storage, I'm aware of that, but remember, I was going from some distant 
memory. And this was picked from unclassified storage for processing to the -- for the 
FMS case.  As to what happened between arrival and departure is for Admiral Donald to 
surmise. 
STAFF:  We have time for just one or two more. 
SEC. WYNNE:  Yes, sir. 
Q     Going back on the timeline a bit, can you tell us when the secretary was told about 
this and when, then, he informed -- I would assume he informed the White House, when -
- 
MR. HENRY:  As I mentioned in my statement, he was informed this last Friday 
morning, at which time he directed the steps to secure the material, put it under positive 
control and return it to the United States to a secure facility, all of which has been done.  
That day, the president was notified. 
Q     Initially, though, it was Thursday, you said, that the Pentagon kind of figured out 
what -- 
MR. HENRY:  Thursday afternoon, different elements here in the Pentagon, the Air 
Force and on the secretary's staff, learned of this. They verified what they were getting.  
This, as you can imagine, was somewhat unusual to come forward.  So they wanted to 
make sure they were coming forward with accurate information.  That happened over a 
matter of hours.  After the close of business Friday afternoon, different senior officials 
were notified.  They gathered more facts and then notified the secretary Friday morning 
as he came into work. 
SEC. WYNNE:  One more question. 
Q     Mr. Secretary, you just said that they reconcile the inventory quarterly.  Is that 
correct? 
SEC. WYNNE:  That's their normal procedure. 
Q     So there were arguably six to eight different inventories at which time these four 
fuses were never -- it was never realized that these fuses were missed? 
SEC. WYNNE:  That's the concern. 
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Q     I mean, is that -- is there a larger concern at this point? I know you guys are -- you're 
going to undergo this large investigation, but is there a larger concern that there's other 
potentially dangerous material -- 
SEC. WYNNE:  Well, the secretary's actually asked the secretary of the Air Force and 
the Navy to essentially arrive at that comprehensive review. 
But suffice it to say here that we have done a real scrub, for this particular part, and have 
identified and found all of the ones that we are aware of. 
(Cross talk.) 
Thank you very much. 
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Appendix Z 
The White House Regular Briefing  
 
Dana Perino – Briefer 
March 25, 2008 
Federal News Service 
(only relevant section included) 
Q     Dana, when was the president first briefed about the missile parts that were 
mistakenly sent to Taiwan?  What was his reaction?  And does he still have confidence in 
the Air Force leadership, considering this is now the second example of nuclear- related 
equipment being mishandled? 
MS. PERINO:  I do know that the president was briefed.  I don't know exactly when, but 
it would have been recently.  But he appreciates that they are taking action, and there is a 
full investigation under way.  And he's glad that the result is that they got the parts back.  
But he'll be interested to hear what the results are from that investigation. 
Q     Does he still have confidence in the Air Force leadership? 
MS. PERINO:  Yes.  Yes, he does. 
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Appendix AA 
Nuclear Parts Sent To Taiwan In Error; U.S. Just Learned Of 2006 Mix-Up 
 
Josh White 
March 26, 2008 
Washington Post 
 
The Defense Department mistakenly shipped secret nuclear missile fuses to Taiwan more 
than 18 months ago and did not learn that the items were missing until late last week, 
Pentagon officials acknowledged yesterday, deepening concerns about the security of the 
U.S. nuclear arsenal. 
Officials with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) sent four nose-cone fuse assemblies 
to Taiwan in August 2006 instead of four replacement battery packs for use in Taiwan's 
fleet of UH-1 Huey helicopters. The fuses help trigger nuclear warheads on Minuteman 
intercontinental ballistic missiles as they near their point of impact. It was unclear 
yesterday how the two very different items were mixed up at a warehouse at Hill Air 
Force Base in Utah and how they were shipped  out of the country without notice.  
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates immediately ordered an investigation, the second 
such probe in the past year to examine serious lapses in the care of U.S. nuclear weapons 
and accessories. Gates learned of the erroneous shipment on Friday and informed 
President Bush, but officials waited until yesterday --  after Saturday's elections in 
Taiwan -- to disclose  the incident. Pentagon and State Department officials have 
conferred with Taiwanese and Chinese diplomats over the past three days. 
"In an organization as large as DOD, the largest and most complex in the world, there 
will be mistakes," said Ryan Henry, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for 
policy, speaking at the Pentagon yesterday. "But they cannot be tolerated in the arena of 
strategic systems, whether they are nuclear or only associated equipment, as was in this 
case." Gates found the incident "disconcerting," he added. 
In August, the Air Force lost track of six nuclear warheads for 36 hours when they were 
inadvertently flown on a B-52 bomber between bases in North Dakota and Louisiana. 
The incident exposed security flaws and raised similar questions about the safety of U.S. 
nuclear weapons. 
Senior defense officials said it was almost certainly human error that led to the nose 
cones being shipped,  and Air Force officials were concerned the classified items were 
placed in an unclassified area of a DLA warehouse and not properly tracked. Quarterly 
inventory checks over the past 18 months did not show   the nose cones were missing. 
A DLA spokesman  did not respond   to questions about the incident. A spokeswoman for 
the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office,  Taiwan's principal 
representative office in the United States,  declined to comment. 
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Missile defense experts said the United States may have violated nuclear nonproliferation 
agreements and U.S. export laws by sending the items to Taiwan. Such treaties and 
regimes are designed to prevent the transfer of nuclear technologies between countries, 
and sensitive nuclear missile parts are among the most regulated items. 
"This is a case of horrifying mismanagement of the inventory at this location," said 
Leonard S. Spector, deputy director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies. "But it does seem more like mismanagement rather than a nefarious scheme to 
get them to Taiwan." 
Since 2003, the Air Force had made 139 separate transfers of classified parts between 
F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming and the base in Utah -- mainly to store excess 
parts in a DLA warehouse -- and  only the March 2005 transfer of four nose cones was 
misplaced,  two defense officials said. How that oversight occurred will be at the center 
of the investigation. 
Taiwan received four drum-shaped packages from the United States in August 2006 and 
placed them, unopened, into storage. Taiwanese officials realized only recently that the 
packages contained the nose cones when they went looking for the helicopter batteries, 
according to U.S. defense officials. 
In trying to arrange reimbursement for the missing battery packs, U.S. officials 
determined that the drums contained classified material, quickly secured the items and 
returned them to the United States. 
Henry and Air Force Secretary Michael W. Wynne said the Taiwanese did not appear to 
tamper with the items, which contain 1960s-era technology, and that the nose cones 
would not have been dangerous on their own because they  work only with U.S. missile 
technology. Of greater concern to senior U.S. officials is  that classified nuclear-related 
items  left  U.S. control, reached the hands of a foreign military and went  without notice 
for so long. 
U.S. foreign military sales to Taiwan totaled nearly $10 billion in deliveries from 1999 
through 2006, second only to Saudi Arabia, which received $13.3 billion, according to a 
report by the Congressional Research Service. Sales to Taiwan have included numerous 
weapons systems -- from helicopters and tanks to air defense missiles and radar systems -
- as well as parts and services. 
Beijing regards Taiwan as a breakaway province and has more than 700 ballistic missiles 
pointed at the island.  Much of China's military buildup appears aimed at achieving air 
and sea superiority in any conflict with Taiwan. 
The United States has long maintained a "one China" policy -- acknowledging that both 
China and Taiwan say Taiwan is part of China -- while supporting Taiwan with arms 
sales. In  discussions with U.S. officials, the Chinese have argued that one of  three 
communiques governing U.S.-China relations, signed in 1982, requires the United States 
to reduce arms sales to Taiwan. 
But President Ronald Reagan, who signed the communique, at the same time secretly 
signed a one-page memo stating that the communique restricted U.S. arms sales only if 
the balance of power between Taiwan and China was preserved. 
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Joseph Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, said the nose-cone incident 
underscores how Washington has "too many nuclear weapons with too little control over 
them." He said he worries that the incident will raise Chinese suspicions that Taiwan is 
restarting its nuclear program -- it  does not now have nuclear capabilities -- and could 
spur China to assume a more aggressive stance. 
"Imagine how we would feel if the Russians accidentally shipped warhead fuses to 
Tehran," Cirincione said. "We'd be going nuts right now. It would be hard for them to 
convince us that it was an accident." 
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Appendix AB 
U.S. Initially Unconcerned About Erroneous Shipment 
 
Josh White and Glenn Kessler 
March 27, 2008 
Washington Post 
 
After Taiwanese officials reported in early 2007 that four packages they had received 
from the U.S. military did not contain the helicopter batteries they had expected, U.S. 
officials suggested that Taiwan simply dispose of the incorrect items -- which turned out 
to be parts for U.S. nuclear missiles. 
In e-mail correspondence over several months between U.S. defense officials and 
Taiwan, the U.S. officials assumed that the erroneous shipment simply contained the 
wrong type of batteries, not that Taiwan had received four classified nuclear-related items 
that never should have left U.S. soil.  
U.S. government officials familiar with the communications said yesterday that at some 
point between August 2006 and last week, Taiwan opened the drum-shaped packages and 
noticed that the items inside were labeled "secret" and that they included Mark 12 nose 
cones, which are used with U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles. 
Since early 2007, Taiwan had been asking U.S. officials to either reimburse it  for the 
missing batteries or replace them, as part of billions of dollars in U.S. military sales to 
Taiwan over the past decade. But after the situation was resolved and U.S. authorities 
told the Taiwanese to get rid of the items they had received -- missing warning signs of a 
serious breach -- the Taiwanese double-checked the packages because of worries that 
discarding them could be dangerous. 
Taiwan last week alerted U.S. authorities that it  believed the military had shipped  items 
related to U.S. "warheads," sparking alarm at the highest levels of the Pentagon. It is 
unclear when the Taiwanese  opened the packages and how long they knew they had 
classified U.S. materials in their possession, but the drums were in a  warehouse for more 
than 18 months while the United States did not know the sensitive materials were 
missing. 
"Last week they said they didn't think they could destroy these items and said it was 
warhead-related material," said one U.S. government official, who like others spoke on 
the condition of anonymity because the incident is under investigation. "That was the first 
time there was any indication we weren't dealing with a battery. All the alarm bells went 
off at that point." 
The parts that the United States shipped to Taiwan are Mark 12 nose-cone assemblies, 
which have 1960s technology and are being phased out by the Air Force in favor of nose 
cones compatible with newer Mark 12A warheads for its Minuteman III missiles. There 
are about 700 Mark 12 assemblies in the U.S. inventory, and the Air Force has been 
shipping excess to the Pentagon's Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for storage at an air 
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base in Utah. The assemblies do not contain nuclear material but help trigger a detonation 
as a ballistic missile nears its target. 
U.S. officials said yesterday  it appears that workers at the DLA initially did not 
determine that the materials Taiwan received were classified because the outside of the 
packages had unclassified inventory codes that indicated they contained batteries. 
Quarterly inventory checks -- about 10 of them -- also missed the error, and the 
discrepancy was not discovered until Thursday. Air Force and DLA spokesmen declined 
to comment and referred questions to the Pentagon. 
"Once the error was verified, the department took immediate action to acquire positive 
control of the equipment and commence the recovery process," said Brian Whitman, a 
Pentagon spokesman. "Positive control was gained in hours, not days." 
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates learned of the error late last week, informed President 
Bush and immediately ordered an investigation, which will focus on whether the Air 
Force properly labeled the packages for shipment to the DLA and then how the DLA 
stored, tracked and shipped them overseas. Authorities said the packages were 
inappropriately stored in an unclassified warehouse and that the outer packages might 
have been mislabeled. 
The incident has been embarrassing to Defense Department officials charged with 
securing and maintaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal and has added tension to the 
relationship between the United States and China. 
China responded sternly yesterday to the news of the erroneous shipment, issuing a 
vehement protest, warning of "disastrous consequences" and demanding a thorough 
investigation. 
The response reflected the depth of Chinese opposition to U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan, 
a self-ruled island that Beijing maintains is a part of China. In particular, China has 
responded with irritation to a recent effort by the Taiwanese Defense Ministry to buy 
advanced F-16 warplanes to enhance its fleet of older F-16s bought from Washington a 
decade ago. 
Bush administration officials said the nose-cone assemblies had been returned and that 
U.S. diplomats contacted China and Taiwan to explain the error after it was discovered 
last week. But the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it expects more 
information about what occurred and that the shipment could affect relations between 
Washington and Beijing. 
"We demand that the U.S. side thoroughly investigate this matter and report to China in a 
timely manner the details of the situation and eliminate the negative effects and 
disastrous consequences created by this incident," said a declaration attributed to Qin 
Gang, a ministry spokesman. "We urge the U.S. side to keep the promises they have 
made . . . and stop weapons sales and military contacts with Taiwan to avoid endangering 
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the improvement in Sino-U.S. relations." 
In a phone conversation yesterday between Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao, the 
subject of the errant delivery came up briefly, according to national security adviser 
Stephen J. Hadley. "It came up very briefly, and basically the president indicated that a 
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mistake had been made," Hadley told reporters. "There [was] very little discussion about 
it." 
Such classified materials are supposed to be closely monitored, and defense officials said 
the shipment to Taiwan almost certainly occurred because of human error. 
"The investigation will determine the integrity of the shipping containers and their 
contents during the foreign military sales process," said Air Force Secretary Michael 
Wynne, in announcing the erroneous shipment on Tuesday. 
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Appendix AC 
Gates orders full inventory of U.S. nuclear weapons 
 
March 28, 2008 
Bismarck Tribune 
 
WASHINGTON (AP) - Defense Secretary Robert Gates has ordered a full inventory of 
all nuclear weapons and related materials after the mistaken delivery of ballistic missile 
fuses to Taiwan, the Pentagon said Thursday.  
Gates told officials with the Air Force, Navy and Defense Logistics Agency to assess 
inventory control procedures for the materials and to submit a report within 60 days. 
Earlier this week, Gates directed Navy Adm. Kirkland H. Donald to take charge of a full 
investigation of the delivery mistake in which four cone-shaped electrical fuses used in 
intercontinental ballistic missile warheads were shipped to the Taiwanese instead of the 
helicopter batteries they had ordered. 
It was the second nuclear-related mistake involving the military that has been revealed in 
recent months. In August an Air Force B-52 bomber was mistakenly armed with six 
nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and flown from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale 
Air Force Base, La. 
Gates orders full inventory of U.S. nuclear weapons, related materials after mistaken 
delivery. 
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Appendix AD 
 
5th Bomb Wing flunks nuclear inspection 
 
Michael Hoffman  
May 30, 2008  
Military Times 
The 5th Bomb Wing at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., has failed its much-anticipated 
defense nuclear surety inspection, according to a Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
report. 
DTRA inspectors gave the wing an ―unsatisfactory‖ grade Sunday after uncovering many 
crucial mistakes during the weeklong inspection, which began May 17. They attributed 
the errors primarily to lack of supervision and leadership among security forces. 
Inspectors from Air Combat Command also participated, but the Air Force refused to 
provide specifics on their findings. 
Security broke down on multiple levels during simulated attacks across the base, 
including against nuclear weapons storage areas, according to the DTRA report, a copy 
of which was obtained by Air Force Times. 
Inspectors watched as a security forces airman played video games on his cell phone 
while standing guard at a ―restricted area perimeter,‖ the DTRA report said. Meanwhile, 
another airman nearby was ―unaware of her duties and responsibilities‖ during the 
exercise. 
The lapses are baffling, given the high-level focus on Minot since last August, when 5th 
Bomb Wing airmen mistakenly loaded six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles onto a B-52 
Stratofortress and flew them to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., where the plane sat on the 
flight line, unattended, for hours. That incident not only embarrassed the Air Force, but 
raised concerns worldwide about the deterioration in U.S. nuclear safety standards. 
Col. Joel Westa took command of the 5th Bomb Wing following that fiasco. After it 
failed an initial nuclear surety inspection, or dry run, in December, Westa acknowledged 
this inspection was going to be the ―most scrutinized inspection in the history of time.‖ 
Even so, airmen were unprepared. 
―Overall their assessment painted a picture of some things we need to work on in the 
areas of training and discipline,‖ Westa said in a statement. 
His airmen are working diligently to correct deficiencies, he said. 
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Inspectors from Air Combat Command will now return to Minot in August to determine 
if the necessary improvements have been made. Eventually, the wing will have to pass a 
full defense nuclear surety inspection. 
Although the wing failed, it will keep its certification to handle nuclear weapons and will 
carry on with training right up to the day ACC inspectors revisit the base, said Maj. 
Thomas Crosson, a command spokesman. The base lost its certification immediately after 
the incident last August and didn‘t have it restored until March 31, after it passed a 
second dry run. 
The wing will participate in both a Red Flag exercise this summer and a nuclear readiness 
operation exercise as it prepares for the inspectors‘ next visit, Crosson said. 
DTRA inspectors gave the wing passing grades in nine of 10 areas they examined, 
including safety and technical operations, but failed it for its nuclear security. 
―The most serious failure is the one regarding security, which is exactly what the Minot 
incident was all about,‖ said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project 
at the Federation of American Scientists. 
Litany of failure 
The DRTA report highlighted an incredible number of gaffes: 
* An internal security response team didn‘t respond to its ―pre-designated defensive 
fighting position‖ during an attack on the weapon storage area, leaving an entire side of 
the maintenance facility vulnerable to enemy fire. 
* Security forces didn‘t clear a building upon entering it, which allowed inspectors to 
―kill‖ three of those four airmen. 
* Security forces failed to use the correct entry codes, issued that week, to allow certain 
personnel into restricted areas. 
* Security forces airmen failed to properly check an emergency vehicle for unauthorized 
personnel when it arrived at a weapons storage area, or search it correctly once it left. 
* While wing airmen simulated loading an aircraft with nuclear weapons, security forces 
airmen failed to investigate vulnerabilities on the route from the storage area to the flight 
line, and didn‘t arm three SF airmen posted at traffic control points along that route. 
* While on the aircraft, one flight of security forces airmen didn‘t understand key nuclear 
surety terminology, including the ―two-person concept‖ — the security mechanism that 
requires two people to arm a nuclear weapon in case the codes fall into the hands of an 
airman gone bad. 
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―Security forces‘ level of knowledge, understanding of assigned duties, and response to 
unusual situations reflected a lack of adequate supervision,‖ wrote the DTRA team chief. 
Security forces leaders rarely visited their airmen on post, and routine exercises ―were 
neither robust nor taken to their logical conclusion,‖ according to the report. 
After reviewing base records, inspectors found ―leaders were unengaged [in] the proper 
supervision of SF airmen.‖ 
―If the leadership is still unengaged after all that has happened with the warheads, the 
missing ballistic missile fuses and problems with the first inspection, then they‘re not fit 
to have this mission,‖ Kristensen said. ―It‘s really frightening.‖ 
Security forces errors made up the majority of the 14-page DTRA inspection report, but 
inspectors found fault with other parts of operations, including late status reports and 
major errors in the wing‘s personnel reliability program, which dictates who can handle 
nukes. 
While reviewing records, inspectors found one individual cleared to handle nukes had 
been ―diagnosed for alcohol abuse‖ but was allowed to keep his certification, according 
to the report. 
More fallout? 
Immediately after the loss of control over the six nuclear warheads last August, the 
former 5th Bomb Wing commander was fired, along with three other high-ranking 
officers. Sixty-nine airmen temporarily lost their certification to handle nukes. 
Crosson said there are no plans to fire any ―key personnel‖ now. He did not rule out 
punitive actions for other airmen, however. 
This latest setback comes shortly after Air Force officials announced plans to form a new 
B-52 squadron at Minot, which will allow one bomber squadron to focus solely on the 
nuclear mission. The move is largely in response to the findings of a blue ribbon panel, 
which told Congress the bomber force had lost sight of the nuclear mission due to the 
heavy demands of supporting troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
―Several of the senior [Defense Department] people interviewed believe that the decline 
in focus has been more pronounced than realized and too extreme to be acceptable,‖ 
according to a report written by a Defense Science Board task force headed by retired Air 
Force Gen. Larry Welch, a former chief of staff. 
Considering the level of resources dedicated to ensuring the 5th Bomb Wing could meet 
standards — including the arrival of new senior noncommissioned officers from other 
bases — Kristensen said he worries about nuclear security not only at Minot but across 
the service. 
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―It makes you wonder what‘s going on elsewhere, like the nuclear weapons stationed at 
bases overseas, and at Barksdale Air Force Base and Whiteman Air Force Base,‖ he said. 
ACC officials said the command will continue to support the 5th Bomb Wing‘s 
leadership and provide the manning to fix security problems. 
―We take our responsibilities to protect and safeguard weapons with the utmost 
seriousness, and understand there is zero tolerance for errors,‖ according to an ACC 
statement. 
Airmen with the 5th Bomb Wing can expect more long hours ahead as the wing 
scrambles to fix its security holes before ACC inspectors return. 
―They really need to drill their people to make sure this can‘t happen,‖ Kristensen said. 
It‘s not the first time airmen at Minot have heard such warnings. 
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Appendix AE 
 
Air Force Unit's Nuclear Weapons Security Is 'Unacceptable' 
 
Walter Pincus 
May 31, 2008 
Washington Post 
 
The same Air Force unit at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota that was responsible 
for mishandling six nuclear cruise missiles last August failed key parts of a nuclear safety 
inspection this past weekend, according to a Defense Department report.  
The 5th Bomb Wing was given an "unacceptable" grade in security of nuclear weapons, 
according to the review by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. In another category, 
management and administration, it received a grade of "marginal," based on deficiencies 
in recording changes  that affected the operational status of nuclear cruise missiles and 
gravity bombs. 
Those are two areas where failures last summer allowed a B-52 at Minot to be loaded 
with six air-launched cruise missiles and flown to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana 
without the pilots, air or ground crews knowing they contained nuclear warheads. 
Among the problems found during last week's inspection: Internal security forces did not 
go to assigned defensive areas during an exercise that involved an attempt to steal a 
nuclear weapon; security guards failed to search an emergency vehicle that entered and 
left the nuclear storage area during that exercise; a security guard used his cellphone to 
play video games while on duty; and guards were unarmed at traffic control points along 
the route where nuclear weapons were to travel. 
While 5th Bomb Wing units received passing grades in the remaining eight categories, 
agency inspectors concluded that security forces' lack of knowledge of their duties 
represented "a lack of supervision" and a "lack of training," according to the report. 
The test failure was first reported yesterday by Air Force Times. 
Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of 
American Scientists, who has seen the report, said yesterday that "this certainly requires a 
closer look than we have so far, because these are serious issues." 
Maj. Thomas Crosson, spokesman for Air Combat Command, which supervises the 5th 
Bomb Wing, said yesterday that he would neither confirm nor deny the contents of the 
defense agency's report. He said they would not be released. 
"There are areas identified as needing improvement," Crosson said. He said 5th Bomb 
Wing units will be reinspected in 90 days by the command's inspector general. In the 
interim, however, he said the wing will not lose its certification to handle nuclear 
weapons. 
Col. Joel Westa, who took over the wing after last summer's incident, had warned his 
subordinates that the inspection would be tough. On Thursday, in a commentary on the 
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Minot Air Force Base Web site, he praised two units of the wing that received good 
grades but made no mention of the poor ones. 
After investigations that followed the August incident, the 5th Bomb Wing lost its 
certification, and personnel at every Air Force base with nuclear weapons had to go 
through retraining. Five officers, including the 5th Bomb Wing commander, lost their 
jobs along with some noncommissioned officers. 
The Minot unit was recertified two months ago, after increased training and several 
practice runs. 
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Appendix AF 
 
Defense Department Briefing Regarding Nuclear Surety 
 
Robert Gates – Briefer 
June 5, 2008 
Federal News Service 
SEC. GATES:  I'm here today to provide a summary of the investigation into the 
shipment of sensitive missile components to Taiwan, and to announce the resulting 
actions and decisions.  A copy of this statement, which I confess is a little long, and a fact 
sheet will be available after the press conference. 
A credible nuclear deterrent has been essential to our security as a nation.  And it remains 
so today.  The safety, security and reliability of our nuclear weapons and associated 
components are or paramount importance. 
Our policy is clear.  We will ensure the complete physical control of nuclear weapons.  
And we will properly handle their associated components at all times.  It is a tremendous 
responsibility and one we must and will never take lightly.  
On March 25th of this year, I appointed Admiral Kirkland H. Donald, director of Naval 
Propulsion, to conduct a thorough investigation into the facts and circumstances 
regarding the misshipment of four MK-12 forward-section reentry vehicle assemblies to 
Taiwan. 
Admiral Donald holds the most senior position in our military, dedicated to the safe and 
effective employment of nuclear technology in defense of the nation.  Admiral Donald 
has completed his investigation.  And I have received his final report. 
Let me summarize the findings of Admiral Donald's investigation. First, the investigation 
did not find anything that would affect the health and safety of the public or our men and 
women in uniform or call into question the safety, security and reliability of our nuclear 
arsenal. 
Second, the integrity of the nation's nuclear deterrent force was not placed at risk as a 
result of this mis-shipment.  MK forward section assemblies are devices that arm and 
fuse nuclear warheads. They do not contain explosives or fissile material and are not 
inherently dangerous. 
Further, the investigation yielded no evidence that the forward section assemblies were 
compromised when they were out of U.S. custody, nor was there ever any compromise of 
control of nuclear materials. 
Having said that, this incident represents a significant failure to ensure the security of 
sensitive military components.  And more troubling, it depicts a pattern of poor 
performance that was highlighted to us following last year's incident involving the 
improper movement of nuclear weapons between Minot Air Force Base and Barksdale 
Air Force Base. 
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The specific cause of this event was the Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency's sole 
reliance on and lack of compliance with existing supply system procedures to provide 
positive control of the four forward section assemblies.  The supply system is designed to 
move and control large quantities of typically low-value material, and mistakes do occur.  
However, mistakes are not acceptable when shipping and controlling sensitive, classified 
parts. 
Additional controls that would have been appropriate were not used.  Moreover, existing 
procedures were not always followed.  Based on Admiral Donald's initial assessment 
provided to me in April, I directed the Air Force, the Navy and Defense Logistics Agency 
to conduct a comprehensive inventory of all nuclear and nuclear-related materials, to 
reestablish positive control of these sensitive, classified components.  These actions have 
been completed, and the results are being evaluated. 
However, those actions only address the immediate problem. 
During the course of the investigation, other issues indicating a decline in the Air Force's 
nuclear mission focus and performance became apparent.  Rather than an isolated 
occurrence, the shipment of the four forward-section assemblies to Taiwan was a 
symptom of a degradation of the authority, standards of excellence and technical 
competence within the nation's ICBM force.  Similar to the bomber- specific August 
2007 Minot-Barksdale nuclear weapons transfer incident, this incident took place within 
the larger environment of declining Air Force nuclear mission focus and performance. 
Specifically, the investigation identified systemic issues associated with this decline.  
First, the investigation identified commonalities between the August 2007 Minot incident 
and this event. Both events involved a chain of failures that led to an unacceptable 
incident.  The investigation determined the Air Force does not have a clear, dedicated 
authority responsible for the nuclear enterprise and who sets and maintains consistent, 
rigorous standards of operation. The investigation concluded that these shortcoming 
resulted from an erosion of performance standards within the involved commands and a 
lack of effective Air Force leadership oversight. 
Second, the investigation found that the failures that led to the misshipment could have 
been prevented had the Air Force's inspection and oversight programs been functioning 
effectively.  The investigation also determined that the lack of a critical self- assessment 
culture in the Air Force nuclear program, and inspection processes that diminish 
ownership at the command level, make it unlikely that systemic weaknesses can be 
discovered and addressed. Overall, the Air Force has not been sufficiently critical of its 
past performance, and that has led to recurring problems of a similar nature. 
Third, the investigation confirmed a declining trend in Air Force nuclear expertise similar 
to findings in other, earlier reports. 
This lack of expertise contributed to involved commands overlooking the problems that 
led to the misshipment. 
Years ago the career path for Air Force personnel in the nuclear field was well 
established and prestigious.  However, the overall mission focus of the Air Force has 
shifted away from this nuclear mission, making it difficult to retain sufficient expertise.  
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The Air Force has not effectively compensated for this diminished expertise through 
training and active career management. 
The report makes clear that these problems and mistakes have their roots in decisions 
made over a period of at least 10 years. Nonetheless, many of the problems leading to the 
Minot and nose cone incidents have been known or should have been known. 
Action is required on two fronts:  first, fixing the structural, procedural and cultural 
problems; and second, ensuring accountability. In terms of addressing the problems, the 
Air Force already has taken initial steps.  However, I believe an outside perspective is 
required to ensure sufficiently far-reaching and comprehensive measures are taken. 
Accordingly, I have asked Dr. James Schlesinger, former secretary of Defense, secretary 
of Energy and director of Central Intelligence, to lead a senior-level task force that will 
recommend improvements necessary to ensure that the highest levels of accountability 
and control are maintained in the stewardship and operation of nuclear weapons, delivery 
vehicles and sensitive components. 
The work of the task force will have two phases.  The first phase, to be completed within 
60 days, will make recommendations on organizational, procedural and policy matters 
involving the Department of the Air Force.  The second phase, to be completed within 
120 days, will examine management and oversight of nuclear weapons and related 
materials and systems across the entire Department of Defense. 
The task force will be drawn from the Defense Policy Board and the Defense Science 
Board.  A copy of the task force's mission statement and charter letter will be provided at 
the end of this briefing. 
The problems identified by the investigation have been developed -- have developed over 
a period of years. 
However, Admiral Donald's report also identified contemporary failures and a lack of 
effective oversight.  Individuals in command and leadership positions not only fell short 
in terms of specific actions, they failed to recognize systemic problems, to address those 
problems or, where beyond their authority to act, to call the attention of superiors to those 
problems.  Each had the leadership responsibility to identify and correct or flag for others 
the structural, procedural and performance deficiencies identified in just a few weeks by 
Admiral Donald. 
The challenge, then, is how and at what level to apply individual accountability.  Here, 
Admiral Donald's report provides guidance.  He concludes, and I quote, "Senior 
leadership accountability also arises from the findings indicative of an overall decline in 
Air Force nuclear weapons stewardship, a problem that has been identified but not 
effectively addressed for over a decade.  Both the Minot-Barksdale nuclear weapons 
transfer incident and the Taiwan misshipment, while different in specifics, have a 
common origin:  the gradual erosion of nuclear standards and a lack of effective oversight 
by Air Force leadership." 
It is my responsibility to ensure that the Air Force is on the right path to correcting the 
systemic and institutional nuclear weapons stewardship problems that have been 
identified.  A substantial number of Air Force general officers and colonels have been 
identified as potentially subject to disciplinary measures, ranging from removal from 
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command to letters of reprimand.  Such measures, whether taken by the Air Force or by 
my direction, might help address the immediate problems but, I have concluded, would 
not adequately address the broader issues involved. 
Accordingly, after discussion with the president and with the support of the chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have accepted the resignation of the secretary of the Air Force 
and the resignation of the chief of staff of the Air Force. 
I will direct the new secretary and the new chief of staff, once confirmed, to evaluate 
each of the individuals identified by Admiral Donald as bearing responsibility in the 
recent incidents and systemic problems, to determine whether and what disciplinary 
measures are warranted, and whether or not they can be part of the solution to the 
problems identified by the investigation. 
In summary, I believe these actions are required because, first, the focus of the Air Force 
leadership has drifted with respect to perhaps its most sensitive mission. 
Second, performance standards in that sensitive area were allowed to degrade. 
Third, only after two internationally sensitive incidents did Air Force leadership apply 
increased attention to the problem. 
And fourth, even then, action to ensure a thorough investigation of what went wrong was 
not initiated by the Air Force leadership but required my intervention. 
Mike Wynne is a dedicated and honorable public servant, and Buzz Moseley has given 
decades of courageous and devoted service to his country.  They both deserve our 
gratitude for their service.  I have enjoyed serving with them, and I deeply regret that the 
issues before us require the actions that I have taken. 
While this is a difficult day for the Air Force, for the Department of Defense and for me, 
it also marks the beginning of a return to the standards of excellence and accomplishment 
for which the Air Force has long been known.  I will make recommendations for a new 
secretary and new Air Force chief of staff shortly. 
Let me close on a personal note.  The Air Force is my service. That is the uniform I wore 
nearly 42 years ago when I first encountered, in the Strategic Air Command, the 
extraordinary men and women who protect and defend our country.  Every day the 
amazing men and women of our Air Force are in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
supporting all the services worldwide and deterring potential adversaries.  They have my 
respect, my support and my commitment to do everything I can, in my remaining time to 
work with them, to sustain the tradition of service and excellence that has been the 
hallmark of the United States Air Force since its inception. 
Thank you. 
Q     Did you conclude that General Moseley and Secretary Wynne were simply 
incapable of changing course and fixing the problems, or were they unwilling to do what 
you wanted them to do? 
SEC. GATES:  I believed that we needed a change of leadership to bring a new 
perspective and to especially underscore the importance of accountability in dealing with 
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these kinds of problems.  As I say, I have the highest respect for both men, but I felt the 
change was needed for a number of these reasons. 
Q     Sir, can you tell us -- the other two pieces of the investigation, into the Navy nuclear 
arsenal and the DLA -- did they find similar problems, or did they get a clean bill of 
health? 
SEC. GATES:  The investigation really did not deal with the Navy part of it.  It did deal 
with the Defense Logistics Agency, identified some problems. 
And there are a couple of disciplinary recommendations that have been made to the 
secretary of the Army. 
Q     Dr. Gates, you have been critical of the Air Force and other officers who have been 
not focused on the current wars.  You used "next war-itis" in one speech.  You criticized 
UAV efforts.  How much do these other issues that you have highlighted in speeches 
regarding the Air Force come into your decisions on a leadership change? 
SEC. GATES:  I've made the decisions that I've made based entirely on Admiral Donald's 
report. 
Q     Sir, this is obviously, as far as I could tell, looking back, an unprecedented move to 
see both the civilian and military leadership of a service removed in this fashion.  What 
does this say about the seriousness with which you view this issue and, you mentioned, 
the most sensitive mission that the Air Force has?  Could you speak a little bit to that? 
SEC. GATES:  I think that really is the crux of it, is the stewardship of our nuclear 
deterrent is the most sensitive mission that we have.  And therefore, I think, the problems 
that have been identified -- despite the fact there was no compromise of the technology, 
despite the fact that there was no danger involved -- the fact that the stewardship itself 
and the declining standards raised questions in the minds of the public as well as 
internationally, in my view, required strong action. 
One more question. 
Q     Sir, you talk about the degradation of focus in terms of nuclear shipping and you talk 
about the critical lack of self- assessment culture.  Can you talk a little bit more about 
that?  I mean, is it beyond the nuclear mission, in the way you see it? 
SEC. GATES:  All of the conclusions that I have described were focused strictly on the 
nuclear mission, on the ICBM force and the bombers.  And I assume high standards of 
excellence elsewhere but, you know, if problems occur, then we'll look at them.  But this 
has been focused -- Admiral Donald's report really focused only on the nuclear mission. 
Q     (Off mike) -- would not have been made had it not been for the Taiwan sale 
mistake?  Is that what you'd sort of conclude? 
SEC. GATES:  I think it was the second incident that prompted me to believe that there 
were serious systemic problems here, a part that went well beyond the incident involving 
Minot and Barksdale.  So the Taiwan incident clearly was the trigger. 
Thank you very much. 
148 
 
Q     (Off mike) -- would you have liked to see a lot of changes after Minot?  Should the 
Air Force have taken more dramatic steps more quickly on the protection of the nuclear 
arsenal? 
SEC. GATES:  Well, I think it goes back to the point that I think that there was, as 
Admiral Donald points out, the lack of critical self-assessment.  And I would just leave it 
at that. 
Thank you. 
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